SERMON I Moral Agency explain'd, and in what Rev. xv. 4. Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy Name? for thou only art Holy. O F all our inquiries concerning the fu- SERM. preme Being, none are more impor- I. tant than those which relate to his moral Character; for that is the immediate foundation of our duty to him, and our hopes from him. An intelligent Agent, poffeffed of an eternal immutable existence, almighty Power, and infinite Knowledge, might be an object of fpeculation which would naturally end in diftrust and horror: But perfect rectitude, equity, and goodness, are considered as practical principles, which fo determine his views, and direct the meafures of his conduct towards other beings, as to be the object of affections, which we know are in the human mind, and of the utmost VOL. II. A con SER M. confequence to its happiness; the objects of I. reverence, efteem, love, truft and a defire of good I. good or evil, and become objects of a diftinct SER M. affection, that, like others, is a fpring of action, influencing and directing our practice. It is this that makes us moral agents, which is the most important part of our conftitu tion. It implies not only intelligence, free agency, and direct affections to other beings, but affections arifing from our reflecting upon characters, affections, and actions morally distinguished, that is, appearing good or evil to our minds, according to a certain invariable standard planted in them. Our highest enjoyment arises from self-approbation, or a consciousness of intire moral affection, and a course of morally good action, so far as human nature can attain to it. And our most intense affection to other beings, accompanied with the greateft, the pureft, the most rational pleasure we know, terminates on the fame characters in them, manifested by their works. Now, if the invifible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly feen, being understood by the things that are made; if from the powers and capacities of the creatures we justly infer his existence and perfections; particularly, if the confcious intelligence and active powers of fome beings formed by him, be a proof of his own felf-original intelligence I. SER M. and activity, may we not in like manner from the moral powers he has given to mankind and other rational creatures infer his moral agency? especially fince this character neceffarily appears to our minds the most excellent and amiable, and of all others the most important to a rational happiness. Is it poffible for any man who believes God to be the father, the designing cause of spirits, of their intelligence, liberty, and all their other rational faculties and enjoyments, to doubt whether he himself is poffeffed of intelligence, liberty, and rational enjoyment? Whether fince he has indued them with a power of self-reflection, particularly, of reviewing their own affections and actions, and judging concerning their rectitude, his own actions and the principles from which they proceed, be not the object of his own understanding and attention? Whether having annexed the highest enjoyment to their self-approbation upon this review, and made their principal happiness to depend upon it, he poffeffes the like, or a more exalted enjoyment in the approbation of his own actions and principles of action? And this being the fum of what we mean by moral-agency, can we doubt whether God be a moral agent? Another I. Another way of apprehending this fubject, SER M, will lead us to the fame conclufion. It has been proved, * and must here be supposed, that God is the defigning cause, the preserver and governor of the world, and all things in it; and from the relations and correfpondencies of things which he has made, and continues to uphold, we difcern his particular ends. Now this implies a Character or a Will, a permanent principle determining him to act after one particular manner, rather than another. But it has been alfo proved + that morality is an eminent part of the human conftitution; that is, the mind of man is fo framed, as when it attains to the full exercife of its rational powers, to be neceffarily fenfible of moral obligations, and to have all the determination to fatisfy them, which is confiftent with the nature of fuch a being, and the nature of virtue itself, i. e. with free-agency in an imperfect state: That morality is of the greatest moment to the perfection and happinefs of every individual, and the whole collective body of mankind: And therefore it must be attributed to our intelligent Creator as the true cause of it, thereby intending thofe very ends, the perfection and happiness of our nature, which it is naturally apt to serve. * Vol. I, A 3 + Vol. I, Serm. 3, |