readers to such republicanism, we have done the "state some service."

And if other dissuasion from party spirit were needed, besides the mischiefs that have been named, we would say, that God has summoned the American people to the correction of this evil. He has suffered party spirit to prevail so far as to be come, in a degree, its own punishment. The people have been alarmed and ashamed on account of excesses and frauds, to which nothing could have led but the madness of partisanship. It is the common foreboding of thoughtful men, that if other grounds of apprehension for the harmony and liberty of this nation in years to come were removed, a most formidable danger remains in the rage of parties, as it has been witnessed in other republics, and sometimes in our own. We can not be insensible to the necessity there is for reformation here, before we may indulge confident expectations as to the purity or permanency of our institutions. Nor can it be yet forgotten, the singular dissonance in our public affairs reminding men of it from time to time,-that this

people have received at least one signal rebuke for the fierce and relentless violence of party feeling. We had seen factions run high, and dash against each other with noise and fury. At last a brave old man rode on the top of the wave, the idol of the multitude, the chief of a triumphant majority. One month was allowed for victory. We shall not soon forget the day when the bells rang out their joyous peal in welcome of him whom the nation delighted to honor, nor that other day when the same bells tolled in announcement of his more imperious summons to another world. once bitter reproach and intemperate applause were silenced. Partisans felt themselves fearfully admonished. The lesson, if it has been disregarded, can not yet be forgotten. Now, as then, God would have us remember that, more momentous than all political contentions, there is a conflict going on between truth and error, between righteousness and sin, in which every man individually participates, and that far above all factious leaders, the Lord reigneth, and that "the Lord-he is God."

At

A DISTINGUISHED writer on moral science, President Wayland, maintains, that an action may be wrong in itself or naturally wrong, and not morally wrong; or that what a person can not do lawfully, he may do without contracting guilt. "Right and wrong," he says, "depend on the relations under which beings are created; and hence the obligations resulting from these re

* The Elements of Moral Science, by Francis Wayland, D. D., President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral Philosophy. Chap. III, Sect. 2d, pp.

88-98.

lations are fixed and unchangeable. Guilt and innocence depend upon the knowledge of these relations and of the obligations arising from them. As these are manifestly susceptible of variation, while right and wrong are invariable, the two notions may manifestly not always correspond to each other." In his opinion, a person may in certain cases fail to do that which from the conditions of his being he is under obligation to perform,' and yet be innocent. This position we consider untenable. Unless we are greatly mistaken, there is nothing

which can wholly justify the voluntary doing of an act by a moral agent which is contrary to his obligations, or which it is in any sense wrong for him to do.

Whoever will consult the chapter referred to in President Wayland's work, will see that his opinion is founded on two groundless hy. potheses, namely, that mankind may sustain relations of which they have at the time no hint or are necessarily ignorant, from which neverthe less obligations arise; and that they may be totally ignorant of obligations arising out of their known relations. Every transgression of such obligations is, he thinks, wrongbut not necessarily morally wrong. This depends on the cause of the present inability of the agent to know the rule of rectitude. If his ignorance is owing to his own previous misconduct, our author considers him responsible (liable to punishment) for all the misdeeds that he ignorantly commits. But if his ignorance is not owing to his own fault, he considers him innocent. In the former case wrong and guilt are correlative; in the other they are not-the agent does a wrong act without criminality. Confident of the correctness of these views, our author is emboldened to take another position, not indeed more indefensible, but more manifestly at variance with sound philosophy, namely, that man is constantly responsible for all that capacity for virtue, and all that usefulness, to which he would have attained by a life of uninterrupted obedience to God. Such, we are persuaded, is not the relation in which man stands to the moral law; in proof of which we shall endeavor to show, that man sustains no practical relations, of the existence of which he has no intimation or means of present knowledge; and that he can not be so ignorant of the obligations arising from his known relations, as to be impelled by an un

equivocal dictate of conscience to disregard them.

Should this proof be furnished, the following points will be established, in the light of which, the actual relation of man to the moral law will be obvious.

Innocence and guilt are coextensive with right and wrong in human conduct.

The guilt of an agent, in a given case, is not measured by the actual results of his misconduct, but by the resistance of his will to his duty.

Man is to-day responsible for that amount of virtue and well doing only, for which he now has a capacity.

We say then that man sustains no practical relations, none in respect to which he is called to act, or out of which obligations arise, of which he has at the time no intimation or is necessarily ignorant. The cause of his inability to perceive the relation-whether it be natural imbecility, want of opportunity, or his own previous neglect or perverseness-can not in any way affect his present obligations. Whatever may be his present disposition, and effort, he can not now know, for example, that there is a God— then he sustains no practical relation to God. The heathen, who have never heard of Christ, are not naturally, any more than they are morally, obligated to believe in him. The want of Christian faith is not a moral wrong in them; neither is it a natural wrong; that is, they bring no evil on themselves or on others, and transgress no law, by not believing in Him of whom they are thus ignorant. They neither do what is forbidden to them, nor neglect what is required of them. Faith in Christ in their circumstances, is not required by the conditions of their being; nor is any duty arising out of the Christian revelation. Their obligations are confined to the narrower circle of natural religion-to the relations

which they perceive, and which they now have ability to perceive. Their duty is measured by the rules of rectitude applicable to perceived and perceivable relations. By obedience to these rules, they would be prepared to receive Christ as soon as they should discover his existence. But at present they sus tain no relation to him which imposes obligations on them, so that their want of Christian faith is wrong, and, if it can be traced back to some past misconduct of theirs, criminal. Thus universally, relations, of which man is necessarily ignorant, are not yet sustained by him in any practical sense; they are still in futurity as the sources of obligation, like the filial relation in infancy; and no obligations now exist in regard to them. A foundling may arrive at manhood in ignorance of his origin, and be daily associating with his parents without knowing them in this relation. It is then in no sense wrong for him to treat them as indifferent persons. The conditions of his being do not require him to act the part of a son to them. A knowledge of the relation might promote the happiness of both parties, but while that knowledge is wanting, there is nothing naturally wrong, any more than there is moral turpitude, in his treat ing them as mere neighbors. In a practical point of view, they are to him nothing more than neigh bors. And so in respect to them; if they do not know him to be their son, and if they have no present means of knowing it, they are not under any kind of obligation to perform parental duties to him, not even if they were the guilty authors of this mutual ignorance. They do not now sustain to him the relation of parents in any practical sense. When a relation is not perceived, no obligation arises from it, unless the mind of the agent has some hint or intimation of its existence, which binds him to investigate the

subject. When such an intimation is wanting, the mind not only does not perceive, but can not yet perceive the existence of the relationand conscience does not bind it— the rule of rectitude does not require it-to act in harmony with that relation, or to pay it the slightest regard. This was not the position of Saul of Tarsus in respect to Christianity. He did not indeed perceive the Messiahship of our Lord. But he had a hint, an intimation, and evidence at hand, of the truth of this claim of Jesus of Nazareth. The claim he knew he had not fairly investigated, so that he could not with a pure conscience reject it. His ignorance of the relations of Christ as the son of God, was not in fact total-for this intimation was sufficient to bind his conscience not to reject Him without farther inquiry. The position, therefore, that man sustains no necessarily unknown relations from which obligations arise, will bear to be modified by substituting for "necessarily," totally, or absolutely. Whoever is totally ignorant of a relation is under no obligation in respect to it; for total ignorance excludes every intimation of its existence, and implies that the mind. is now unable to perceive it. That the moral law takes no cognizance of the conduct of men beyond the limits of those relations of which they have some hint, seems no less obvious than the exemption of an idiot, or brute animal, from human obligations. Total ignorance, as we have defined it, that is, ignorance from which the mind has no present means of relief, is incompatible with the existence of a relation in that practical sense which makes it the source of obligation.

But it is also maintained, that a person may so far mistake the obligations arising from his known relations as to be innocent in disregarding them. Total ignorance of

an obligation does undoubtedly va cate the obligation; but is such ignorance of the obligations of a person possible? Can conscience be wholly deceived in respect to the moral character of an act, which a person is bound by the conditions of his being to do or to refrain from doing? Is it possible, in other words, for man to do what it is wrong for him to do, and not at the same time transgress some known rule of moral obligation, and contract guilt? We think not. It is not to be believed, without examination, that our Creator has made us susceptible of being incited by an unequivocal sense of duty, to perform actions opposed to His will or our own well being and usefulness. That man is often hurried on by passion to do things contrary to his obligations, persuading himself that they are lawful, is a fact of familiar observation and experience. But the question is, whether he can do such an act with a perfectly pure conscience. Does he unhesitatingly believe on reflection, in the rectitude of his conduct? Is he impelled by an unequivocal voice of conscience to do what is wrong, or to neglect what is required of him "by the conditions of his being ?"

This hypothesis sets up the judgment of man even when erroneous, as the rule of rectitude. Whether an act is naturally right or wrong, the agent contracts guilt, if he does it with a hesitating conscience. "He that doubteth is damned if he eat." Rom. xiv, 23. Hence, if he is fully convinced, that he ought to do a wrong act, he ought in fact to do it. He must otherwise do what he be lieves to be wrong. He must choose to sin against God, which is actually sinning; or else he must do that, which in itself ought not to be done. He ought to lie, to steal, to commit murder, to worship idols, to persecute heretics, if he sincerely believes it to be his duty? What

if these acts are contrary to the immutable law of rectitude, would he not break that law by refusing to do what he believes, though erro neously, to be required by it? Is not the papist, if he feels bound by conscience to worship the virgin Mary, obliged to worship her, or disobey God in fact though not in form? For refusing to do what he believes to be his duty, is really a refusal to obey God. Thus the notion, that conscience may unhesitatingly impel us to act unlawfully, exalts the erring judgment of man to the rank of a supreme lawgiver.

This notion does violence to the common sense of mankind. It some times happens that the fires of religious persecution rage, when brother delivers up brother to death, and parents their children. In such cases the delusion of the mind is very strong. But is it complete ? Does the persecutor entertain no secret suspicion, that his conduct is not, in all respects, right? Is he truly conscientious?

Is it possi

ble for him to feel, on reflection, that there is no doubt of the rectitude of his conduct? If so, he is placed under the necessity, either of refusing to obey God, or of delivering up his kindred and neighbors to the fires of persecution. The common sense of mankind revolts at such a conclusion. How ever superstitious and ignorant a persecutor, is, they consider him guilty; they believe he acts more from passion than intelligent conviction, and if he would honestly ask himself whether he has ever duly examined the moral nature of his present conduct, he would feel self-condemned.

This hypothesis contradicts also the representations of the Bible respecting the conduct of the pagan world. The murder of superannuated parents, the exposure of infants to perish in the streets, the sacrifice of human beings to false gods, and all the cruelties of idol

worship, idolatry itself-are apparently practiced by the heathen without compunction. They plead, that it is an act of humanity to destroy the aged who can only suffer if they live, and also infants of feeble constitution or of poor parentage. They claim also, that it is their duty to worship idols, according to the custom of their ancestors. Such, in general, is their blindness, that if they sin by such conduct, it is a sin of ignorance. But is it true, that they commit no sin against conscience by these acts, which it is admitted are naturally wrong? Is it true, that their faith in a false god, renders it their duty to worship him? Is it possible, in other words, that they should be so fully persuaded of the truth of these errors, as to feel, on reflection, no doubt respecting them. Paul teaches us the contrary. In Rom. i, 32, he informs us, that they who do such things as he had charged upon the heathen, are worthy of death. He represents them to be guilty for performing those actions which are naturally wrong, of which he gives an extended catalogue, and of the obligation of which we should suppose them to be ignorant, if entire ignorance is possible. Nor does he justify their idolatry, which it is reasonable to suppose they conscientiously practiced, if man can be truly conscientious in any conduct which is condemned by the light of

nature.

This hypothesis is moreover liable to the objection, that it supposes a person may be led by such an examination of the subject, as seems to him candid and complete, to an unhesitating belief that he ought to do that which is naturally wrong. For if, on reflection, he can not refer to any such ground of conviction, that he is doing his duty, his reason will tell him, that he may be wrong, and conscience will refuse to pronounce an unequivocal sentence of approbation on his conVol. I.

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duct. He can be satisfied only by what he believes to be a full and candid investigation; and it is improbable, if nothing more, that such an investigation would lead him to a false conclusion in regard to a question of natural duty.

What indeed is this hypothesis but the pernicious doctrine of infidelity, that sincere differences of opinion in regard to religious and moral obligations, may be honestly entertained; and that such opinions, if erroneous, are only to be pitied, not condemned. This spreads a

shield over the conscience and reputation of wicked men; for whatever may be their misconduct, they feel justified, if it corresponds with their creed, and they expect the community will pronounce on them the same favorable judgment.

This hypothesis farther implies, that human governments may justly punish men for doing their duty to God. Whoever commits murder or robbery is punished, on detection, by the civil power; yet who knows, if a person may be unequivocally impelled by his conscience to do what is naturally wrong, that the most atrocious crimes may not be committed under this conviction? And if so, the crimes ought, in those instances, to be committed; or the agent is placed under the embarrassing necessity of sinning, whichever course he may adopt.

The Bible, we believe, invariably charges man with guilt when he does things which are naturally wrong; and represents his ignorance to be only a palliation of the crime. Thus, Luke xxiii, 34, "Then said Jesus, Father forgive them; for they know not what they do."

They were ignorant in some respects, which mitigated their offense; in other respects, they knew better; and hence they needed forgiveness. Luke xii, 47, 48. Those who are destitute of a written revelation, are represented as not know