Scandal flung upon the Nation by a few bigotted French Scriblers, or the invidious Affertion of a Ruined Party at home, in the Bitterness of their Souls. Not one material Circumftance agreeing with thofe in 1648; and the greatest part of the Nation having preferved the utmoft Horror for that ignominious Murder: But whe ther his Removal were caufed by his own Fears or other Mens Artifices, 'tis manifeft to me, that fuppofing the Throne to be Vacant, which was the Foot they went upon, the Body of the People was thereupon left at Liberty to chufe what Form of Government they pleased, by them felves or their Reprefentatives.

THE only Difficulty of any weight against the Proceedings at the Revolution, is an obvious Objection, to which the Writers upon that Subject have not yet given a direct or fufficient Anfwer, as if they were in pain at fome Confequences which they apprehended thofe of the contrary Opinion might draw from it. I will repeat this Objection as it was offered to me. fome time ago, with all its Advantages, by a very Pious, Learned, and worthy Gentleman of the Non-juring Party.

THE Force of his Argument turned upon this; That the Laws made by the Supreme Power, cannot otherwife than by the Supreme Power be annulled This confifting in England of a King, Lords and Commons, whereof each have a Negative Voice, no Two of them can Repeal or Enact a Law without Confent of the Third: i much lefs any one of them be entirely excluded from its Part of the Legiflature by a Vote of the other Two. That all thefe Maxims were openly violated at the Revolution; where an Af fembly

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fembly of the Nobles and People not fummoned by the King's Writ (which was then an effential Part of the Conftitution) and consequently no lawful Meeting, did meerly upon their own Autho rity, declare the King to have abdicated, the Throne vacant, and gave the Crown by a Vote to a Nephew, when there were three Children to Inherit, though by the fundamental Laws of the Realm the next Heir is immediately to Succeed. Neither does it appear how a Prince's Abdication can make any other fort of Vacancy in the Throne, than would be caufed by his Death, fince he cannot abdicate for his Children (who claim their Right of Succeffion by Act of Parliament) otherwife than by his own Confent in form to a Bill from the Two Houfes.

AND this is the Difficulty that feems chiefly to ftick with the most reafonable of thofe, who from a meer Scruple of Confcience refufe to joyn with us upon the Revolution-Principle; but for the reft are, I believe, as far from lov ing Arbitrary Government, as any others can be, who are born under a free Conftitution, and are allowed to have the leaft Share of common good Senfe.

IN this Objection there are two Queftions included; Firft, Whether upon the foot of our Conftitution as it flood in the Reign of the late King James; a King of England may be depofed? The Second is, whether the People of England, convened by their own Authority, after the King had withdrawn himself in the manner he did, had Power to alter the Succeffion?

As for the Firft; It is a Point I' fhall not prefume to determine, and fhall therefore only

fay

fay, that to any Man who holds the Negative, I would demand the Liberty of putting the Cafe as ftrongly as I pleafe. I will fuppofe a Prince limited by Laws like ours, yet running into a thoufand Caprices of Cruelty like Nero or Caligula. I will fuppofe him to murder his Mother and his Wife, to commit Inceft, to Ravish Matrons, to blow up the Senate, and burn his Metropolis, Openly to renounce God and Chrift, and worship the Devil. These and the like Exorbitances are in the Power of a Single Perfon to commit without the Advice of a Miniftry, or Affiftance of an Army. And if fuch a King, as I have defcribed, cannot be Deposed but by his own Confent in Parliament; I do not well fee how he can be refifted, or what can be meant by a limited Monarchy; Or what fignifies the Peoples Confent in making and repealing Laws, if the Perfon who administers hath no Tye but Confcience, and is answerable to none but God. I defire no ftronger Proof that an Opinion must be false, than to find very great Abfurdities annexed to it; and there cannot be greater than in the prefent Cafe; For it is not a bare Speculation that Kings may run into fuch Enormities as are above-mentioned; the Practice may be proved by Examples not only drawn from the first Cafars or later Emperors, but many modern Princes of Europe; fuch as Peter the Cruel, Philip the Second of Spain, John Bafilovits of Mufcory, and in our own Nation, King John, Richard the Third, and Henry the Eighth. But there cannot be equal Abfurdities fuppofed in maintaining the contrary Opinion, because it is certain, that Princes have it in their Power to keep a Majority on their fide by any toleraG 4 able

ble Administration; till provoked by continua Oppreffion, no Man indeed can then anfwer where the Madness of the People will top.

As to the fecond Part of the objection; Whether the People of England convened by their own Authority, upon King James's precipitate Departure, had Power to alter the Succeffion? IN Answer to this, I think it is manifeft from the Practice of the Wifeft Nations, and who feem to have had the trueft Notions of Freedom, that when a Prince was laid afide for Maleadministration, the Nobles and People, if they thought neceffary for the Publick Weal, did refume the Adminiftration of the Supreme Power (the Power it felf having been always in them) and did not only alter the Succeffion, but often the very Form of Government too; Because they believed there was no natural Right in oneMan to Govern another, but that all was by Inftitution, Force, or Confent. Thus, the Cities of Greece, when they drove out their Tyranncal Kings, either chofe others from a new Family, or abolifhed the Kingly Government, and became Free States. Thus the Romans, upon the expulfion of Tarquin, found it was inconvenient for them to be fubject any longer to the Pride, the Luft, the Cruelty and Arbitrary Will of Single Perfons, and therefore by general Confent entirely altered the whole Frame of their Government. Nor do I find the Proceedings of either, in this Point, to have been condemned by any Hiftorian of the fucceeding Ages.

Bur a great deal hath been already said by: other Writers upon this invidious and beaten Subject; therefore I fhall let it fall, tho' the Point is commonly mistaken, especially by the

Law

Lawers; who of all others feem leaft to underftand the Nature of Government in general; like Under-workmen, who are expert enough, at making a fingle Wheel in a Clock, but are utterly ignorant how to adjust the feveral Parts, or regulate the Movement.

To return therefore from this Digrefion; It is a Church of England-Man's Opinion, that the Freedom of a Nation confifts in an abfolute Unlimited Legislative Power, wherein the whole Body of the People are fairly reprefented, and in an Execu tive Duly limited; because on this fide likewife there may be dangerous Degrees, and a very ill Extream. For when two Parties in a State are pretty equal in Power, Pretenfions, Merit, and Vir tue, (for thefe two laft are, with relation to Parties and a Court, quite different Things) it hath been the Opinion of the best Writers upon Government, that a Prince ought not in any.. fort to be under the Guidance or Influence of either, because he declines by this means from his Office of prefiding over the Whole, to be the Head of a Party which befides the Indignity, renders him answerable for all Publick Mifmanagements, and the Confequences of them; And in whatever State this happens, there muft either be a Weakness in the Prince or Miniftry, or elfe the former is too much restrained by the Legislature.

To conclude; A Church of England-Man may with Prudence and a good Confcience approve, the profeffed Principles of one Party more than the other, according as he thinks they beft promote the Good of Church and State; but he will never be fway'd by Paffion or Intereft, to advance an Opinion meerly because it is That

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