9. And thus I have fhewn the necessity and the fufficiency of Prudence to a Vertuous Life, which are the two Branches of its Connection with Vertue, and confequently of its Importance. For the Importance of Prudence is abfolutely fpeaking its Connection with Happiness, and it is connected with Happiness in the fame manner, that is, by the fame ways as it is connected with Vertue. And therefore fince it has been fhewn to be both neceffary and fufficient for Vertue, it follows that it must have the like connection with Happiness. That of the other World efpecially, but not excluding the Happiness of the Life that now is, to the Happiness of which, Prudence, tho' perhaps it may not always be a Sufficient, is yet always a very neceffar, Condition and indifpenfable Qualification. For setting afide the Influence that Vertue has upon the Prefent as well as Future Happiness of Man, and that without Prudence there is no Vertue, as has been shewn, 'tis further to be confider'd that the Paffions of Men are fo unruly, and the Provocations which by this means they give one another are fo many, that unless they have Prudence enough to govern their own Paffions, and to bear other Mens Follies and Indifcretions, there will be no living together with any tolerable Comfort or Enjoyment in the World, nor will Human Life be any Happiness even to those who enjoy it in its beft Circumstances, but rather Vexation of Spirit as well as Vanity. Not but that the Happiness of this Life, as well as

that

that of the other, may depend upon other more immediate Caufes, particularly upon certain fociable Vertues, fuch as Juftice, Charity, Humility, Meekness, Peaceablenefs; but ftill Prudence being at the bottom of all these, its last stay and dependance will still be upon that, as the weight of the Building makes its last rest upon the Foun dation. So that we may fay of Prudence what the Apostle fays of Godliness, that it is profitable unto all things, having if not the Promife, yet the Happiness of the Life that now is, and of that which is to come. By all which it may now appear, what an Important Subject we have in hand, and why fo many great and glorious Things are faid of it in Holy Scripture, particularly in the Writings of Solomon.

CHAP.

CHA P. II.

Being an Enquiry into the Nature of Prudence, fhewing what Prudence, and par ticularly Christian Prudence is, and how it differs from fome other Things which carry a refemblance with it, fuch as Wit, Policy, &c. With a Remark that Pru dence cannot confist with Fatality.

1.

WE

E have feen the Importance of Prudence in the immediate Connection which it has with Vertue, and by Vertue with Happiness. Our next step fhall be to inquire into the Nature of it, and to declare what it is. I was willing to confider the Importance of it first, that it might appear that we are not giving our felves a needlefs Trouble, nor providing for others a vain and useless Entertainment, but that the Subject we are confidering is indeed worthy of our Confideration. Befides that the Ufe and Importance of a Thing is that fide of it which principally moves and affects us, who are more concern'd in the Relative than in the Abfolute Nature of Things, what they are to us, more than what they are in themselves, in their Goodnefs more than in their Truth. This alfo is first in view, and touches us before we are either capable,

pable, or at leasure to make any farther Enquiry. So 'tis in Light, it strikes our Eyes before it awakens our Minds to confider what it is. We fee by it, and feel Pleafure and Warmth from it a long time before we have any Notion of its Nature, or can enter into its Philofophy. At length our Curiofity is excited to confider what that is from which we receive fo much Pleasure and Benefit, which entertains our Minds with Objects, gives Direction to our Way, and Comfort to our Lives.

2. Now for the better clearing our way to this matter, and in order to the giving a right Account of it, I think convenient in the first place to observe in the general that Prudence is not a Moral, but an Intellectual Vertue. It is indeed Moral in refpect of the Object, becaufe 'tis concern'd about things that are to be done, or that are to be avoided; but 'tis Intellectual in respect of the Subject, as being fubjected or feated not in the Will but in the Understanding. For 'tis a directing and governing Vertue, not such as is directed or govern'd. For tho' there are certain Rules and Laws whereby it is to be govern'd, (otherwife Prudence would be an arbitrary and mutable thing, and not the fame in all Men) yet it is not govern'd by any other Vertue, but is it felf that Vertue which directs and governs all the reft, there being no Vertue but what is the effect of Prudence. For as Understanding is before willing, it being impoffible there fhould be any Will of what is unknown, fo the Underftanding

ftanding muft perceive and judge right before the Will can act right. Now as those Habits which immediately difpofe the Will to act right, and are fubjected in it, are properly what we call Moral Vertues, fo that in the Understanding which directs and practically determines the Will fo to act, is as properly an Intellectual Vertue. Such is Prudence, and therefore that it is an Intellectual Vertue is plain. A Vertue, because it determines the Will to that which is good. And an Intellectual Vertue, because it is fubjected in the Understanding, tho' ftill Moral as to the Object, as was noted before. For indeed the Objects are really the fame in Prudence and in those other Vertues which we call Moral, the things that are to be done being the Objects of both. But yet with this remarkable difference as to the Formality. They are the Objects of Prudence as fo many Practical Truths which Reafon approves and recommends, but they are the Objects of the Moral Vertues as they are defirable Goods. To clear this by an Example. To eat and drink moderately belongs at once to Prudence and Temperance. To Prudence,. as directing fuch a proportion to be taken ; to Temperance, as inclining the Will to take according to the measure by Prudence prescrib'd. So that tho' the Object be really the fame in both, yet 'tis not under the fame manner and formality that it is fo, it belonging to Prudence after a more Rational and Intellectual way than to the other Vertues. So that even here where they

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