interest and object of society-the administration of justice, public and private-is involved in the condition of the language. Le droit, (says a standard writer on criminal legislation,) le droit est une langue, une langue qui a de nombreuses et profondes ressemblances avec la langue parlée.* Such is the essential dependence of law upon language, in even its most favourable conditions, where the terms have been defined, and under well-constituted codes. But in a jurisprudence like ours, almost utterly destitute of both these requisites, the consideration of language assumes a remedial importance, in addition to the regular and instrumental. In other words, besides the grammatical and the logical functions simply, which are ordinarily sufficient under written laws, Interpretation here acquires an historic and systematizing efficiency, indispensable to supply, in some degree, the want of a code: for a code is but a classification, and classification (of moral objects) is but a system of terms. The interpreter of the Common Law, instead of at once proceeding to infer synthetically from a defined term or rule, is ordinarily met on the threshold by a pair of previous questions, ("previous," too often, in the parliamentary sense,) namely, whether there be at all a rule appropriate to the category; and if there be, then what it is precisely. In this consists what was called of old, "the glorious uncertainty of the law." The present salvo, no less characteristic, is to pretend it to be the "Inductive Method" applied to Jurisprudence. There is a difference, however, between experimental philosophizing and interpreting the Common Law; and it is this circumstance, exactly, which renders the scientific amelioration of language of peculiar concernment to a country blessed or cursed with such a legislation. The difference is, that in the physical investigation the interrogatory is addressed to veracious nature; in the juridical, to equivocating words, still words.

While, however, our immediate design was thus suitably moderate, it is also true that the practical speciality of the object has not been suffered to affect the philosophical generality of the survey. Nor would there, indeed, have been any rational tendency to this effect. So that, should these essays be found of value on the score of reformative applicability, we are quite willing to renounce the credit, as we have just disclaimed the presumption, of so ambitious a purpose. In truth, it is a spontaneous consequence of our manner of conceiving the subject, and which necessarily renders the exposition alike, though not equally, available to all branches of the entire system of dependent arts. Accordingly, while it may be the writer's to employ its principles in the comparatively limited, however important,

*Rossi, Traité de Droit Pénal.-Liv. iv, ch. 3.

application just specified, others would, we doubt not, find them no less accessible or essential in other equally important departments, whether of practice or speculation, of reform or inquiry. The philosopher (for example) who, adequately up to the demands of his mission and the age, would counteract the empirical tendency of our day to render the sciences at once inaccessible by multiplicity, and barren by minuteness, might find his most popularly impressive argument in the pattern, faint perhaps but faithful, of their mutual dependence and fundamental unity, which would be furnished by the historical analysis we endeavour to describe, of the laws, the logical laws, of language. And for educational purposes-in this country more urgent, perhaps, and intelligible than the abstract exigences of science-this source would, we believe, prove still more usefully as more directly suggestive towards re-organizing, in conformity with the advancing condition of science and the increasing necessities of systematization, our semi-scholastic, shallow, and quack-patched compilations of Grammar, Rhetoric, and of Logic above all. But as a method of treatment pretending with any right to results such as these, must needs be something new in philology, and is, moreover, of a nature (like everything else that is truly scientific) not to be followed advantageously in detail without a previous conception of its general character and course-for these, among other reasons, an outline, but brief as possible, will properly occupy the next and closing article of this series.

ART. XI.-THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION.

The Philosophy of Christian Perfection; embracing a Psychological Statement of the Principles of Christianity on which this Doctrine rests: together with a Practical Examination of the Peculiar Views of several Recent Writers on this Subject. Philadelphia: Sorin & Ball. 1848.

THE doctrine of holiness, or Christian perfection, has not, until a comparatively recent period in the history of the Church, been a subject of much controversy. But while many other doctrines, once controverted with great zeal, have fallen into neglect, this new topic has been brought forward and discussed with various success by various writers, but we trust not without some real advantage to religion. So far as the discussion is wisely conducted, it must have a beneficial tendency, because it familiarizes the human mind with the most elevated practical truths of the gospel; the introduction, how

ever, of a dogmatic and intolerant spirit is to be guarded against as an evil, and an evil especially pernicious in matters of faith. We are not aware that unusual bitterness has marked the progress of this controversy, or that the advocates of perfection have shown themselves less perfect than the common run of religious disputants. On the contrary, we believe the dispute has generally been conducted with eminent candour, and as became men who believed that Christianity, sooner or later, would restore them to perfect holiness. If some exceptions occur, it is no more than might have been expected, and no more than will occur again, if the question continues to be mooted.

All idea of absolute agreement in things merely speculative, on this or any other subject, should at once be abandoned. After eighteen centuries of controversy, the Church is no nearer one, in matters of this kind, than it was at the beginning. This fact suggests the propriety of great forbearance on the part of those engaged in theological disputes; they may prove their doctrines ever so clearly, but it will be labour lost except within a particular circle. The results of controversy have been meagre enough. Indeed, the peculiar barrenness of this method of propagating truth ought long since to have pointed out the better way. That better way is to follow the order of Providence, and respect, rather than extirpate, that variety which exists everywhere in the intellectual, as well as in the physical world. Men of equal goodness and of equal intellect have in all ages differed on abstract questions, nor has it been possible for them to do otherwise than differ. In proportion as they have receded from speculation, and confined themselves to points which can at all be considered fundamental, this difference has become less. And if we could fall back upon what are strictly essentials, and cease to attach such disproportioned importance to other points, unity of faith might at last be attained. No truth, no principle, need be sacrificed; nothing need be done but to repress that spirit of theorizing and dogmatizing, the indulgence of which has filled the world with fancies disguised as the sacred truths of religion. Religious dogmatism is a despicable vice; it is not simply ridiculous, like some other vices, but is malignant to a degree not easily conceived; it strikes at the very constitution of religion, and would banish all piety, by banishing all freedom of soul. Against this fearful evil it is the duty of good men to make whatever resistance they can, though the hope is hardly to be entertained that it will speedily be removed. In the mean time, every effort to harmonize conflicting views, and to soften the asperity of feeling which has been engendered by doctrinal antagonisms, ought

to be favoured, rather than discouraged. If the evil of contention cannot be entirely cured, it must be borne with the best possible grace, and no means left untried which are likely to mitigate its dire effects. An effort of this kind produced the "Philosophy of Christian Perfection."

This work is now known to have been written by the late Professor Caldwell. The author, after adorning for many years an important station in one of our literary institutions, was called to his reward just after the publication of this volume. On its first appearance it was severely reviewed, and pronounced heretical,-thus securing to its author, while he lived, what Dr. Johnson calls the second degree of good fortune. He said the first thing to be desired by an author was, to have his work approved, the second, to have it censured, and the worst of all was, to have it fall dead from the press, attracting neither praise nor blame. The general object of the work is thus stated by the author :—

"In the treatise upon which we now enter we propose to interrogate our psychology, that we may see whether science, as the handmaid of revelation, can be made to aid in giving us any clearer views of the moral constitution of man, or any more definite ideas of the moral perfections made attainable by him. Instead of propounding any new theory of Christian perfection, our object will be, in the first few chapters, to discuss some general principles, and, so far as we are able, to render intelligible to those acquainted with the modern terms of metaphysical science, the great system of Bible truth, as we suppose it to be understood and interpreted by evangelical Christian writers generally; and then, by the aid of the light we may thus obtain, to see how far this will tend to reconcile the conflicting views of those who have, from time to time, engaged in the discussion of the subject now immediately before us. The disuse, therefore, of all technical language, even though it may be the language of Scripture, so far as it has been employed in different senses, will not be deemed affectation. It will, indeed, be readily seen, that the employment of such language would entirely countervail the object we have in view, which is, not to support, nor indeed to overturn, any existing theory; but rather to see to what extent the various theories may be reconciled with each other." P. 11.

The design is certainly commendable; and the only question that can be raised is in reference to the method adopted. Can a psychological investigation throw any light upon a doctrine of Scripture? Many will, no doubt, take the negative of this position; but we cannot see how they are to maintain their ground without excluding every branch of natural science from the investigations of religion. It is now pretty generally admitted, that the study of nature has a tendency to illustrate and confirm the doctrines of revelation. With this view Paley wrote his Natural Theology,—a work of acknowledged utility, and of unanswerable argument. Butler's Analogy is based upon the same general principle, "the Constitution and Course

of Nature," proving in the latter work the divinity of the whole Bible, and in the former work the principal doctrine of the Bible,— the existence of God. Now, if observations on nature have contributed, in these instances, to establish important Biblical truths, it is sufficiently evident that similar observations may contribute to establish other truths of like character. We readily admit that much will depend upon the manner in which such investigations are conducted, but we can see no defect in the method itself.

"Philosophy, baptized

In the pure fountain of eternal love,

Has eyes indeed; and, viewing all she sees

As meant to indicate a God to man,

Gives him his praise, and forfeits not her own."-Task.

But the term philosophy is justly objectionable, if we do not make a wide distinction between what is now understood by that term, and what was once understood by it. The only philosophy of any acknowledged authority in modern times is but a collection of facts, whereas the philosophy of the ancients was mostly mere speculation. It is true that ingenious men, even in our times, have fabricated theories, and rashly given them to the world as science; but such theories have no weight, except with a credulous few, and are no more recognized as a part of philosophy than is the Arabian Nights Entertainments. It is also true that no inconsiderable share of these vagaries has existed in connexion with the science of mind. In this, as in many other sciences, our actual knowledge is confined to a few cardinal truths; but of these we are as well assured as we are of the first principles of any other science. For instance, we know that man is a rational being, possessed of consciousness, and capable of thinking; of these facts, which are the basis of psychology, we have the same knowledge that we have of the elements of physics, of matter, its modifications and laws, Now, there can be no more impropriety in using what we do know of mental philosophy for the support of religion, than there is in using the facts of physical science for this purpose. Our author does not propose to give any weight to the speculative part of metaphysics; he has not once referred to anything of the kind, nor does he make the least use of such materials. His whole system, whether correct or not, is based upon a few plain facts in human psychology. While the Bible everywhere accords with fact, it rarely if ever accords with mere hypothesis; the former may, therefore, be allowed great weight in the interpretation of Scripture, while the latter can be allowed none at all. Throughout the natural world there is a marked fitness of means to ends, of creatures to their circumstances, of laws to what