has been taken quietly, many suppose that the disappointed ruler and his people only wait for some favourable juncture to repeat their demand, and attempt to enforce it by war. Only God can foresee the issue of any single struggle, but the laws that operate in a long series of events are sometimes traceable by man; and there need be little hesitation in stating that, whatever might be the result of one war waged by France against Germany, the end of a series of wars would be that Germany would win the day. Let the German nationality seek to reconstruct itself under Protestant leadership, or even let the greater portion of it do so, and France could scarcely say it nay. Statistics almost settle the question. The whole population of the Germanic Confederation in 1861 was stated by Dr Keith Johnston, in the new edition of his Gazetteer, to have amounted to 45,013,034. Of this number, Austria figures for 12,802,944. But this includes Bohemia, Moravia, and other provinces more Sclavonian than German. If, making deductions on this account, and additions for German Switzerland, &c., we estimate the Germanic nationality at 40,000,000 on the continent of Europe, then if it desired to reconstruct itself, France with its thirty-seven and a-half millions of people, even if aided by the four and a-half millions of Belgium, could scarcely prevent the consummation.

But there is a consideration even more important, which, strangely enough, attracts no general notice, though, if comprehended, it could not fail to be in the last degree interesting, not to scientific men simply, but to politicians, as well as to all interested in the religious improvement of continental Europe. It is this, that the different races or nationalities are increasing at very different rates, so much so, that their relative importance will be greatly altered in a hundred years from what. we find it at present. If France increase as slowly as it has done of late, its voice in the affairs of Europe and the world will be less and less potent with the lapse of time. In 1826, the sum total of population in France was 31,851,545; in 1855, it was 35,781,628. There had therefore been in twenty-eight years an increase of 3,930,083, that is, an annual addition of 140,360. And this was so, though during that period only 40,000 had settled permanently in foreign parts. So we learn from two articles in the French Presse, published in July 1855, and of which the substance was reprinted at the time in the British newspapers. A writer in the Revue des Deux Mondes, M. le de Lavergne, some time ago mentioned that in 1854 and 1855, which, it will be remembered, were the chief years of the Crimean war, the deaths in France actually exceeded the births. Quite in harmony with these facts are the statements of M. Block, "Sous-chef du Bureau de la Statisique Générale de

Relative Increase of the Leading Powers. 765

France," in Le Temps newspaper, and of which the substance appeared in the "Journal of the Statistical Society of London" for 1862 (vol. xxv. pp, 72, 73). He says that the population of France increased-

From 1826 to 1831 at the rate of 142,037 per annum.

1856, 1861

Compare with this the British statistics as given in last census report. During the ten years that included the year of the Irish famine and exodus, or from 1841 to 1851, when the decennial increase in Britain had been less than at any period since accurate enumeration began, 709,499 were added to the population, or an average of 70,950 annually, less, it will be perceived, than the French average. But in the next decade, 1851 to 1861, though the Russian war and the Indian mutinies happened during its currency, the increase was 1,575,339, or an annual average of 157,534; that is more than that of France, though, from its population being larger than that of Britain, it might have been expected to have a larger annual increase. But in the case of Britain, it is needful to add the emigrants who left during the period under consideration. Taking them into account, then the British increase becomes 362,992 annually, or more than two and a half times that of France. It is, however, specially with the continental nations that we have to do; and first, of Prussia. According to the British newspapers of the day, the population of Prussia, as ascertained by the census of December 3. 1861, was 18,497,458, being an increase of 757,545, or 4.27 over the census of 1858. In 1861 it was but 10,349,031. Since then it has been augmented about 79 per cent., or "according to these statistics, thrice the proportion of the increase on the population of France, and nearly double the proportion of that of Great Britain" (as kept down by emigration). Do not these figures somewhat explain Prussia's remarkable tendency to self-assertion during the bygone year? By the incorporation of Hanover with its 1,923,492, according to the census of December 1864; Electoral Hesse, with its 845,863; Nassau, with its 468,311; Frankfort, with its 91,180, the population of Prussia, formerly 19,552,139, will be increased to 22,480,185. Then 33,900 it appears are to be added from Bavaria; and Saxony with its population, in 1861, 2,225,240, will become all but Prussian. Let these, with a few other states, be congregated into one people, and France will require to think well before it tries the

VOL. XV.-NO. LVIII.

3 D

issue of war with so formidable an opponent. Even apart from any temporary superiority of weapons on the Prussian side, and not taking into account the probability that the southern German States will speedily begin to gravitate to the northern nationality, the rapid increase of population in the newly extended kingdom, will ultimately put it beyond the power of France taken alone, or even aided by Belguim, to forbid its development.

Before France would dare to interfere, it would require to have Russia on its side; and it becomes interesting to inquire what the probable future of that mighty power will be. Omitting annexations, is it making slow advance, or does it go forward rapidly? In the year 1842, as stated by Count Nesselrode, the increase on the 49,525,420 then inhabiting the more civilised parts of Russia, was 349,239. (See Journal of the Statistical Society of London for 1844, vol. vii. pp. 243–245.) If this rate were preserved, then the annual augmentation on the 74,179,860 who, according to Dr Keith Johnston's Gazetteer, now inhabit Russia, should be about 525,000, it is therefore probable that Russia's predominance will not soon be impaired.

In 50 years Russia has increased in population 100 per cent. England

50

Prussia (from 1816 to 1858)' Austria (from 1818 to 1857) 35 France (from 1826 to 1861)

119

72

27

12

The above statements are made on the authority of M. Block, already referred to; and he says also, "The true increase of a population, however, is the excess of births over deaths. In this respect France does not appear to advantage. The excess is in France three times less than in Austria, five times less than in Russia, six times less than in Prussia, and eight times less than in Great Britain." (Journal of the Statistical Society of London for 1862, vol. xxv. pp. 72, 73.) Here it will be perceived that the great Romish powers, France and Austria, are prevented by some physiological law from making the same progress with the other leading nations of Europe, and their voices must necessarily become less potent in the affairs of the world than they have hitherto been. It is therefore improbable, that at any future time, Austria will be able permanently to displace Prussia from the leadership of Germany. The blow struck against her at Sadowa will be lasting in its effects.

The only possibility of overthrowing already accomplished facts, would be by a speedy union between France and Russia. It is impossible to contemplate the great Russian colossus, standing as it does with one foot on Europe and the other on Asia, without feeling that it is from that direction that danger

Austria of Use in the European System.

767

may come. An alliance between France and Russia is the only contingency which reviving Germany has to dread. Were this to occur, Prussia might be overborne, at least for a time, though there is a curious precedent in history which shews that even this is not so certain as might at first sight appear. In the third Silesian, generally termed the Seven Years' War, a determined effort was made to overwhelm Frederick the Great of Prussia, by calling out against him what Carlyle terms the "general posse comitatus of mankind." "It is computed," he adds, "that there were arrayed against this one king, under their respective kings, empress-queens, Swedish senates, Catins and Pompadours, populations to the amount of above a hundred millions. In after stages I remember to have seen a hundred and fifty millions loosely given as the exaggerative cipher of armed soldiers; actually in the field against him (against Hanover and him) in 1757, there are by strict count. 430,000. Frederick's own dominions at this time contain about five millions of population; of revenue, somewhat less than two millions sterling."-(Carlyle's "Frederick the Great," vol. v. p. 5.) And yet he managed so well to keep off his assailants, that when peace was again concluded, it left matters pretty much as they had been before. Still, such a combination as that supposed between France and Russia might undo, at least for a time, a great part of what has been effected in central Europe.

Though believing that it is well for Europe, and for humanity at large, that the German leadership shall be in Protestant hands, yet it is impossible not to feel pity for Austria, humbled as it now is by the results of the recent war. Whatever may be said of its conduct in the affair of Schleswig-Holstein, it certainly did not seem the aggressor in the quarrel which has brought on it such severe chastisement; and, however much its support of the Papacy, and its despotism, in both civil and religious matters, may have for a long period alienated from it public sympathy, yet it seemed of late so much disposed to enter on a more enlightened course of policy, that it was gaining a place in the hearts of people who, up till recently, looked on it almost as a natural foe. Were it now to break up like a stranded vessel, it is very questionable whether Europe would be a gainer by the catastrophe. The Sclavonic elements in the empire, already, to a certain extent, gravitating towards Russia, would do so then in a yet greater degree. The doctrine of Panslavism is one of which every enlightened country in the eastern hemisphere has reason to be jealous. Its nature is pretty well understood. Assuming the correctness of the forecast attributed to the great Napoleon, that Europe would one day be republican or Cossack, it welcomes the latter side of the alternative, and hopes to see it speedily realised. We have

happily heard little of it for some years, but it is again reappearing now that Austria is in difficulty. There was printed in a leading London paper a letter from an Austrian subject, one of the Czechs or Bohemians, adverting to the noble stand made by the Hussites in former times, and hoping that the Bohemians would again cause their power to be felt; but unhappily, his watchword for the future was the Panslavic cry. The position of Austria is indeed one of almost inconceivable difficulty; and we have often felt how little appreciation of her position was shewn when Englishmen, not similarly tempted, denounced her inexcusable despotism over the races that she ruled. Her despotism was inexcusable, it must be admitted, but it could easily be accounted for. If in the imperial parliament of Britain there sat representatives from half-a-dozen of Scotlands, and as many Irelands, the latter with an irresistible tendency to vote themselves out of the empire, would the English, using the term in its specific sense, submit to be outvoted on every question, and see the empire dismembered? or would they be tempted, in Austrian fashion, to deny the other races their rights, and act despotically? No one who knows human nature need hesitate what answer to return to this question. We therefore think that the despotism of Austria, though very censurable, was in some measure the result of sharper temptation than has for a long time been known in Britain or in other parts of Europe. And if Austria has of late shewn some despotism to try more liberal courses, the merit is proportionally great. The complete disintegration of Austria would set free, among others, the German, the Sclavonian, and the Magyar nationalities, now under the Hapsburg sceptre. The Turanian Magyars would be too feeble to hold their own. The German element, by the hypothesis, ceasing to bear sway over the others, would almost of necessity gravitate towards the rest of the Teutonic fatherland. The Sclavonians would look to Russia as their pole-star, and would sooner or later let Russia into central Europe. Galicia would then be added to Russian Poland. Posen would be coveted to complete the Polish nationality, and, on the first quarrel with Prussia, forcibly taken. The eastern provinces of the former Austrian empire would seek admission into the prosperous fraternity. So would the northern ex-kingdoms, Bohemia and Moravia. With Russia in the former of those lands, it would be as if a sword were for ever presented at the heart of France, of Germany, and even of Britain. With the strong Russian proclivities of the Sclavonic races in Turkey, and of the Greek Church of whatever race, the demise we believe in any case inevitable-of the Ottoman empire would be inconveniently precipitated. And how European liberty could breathe freely side by side with such a