things of all. And hence the sciences seem to have their Hercules' Pillars, which bound the desires and hopes of mankind.

But as a false imagination of plenty is among the principal causes of want, and as too great a confidence in things present leads to a neglect of the future, it is necessary we should here admonish mankind that they do not too highly value or extol either the number or usefulness of the things hitherto discovered; for, by closely inspecting the multiplicity of books upon arts and sciences, we find them to contain numberless repetitions of the same things in point of invention, but differing indeed as to the manner of treatment; so that the real discoveries, though at the first view they may appear numerous, prove upon examination but few. And as to the point of usefulness, the philosophy we principally received from the Greeks must be acknowledged puerile, or rather talkative than generativeas being fruitful in controversies, but barren of effects.

The fable of Scylla seems a civil representation of the present condition of knowledge; for she exhibited the countenance and expression of a virgin, whilst barking monsters encircled her womb. Even thus the sciences have their specious and plausible generalities; but when we descend to particulars, which, like the organs of generation, should produce fruits and effects, then spring up loud altercations and controversies, which terminate in barren sterility. And had this not been a lifeless kind of philosophy, it were scarce possible it should have made so little progress in so many ages, insomuch, that not only positions now frequently remain positions still, but questions remain questions, rather riveted and cherished than determined by disputes; philosophy thus coming down to us in the persons of master and scholar, instead of inventor and improver. In the mechanic arts the case is otherwise these commonly advancing towards perfection in a course of daily improvement, from a rough unpolished state, sometimes prejudicial to the first inventors, whilst philosophy and the intellectual sciences are, like statues, celebrated and adored, but never advanced; nay, they sometimes appear most perfect in the original author, and afterwards degenerate. For since men have gone over in crowds to the opinion of their

leader, like those silent senators of Rome, they add not to the extent of learning themselves, but perform the se duty of waiting upon particular authors, and repeating t doctrines.

It is a fatal mistake to suppose that the sciences gradually arrived at a state of perfection, and then h recorded by some one writer or other; and that as noth better can afterwards be invented, men need but culti and set off what is thus discovered and completed; wher in reality, this registering of the sciences proceeds only f the assurance of a few and the sloth and ignorance of ma For after the sciences might thus perhaps in several pa be carefully cultivated; a man of an enterprising ger rising up, who, by the conciseness of his method, rend himself acceptable and famous, he in appearance erects art, but in reality corrupts the labours of his predecess This, however, is usually well received by posterity, readily gratifying their curiosity, and indulging their in lence. But he that rests upon established consent as judgment approved by time, trusts to a very fallacious a weak foundation; for we have but an imperfect knowled of the discoveries in arts and sciences, made public in di rent ages and countries, and still less of what has been do by particular persons, and transacted in private; so th neither the births nor miscarriages of time are to be fou in our records.

Nor is consent, or the continuance thereof, a thing of a account; for however governments may vary, there is b one state of the sciences, and that will for ever be democratic or popular. But the doctrines in greatest vogue among t people, are either the contentious and quarrelsome, or t showy and empty; that is, such as may either entrap t assent, or lull the mind to rest: whence, of course, th greatest geniuses in all ages have suffered violence; whil out of regard to their own character, they submitted to th judgment of the times, and the populace. And tl us whe any more sublime speculations happened to appear, they wer Commonly tossed and extinguished by the breath of popula opinion. Hence time, like a river, has brought down to u

• Pedarii senatores.

what is light and tumid, but sunk what was ponderous and solid. As to those who have set up for teachers of the sciences, when they drop their character, and at intervals speak their sentiments, they complain of the subtilty of nature, the concealment of truth, the obscurity of things, the entanglement of causes, and the imperfections of the human understanding; thus rather choosing to accuse the common state of men and things, than make confession of themselves. It is also frequent with them to adjudge that impossible in an art, which they find that art does not affect; by which means they screen indolence and ignorance from the reproach they merit. The knowledge delivered down to us is barren in effects, fruitful in questions, slow and languid in improvement, exhibiting in its generalities the counterfeits of perfection, but meagre in its details, popular in its aim, but suspected by its very promoters, and therefore defended and propagated by artifice and chicanery. And even those who by experience propose to enlarge the bounds of the sciences, scarce ever entirely quit the received opinions, and go to the fountainhead, but think it enough to add somewhat of their own; as prudentially considering, that at the time they show their modesty in assenting, they may have a liberty of adding. But whilst this regard is shown to opinions and moral considerations, the sciences are greatly hurt by such a languid procedure; for it is scarce possible at once to admire and excel an author: as water rises no higher than the reservoir it falls from. Such men, therefore, though they improve some things, yet advance the sciences but little, or rather amend than enlarge them.

There have been also bolder spirits, and greater geniuses, who thought themselves at liberty to overturn and destroy the ancient doctrine, and make way for themselves and their opinions; but without any great advantage from the disturbance; as they did not effectively enlarge philosophy and arts by practical works, but only endeavoured to substitute new dogmas, and to transfer the empire of opinion to themselves, with but small advantage; for opposite errors proceed mostly from common causes.

As for those who, neither wedded to their own nor others' opinions, but continuing friends to liberty, made use assistance in their inquiries, the success they met with did

-1ot answer expectation, the attempt, though laudable, b but feeble; for pursuing only the probable reason things, they were carried about in a circle of argume and taking a promiscuous liberty, preserved not the rigo true inquirers; whilst none of them duly conversed experience and things themselves. Others again, commit themselves to mechanical experience, yet make t experiments at random, without any method of inqu And the greatest part of these have no considerable vi but esteem it a great matter if they can make a single covery; which is both a trifling and unskilful proced as no one can justly or successfully discover the nature of one thing in that thing itself, or without numerous exp ments which lead to farther inquiries. And we must omit to observe, that all the industry displayed in experim has been directed by too indiscreet a zeal at some prejud effect, seeking those which produced fruit rather than kn ledge, in opposition to the Divine method, which on first day created time alone, delaying its material creati until the sun had illumined space.

Lastly, those who recommend logic as the best and sur instrument for improving the sciences, very justly obser that the understanding, left to itself, ought always to suspected. But here the remedy is neither equal to t disease, nor approved; for though the logic in use may properly applied in civil affairs, and the arts that are found in discourse and opinion, yet it by no means reaches t subtilty of nature; and by catching at what it cannot hol rather serves to establish errors, and fix them deeper, tha open the way of truth.b

Upon the whole, men do not hitherto appear to be happil inclined and fitted for the sciences, either by their own in dustry, or the authority of authors, especially as there is litt dependence to be had upon the common demonstrations an experiments; whilst the structure of the universe renders a labyrinth to the understanding; where the paths are no only everywhere doubtful, but the appearances of things and their signs deceitful; and the wreaths and knots of natur

b For exemplifications of these opinions, the reader may consul Morhof's "Polyhistor.," and the other writers upon polymathy and literary history. Shaw.

intricately turned and twisted: through all which we are only to be conducted by the uncertain light of the senses, that sometimes shines, and sometimes hides its head; and by collections of experiments and particular facts, in which no guides can be trusted, as wanting direction themselves, and adding to the errors of the rest. In this melancholy state of things, one might be apt to despair both of the understanding left to itself, and of all fortuitous helps; as of a state irremediable by the utmost efforts of the human genius, or the often-repeated chance of trial. The only clue and method is to begin all anew, and direct our steps in a certain order, from the very first perceptions of the senses. Yet I must not be understood to say that nothing has been done in former ages, for the ancients have shown themselves worthy of admiration in everything which concerned either wit or abstract reflection; but, as in former ages, when men at sea, directing their course solely by the observation of the stars, might coast along the shores of the continent, but could not trust themselves to the wide ocean, or discover new worlds, until the use of the compass was known: even so the present discoveries referring to matters immediately under the jurisdiction of the senses, are such as might easily result from experience and discussion; but before we can enter the remote and hidden parts of nature, it is requisite that a better and more perfect application of the human mind should be introduced. This, however, is not to be understood as if nothing had been effected by the immense labours of so many past ages; as the ancients have performed surprisingly in subjects that required abstract meditation, and force of genius. But as navigation was imperfect before the use of the compass, so will many secrets of nature and art remain undiscovered, without a more perfect knowledge of the understanding, its uses, and ways of working.

For our own part, from an earnest desire of truth, we have committed ourselves to doubtful, difficult, and solitary ways; and relying on the Divine assistance, have supported our minds against the vehemence of opinions, our own internal doubts and scruples, and the darkness and fantastic

By wreaths and knots, is understood the apparent complication of causes, and the superaddition of properties not essential to things; as light to heat, yellowness to gold, pellucidity to glass, &c. Shaw.