A

powers are general.1 The knowledge required of a national representative is, therefore, necessarily of a more large and comprehensive character than that of a mere State representative. Minute information, and a thorough knowledge of local interests, personal opinions, and private feelings, are far more important to the latter than the former.2 Nay, the very devotion to local views and feelings and interests, which naturally tends to a narrow and selfish policy, may be a just disqualification and reproach to a member of Congress.3 A liberal and enlightened policy, a knowledge of national rights, duties, and interests, a familiarity with foreign governments and diplomatic history, and a wide survey of the operations of commerce, agriculture, and manufactures, seem indispensable to a lofty discharge of his functions.4 knowledge of the peculiar interests and products and institutions of the different States of the Union is doubtless of great value; but it is rather as it conduces to the performance of the higher functions already spoken of than as it sympathizes with the local interests and feelings of a particular district, that it is to be estimated.5 And in regard to those local facts which are chiefly of use to a member of Congress, they are precisely those which are most easily attainable from the documentary evidence in the departments of the national government, or which lie open to an intelligent man in any part of the State which he may represent. 6 A knowledge of commerce and taxation and manufactures can be obtained with more certainty by inquiries conducted through many than through a single channel of communication. The representatives of each State will generally bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws and of the local interests of their districts. They will often have previously served as members in the State legislatures, and thus have become, in some measure, acquainted with all the local views and wants of the whole State.7

§ 660. The functions, too, of a representative in Congress re

1 The Federalist, No. 56.

2 1 Elliot's Debates, 228, 229, 253; 2 Lloyd's Debates, (in 1789,) 189; The Federalist, No. 56.

3 1 Elliot's Debates, 238.

4 1 Elliot's Debates, 228, 229, 253; The Federalist, No. 56.

5 The Federalist, No. 56; 1 Elliot's Debates, 220, 241, 242, 246, 253.

6 The Federalist, No. 56; 1 Elliot's Debates, 228, 229, 253.

7 The Federalist, No. 56.

quire very different qualifications and attainments from those required in a State legislature. Information relative to local objects is easily obtained in a single State, for there is no difference in its laws, and its interests are but little diversified. But the legislation of Congress reaches over all the States; and as the laws and local circumstances of all differ, the information which is requisite for safe legislation is far more difficult and various, and directs the attention abroad rather than at home.1 Few members, comparatively speaking, will be found ignorant of the local interests of their district or State; but time and diligence, and a rare union of sagacity and public spirit, are indispensable to avoid egregious mistakes in national measures.

§ 661. The experience of Great Britain upon this subject furnishes a very instructive commentary. Of the five hundred and fifty-eight members of the house of commons, one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty-four persons, and one half by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three persons.2 And this half certainly have little or no claim to be deemed the guardians of the interests of the people, and indeed are notoriously elected by other interests.3 Taking the population of the whole kingdom, the other half will not average more than one representative for about twenty-nine thousand of the inhabitants. It may be added, that nothing is more common than to select men for representatives of large and populous cities and districts, who do not reside therein, and cannot be presumed to be intimately acquainted with their local interests and feelings. The choice, however, is made from high motives, a regard to talents, public services, and political sagacity. And whatever may be the defects of the representative system of Great Britain, very few of the defects of its legislation have been imputed to the ignorance 1 The Federalist, No. 56; Id. No. 35.

2 See Mr. Christian's note, (34,) to 1 Black. Comm. 174, where he states the number of which the house of commons has consisted at different periods, from which it appears that it has been nearly doubled since the beginning of the reign of Henry the Eighth. See also 4 Inst. 1.

8 The Federalist, No. 56; Paley's Moral Philosophy, B. 6, ch. 7.

4 The Federalist, Nos. 56, 57. [Much of what is said in this chapter regarding Great Britain has, since the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867, no longer any application. The house of commons is now much more nearly than formerly a representative body of the people. England, with a population, according to the census of 1871, of 22,704,108, has 493 members; Scotland has 60, representing 3,358,613 people; and Ireland has 105, representing 5,402,759 people. The average is one representative to about 48,000 inhabitants.]

of the house of commons of the true interests or circumstances of the people.1

§ 662. In the history of the Constitution it is a curious fact, that with some statesmen, possessing high political distinction, it was made a fundamental objection against the establishment of any national legislature, that if it "were composed of so numerous a body of men as to represent the interests of all the inhabitants of the United States in the usual and true ideas of representation, the expense of supporting it would be intolerably burdensome; and that if a few only were vested with a power of legislation, the interests of a great majority of the inhabitants of the United States must be necessarily unknown; or, if known, even in the first stages of the operations of the new government, unattended to." 2 In their view a free government seems to have been incompatible with a great extent of territory or population. What, then, would become of Great Britain, or of France, under the present constitution of their legislative departments?

§ 663. The next objection was that the representatives would be chosen from that class of citizens which would have the least sympathy with the mass of the people, and would be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few. It was said, that the Author of Nature had bestowed on some men greater capacities than on others. Birth, education, talents, and wealth created distinctions among men as visible, and of as much influence, as stars, garters, and ribbons. In every society men of this class will command a superior degree of respect; and if the government is so constituted as to admit but few to exercise its powers, it will, according to the natural course of things, be in their hands. Men in the middling class, who are qualified as representatives, will not be so anxious to be chosen as those of the first; and if they are, they will not have the means of so much influence.4

§ 664. It was answered, that the objection itself is of a very

1 The Federalist, No. 56. See also Dr. Franklin's Remarks, 2 Pitk. Hist. 242; 1 Wilson's Law Lect. 431, 432; Paley's Moral Philosophy, B. 6, ch. 7 ; 1 Kent's Comm.

219.

2 Letter of Messrs. Yates and Lansing to Gov. Clinton, 1788 (3 Amer. Museum, 156, 158).

3 The Federalist, No. 57; 1 Elliot's Debates, 220, 221. No. 35.

4 1 Elliot's Debates, 221, 222.

See also the Federalist,

extraordinary character; for while it is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, in principle it strikes at the very root of a republican government; for it supposes the people to be incapable of making a proper choice of representatives, or indifferent to it, or utterly corrupt in the exercise of the right of suffrage. It would not be contended that the first class of society, the men of talents, experience, and wealth, ought to be constitutionally excluded from office. Such an attempt would not only be unjust, but suicidal; for it would nourish an influence and faction within the state, which, upon the very supposition, would continually exert its whole means to destroy the government and overthrow the liberties of the people.1 What, then, is to be done? If the people are free to make the choice, they will naturally make it from that class, whatever it may be, which will in their opinion best promote their interests and preserve their liberties.2 Nor are the poor, any more than the rich, beyond temptation or love of power. Who are to be the electors of the representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the heirs of distinguished families, more than the children of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the body of the people of the United States, jealous of their rights, and accustomed to the exercise of their power. Who are to be the objects of their choice? Every citizen, whose merit may commend him to the esteem and confidence of his fellow-citizens. No qualification of wealth or birth or religion or civil profession is recognized in the Constitution; and, consequently, the people are free to choose from any rank of society according to their pleasure.4

§ 665. The persons who shall be elected representatives must have all the inducement to fidelity, vigilance, and a devotion to the interests of the people which can possibly exist. They must be presumed to be selected from their known virtues and estimable qualities, as well as from their talents. They must have a desire to retain and exalt their reputation, and be ambitious to deserve the continuance of that public favor by which they have been elevated. There is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor, of favor, of esteem, and of confidence, which, apart from all considerations of interest, is some pledge for grateful and be

11 Elliot's Debates, 222, 223. 2 The Federalist, No. 35; Id. No. 36; Id. No. 57. 3 The Federalist, No. 57; Id. No. 35; Id. No. 36. * The Federalist, No. 57; Id. No. 35; Id. No. 36.

nevolent returns. But the interest of the representative, which naturally binds him to his constituents, will be strengthened by motives of a selfish character. His election is biennial; and he must soon return to the common rank of a citizen, unless he is re-elected. Does he desire office? Then that very desire will secure his fidelity. Does he feel the value of public distinctions? Then his pride and vanity will equally attach him to a government which affords him an opportunity to share in its honors and distinctions, and to the people, who alone can confer them.2 Besides, he can make no law which will not weigh as heavily on himself and his friends as on others; and he can introduce no oppression which must not be borne by himself, when he sinks back to the common level. As for usurpation, or a perpetuation of his authority independent of the popular will, that is hopeless, until the period shall have arrived in which the people are ready to barter their liberties, and are ready to become the voluntary slaves of any despot. Whenever that period shall arrive, it will be useless to speak of guardians or of rights. Where all are corrupt, it is idle to talk of virtue. Quis custodiet custodes? Who shall keep watch over the people when they choose to betray themselves?

3

§ 666. The objection itself is, in truth, utterly destitute of any solid foundation. It applies with the same force to the State legislatures as to that of the Union. It attributes to talents and wealth and ambition an influence which may be exerted at all times and everywhere. It speaks in no doubtful language that republican government is but a shadow, and incapable of preserving life, liberty, or property. It supposes that the people are always blind to their true interests, and always ready to betray them; that they can safely trust neither themselves nor others. If such a doctrine be maintainable, all the constitutions of America are founded in egregious errors and delusions.

4

§ 667. The only perceptible difference between the case of a representative in Congress and in the State legislature as to this point is, that the one may be elected by five or six hundred citizens, and the other by as many thousands.5 Even this is true only in particular States; for the representatives in Massachusetts (who are all chosen by the towns) may be elected by six thousand

1 The Federalist, No. 57. 2 The Federalist, No. 57.

Id. No. 57; Id. Nos. 35, 36.

8 Id. No. 57; Id. Nos. 35, 36. 5 Id. No. 57.