AGAIN, it is manifeft from what has been faid, that in order to preferve the Balance in a mix'd State, the Limits of Power depofited with each Party ought to be afcertained, and generally known. The Defects of this is the caufe that introduces thofe Strugglings in a State about Prerogative and Liberty, about Encroachments of the Few, upon the Rights of the Many, and of the Many upon the Privileges of the Few, which ever did and ever will conclude in a Tyranny: Firft, either of the Few, or the Many, but at laft infallibly of a fingle Perfon. For, which ever of the Three Divifions in a State is upon the Scramble for more Power than its own, (as one or other of them generally is) unless due care be taken by the other two; upon every new Question that arifes, they will be fure to decide in favour of themselves, talk much of Inherent Right, they will nourish up a dorment Power, and referve Privileges in petto, to exert apon Occafions, to ferve Expedients, and to urge upon Neceffities. They will make large Demands, and fcanty Conceffions, ever coming off confiderable Gainers: Thus at length the Balance is broke, and Tyranny let in, from which Door of the Three it matters not.

To pretend to a declarative Right upon any occafion whatsoever, is little lefs than to make ufe of the whole Power: That is, to declare an Opinion to be Law, which has always been contefted, or perhaps never ftarted at all before fuch an Incident brought it on the Stage. Not to confent to the Enacting of fuch a Law, which has no view befides the general Good, unlefs another Law fhall at the fame time pafs with no other view but that of advancing the

Power

Power of one Party alone: What is this, but to claim a pofitive Voice as well as a negative? To pretend that greatCh auges and Alienations of Property have created new and great Dependences, and confequently new Additions of Power, as fome Reafons have done, is a moft dangerous Tenet: If Dominion muft follow Property, let it follow in the fame pace: For Changes in Property thro' the Bulk of a Nation make flow marches, and its due Power always attends it. To conclude, that whatever Attempt is begun by an Affembly, ought to be purfued to the end, without regard to the greateft Incidents that may happen to alter the Cafe; To count it mean, and below the Dignity of a House, to quit a Profecution; to refolve upon a Conclufion, before it is poffible to be apprifed of the Premiffes; To act thus, I lay, is to affect not only abfolute Power, but Infallibility too, Yet fuch unaccountable Proceedings as thefe have Popular Affemblies engaged in, for want of fixing the due Limits of Power and Privilege.

GREAT Changes may indeed be made in a Government, yet the Form continue, and the Balance be held; but large Intervals of Time muft pafs between every fuch Innovation, enough to melt down, and make it of a Piece with the Conftitution. Such we are told were the Proceedings of Solon, when he Modelled anew the Athenian Common-wealth: And what Convulfions in our own, as well as other States, have been bred by a neglect of this Rule, is fresh and notorious enough: 'Tis too foon in all Confcience to repeat this Error again.

HAVING fhewn that there is a natural Balance of Power in all Free States, and how it has been divided fometimes by the People themselves, as in Rome, at others by the Inftitutions of the Legiflators, as in the feveral States of Greece and Sicily: The next thing is to examine whatMethods have been taken to break or overthrow this Ba lance; which every of the three Parties have continually endeavour'd, as opportunities have ferv'd; as might appear from the Stories of moft Ages and Countries. For, Abfolute Power in a particular State, is of the fame nature with Univerfal Monarchy in feveral States adjoyning to each other. So endless and exorbitant are the Defires of Men, whether confider'd in their Perfons or their States, that they will grafp at all, and can form no Scheme of perfect Happiness with lefs, ever fince Men have been united into Governments, the Hopes and Endeavours after Univerfal Monarchy have been bandied among them, from the Reign of Ninus to this of the Moft Chriftian King; in which purfuits Common-wealths have had their fhare as well as Monarchs: So the Athenians, the Spartans, the Thebans, and the Achaians, did at feveral times aim at the Univerfal Monarchy of Greece; So the Common-wealths of Carthage and Rome affected the Univerfal Monarchy of the then known World. In like manner has Abfolute Power been purfued by the feveral Parties of each particular State; wherein fingle Perfons have met with most Succefs, tho' the Endeavours of the Few and the Many have been frequent enough; But, being neither fo uniform in their Defigns, nor fo direct in their Views, they neither could manage nor maintain the Power they had got,

but

but were ever deceived by the Popularity and Amabition of fome fingle Perfon. So that it will be always a wrong ftep in Policy, for the Nobles or Commons to carry their Endeavours after Pow er fo far, as to overthrow the Balance: And it would be enough to damp their warmth in fuch Purfuits, if they could once reflect, that in fuch a Course they will be fure to run upon the very Rock that they meant to avoid, which I fuppofe they would have us think is the Tyranny of a fingle Perfon,

MANY Examples might be produc'd of the Endeavours from each of thefe Three Rivals after Abfolute Power; But I fhall fuit my Difcourfe to the Time I am writing it, and Relate only fuch Diffentions between the Nobles and Commons, with the Confequences of them, in Greece and Rome, wherein the latter were the Aggreffors.

Ifhall begin with Greece, where my Obfervations fhall be confined to Athens, tho' feveral Inftances might be brought from other States thereof.

Of the DISSENTIONS in Athens, between the FEW and the MANY.

HESEUS is the firft, who is Recorded

Twith any appearance of Truth to have

brought the Grecians from a barbarous manner of Life among scattered Villages, into Cities; and

to

to have establish'd the Popular State in Athens, affigning to himself the Guardianfhip of the Laws, and chief Command in War. He was. forced after fome time to leave the Athenians to their own Measures, upon account of their Seditious Temper, which ever continu'd with them till the final Diffolution of their Government by the Romans. It feems, the Country about Attica was the moft Barren of any in Greece; through which means it happened that the Natives were never expelled by the Fury of Invaders, (who thought it not worth a Conqueft) but continued always Aborigines; and therefore retained through all Revolutions a tincture of that turbulent Spirit wherewith their Government began. This Inftitution of Thefeus appears to have been rather a fort of mix'd Monarchy than a Popular State, and for ought we know, might continue fo during the Series of Kings till the Death of Codrus. From this laft Prince, Solon was faid to be defcended; who finding the People engaged in two violent Factions, of the Poor and the RICH, and in great Confufions thereupon; refufing the Monarchy which was offered him, chofe rather to caft the Government after another Model, wherein he made due Provifion for fetling the Balance of Power, chufing a Senate of 4c0, and difpofing the Magiftracies and Offices according to Mens Eftates; leaving to the Multitude their Votes in Electing, and the Power of Judging certain Proceffes by Appeal. This Council of 400 was chofen, foe out of each Tribe, and it feems to have been a Body Reprefentative of the People; tho' the People Collective referved a fhare of Power to themfelves. It is a Point

of