questions, he informed me that he had presented my suggestion to the cabinet, that Nicaragua should treat the Mosquitos within her limits as Great Britain and the United States treated their own Indians, under similar circumstances; and they thought, as he had done, that it was highly reasonable. I told him I was glad to learn this, and was happy to inform him I could now state, from advices received by the last steamer, that you were of the same opinion.

He then asked, in what manner shall we carry this into effect? and intimated that the appointment of commissioners by the two governments for this purpose might be the best mode of proceeding. I told him I was not then prepared to express an opinion on the subject, but would take it into consideration. The proportion of territory to be occupied by the Mosquitos until their title was extinguished by Nicaragua ought to depend very much upon their number. Lord John Russell had stated this to be thirty or forty thousand, whilst from my information, which was, however, vague, it did not exceed as many hundreds. He replied, that Mr. Green, the British consul and agent at Bluefields, was now in London, and had mentioned to him that my estimate of their number was probably correct in regard to the Mosquitos north of the San Juan, though there might be a thousand more; but that the Mosquitos south of the San Juan were so numerous as to render Lord John's estimate of the whole not excessive. I told him I had never heard that any portion of this tribe resided in Costa Rica, and I thought there must be some mistake in the statement of Mr. Green. He then asked what we should do with the grants of land which had been made to individuals by the king of the Mosquitos; and I answered that under the law of all European nations since the discovery of America, as well as by the uniform practice both of Great Britain and the United States, such grants made by Indians were absolutely void. I also stated to him, somewhat in detail, the decision on this point made by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Johnson vs. McIntosh, (8 Wheaton, 543,) to which he appeared to listen with marked attention.

After this we had a discursive and rambling conversation, embracing the Ruatan and Belize questions, the Clayton and Bulwer treaty, and several other matters which I do not propose to detail. In the course of it he stated distinctly that this treaty was, in their opinion, entirely prospective in its operation, and did not require them to abandon any of their possessions in Central America. At this I expressed my astonishment, and we discussed the point in an earnest but good natured manner.

In regard to Ruatan, he said he had the papers in a box before him to prove their title to that island; but it would consume too much time to read them, and therefore he had thought of submitting his views to me respecting it in writing. This suggestion pleased me much, as I desired to present to his lordship a memorandum which I had prepared, embracing our whole case in Central America. I told him, therefore, I should be much gratified to receive his views in writing; and at the same time informed him, that without changing our mode of personal conference, I desired also to deliver him a written memorandum to which he might at all times refer, containing a

statement of the case on the part of my government. With this he expressed himself to be much pleased. I am sorry that I shall not be able to furnish you a copy of this memorandum by the present steamer.

One incident may be worth particular mention. In the course of the conversation he said the Bay Islands were but of little value; but if British honor required their retention they could never be surrendered. I made some playful remark in reference to the idea of British honor being involved in so small an affair. He then became quite earnest on the point of honor, which might, he observed, be as much involved in subjects of little as of great value. To this I assented, but said, that when the construction of a treaty was really doubtful, which I did not admit upon the present occasion, and when the friendly relations between two great countries were at stake, there could in such a case be no point of honor involved in the one yielding to the other what was admitted to be of but little value. He replied that in this view of the case I might be correct.

In regard to Belize, there was not the least appearance of yielding on the part of his lordship. He repudiated the idea, with some warmth, that any person should suppose they had surrendered this settlement under the Clayton and Bulwer treaty.

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The time has therefore arrived when it becomes indispensable that I should receive the Presidents instructions on this point. In forming his opinion, it may be worthy of consideration, that the British have been in the actual possession of Belize, under treaty, for more than seventy years; that no period was fixed when they should withdraw from this possession; that Spain declared war against Great Britain on the 11th October, 1796; that an attack was made from Yucatan on Belize in 1798, which was repelled by the British settlers; and that for nearly a quarter of a century it has been under a regular colonial government, without attracting the notice of the United States.

In any event, I shall do my whole duty in first urging their withdrawal from the whole colony; and if that should not prove successful, then from the portion of it south of the Sibun. But what am I to do in case I shall be unsuccessful in both or either of these particulars? I shall await your answer with considerable anxiety.

When I pointed out to Lord Clarendon on Bailey's map, which lay before him, the extent of the encroachments which British settlers had made beyond the treaty limits, his only answer was, in a tone of pleasantry, that we ought not to complain of encroachments, and instanced our acquisition of Texas. I then took occasion to give him information on this subject, for which he thanked me, and said that he had never understood it before.

Returning again to the Mosquitos, am I to consent that they shall continue in the occupation of the territory assigned to them by the agreement between Messrs. Webster and Crampton, of April 30, 1852, until their title shall be extinguished by Nicaragua? Whether this assignment be unreasonable or not would depend much upon their

W number. You can doubtless ascertain at Washington whether any considerable number of the tribe inhabit the country south of the San Juan, as stated by Mr. Green.

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In regard to the Mosquitos, the question of the greatest difficulty would seem to be, in what manner can Great Britain and the United States interfere, as suggested by Lord Clarendon, to prevent Nicaragua from depriving these Indians of their right of occupancy without a fair equivalent. It would seem that this could be best accomplished by a treaty with Nicaragua. The whole detail presents embarrassments which will be annoying without the consent of Nicaragua, and yet I am persuaded the British government care little or nothing for this consent. They have evidently formed a very unfavorable opinion of that State, and greatly prefer Costa Rica. It would appear, from what his lordship informed me, Mr. Marcoleta had told Mr. Crampton that Costa Rica is jealous of the influence of Nicaragua with the United States.

You would naturally desire to know something of his Majesty the present king of the Mosquitos. I had, on a former occasion, stated to Lord Clarendon that he was drunken and worthless. At this interview his lordship informed me I was mistaken; that the present king was a decent and well behaved youth of between twenty-two and twenty-three, who resided in Mr. Green's family, though he believed his late Majesty, to whom I had doubtless referred, was a bad fellow. Yours, very respectfully,

Hon. Wм. L. MARCY,

Secretary of State.

JAMES BUCHANAN.

Statement for the Earl of Clarendon.

When the negotiations commenced, which resulted in the conclusion of the Clayton and Bulwer convention of April 19, 1850, the British government were in possession of the whole extensive coast of Central America, sweeping round from the Rio Hondo to the port and habor of San Juan de Nicaragua, except that portion [of] it between the Sarstoon and Cape Honduras, together with the adjacent Honduras island of Ruatan.

The government of the United States seriously contested the claim of Great Britain to any of these possessions, with the single exception of that part of the Belize settlement lying between the Rio Hondo and the Sebun, the usufruct of which, for a special purpose and with a careful reservation of his sovereign rights over it, had been granted. by the king of Spain to the British under the convention of 1786.

The progress of events had rendered Central America an object of special interest to all the commercial nations of the world, on account of the railroads and canals then proposed to be constructed through the isthmus, for the purpose of uniting the Atlantic and Pacific

oceans.

Great Britain and the United States, both having large and valua

ble possessions on the shores of the Pacific and an extensive trade with the countries beyond, it was natural that the one should desire to prevent the other from being placed in a position to exercise exclusive control, in peace or in war, over any of the grand thoroughfares between the two oceans. This was a main feature of the policy which dictated the Clayton and Bulwer convention. To place the two nations on an exact equality and thus to remove all causes of mutual jealousy, each of them agreed by this convention never to occupy, fortify, or exercise dominion over any portion of Central America. Both parties adopted this self-denying ordinance for the purpose of terminating serious misunderstandings then existing between them, which might have endangered their friendly relations.

Whether the United States acted wisely or not in relinquishing their right as an independent nation, to acquire territory in a region on their own continent, which may become necessary for the security of their communication with their important and valuable possessions on the Pacific, is another and a different question. But they have concluded the convention; their faith is pledged, and under such circumstances they never look behind the record.

The language of the convention is, properly, mutual, though in regard to the United States it can only restrain them from making future acquisitions, because it is well known that, in point of fact, they were not in the occupation of a foot of territory in Central America. In reference to Great Britain the case is different, and the language applies not only to the future, but the past; because she was then in the actual exercise of dominion over a very large portion of the eastern coast of Central America. Whilst, therefore, the United States has no occupancy to abandon, under the convention, Great Britain had extensive possessions to restore to the States of Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

And yet the British government, up till the present moment, have not deemed it proper to take the first step towards the performance of their obligations under this convention. They are still in the actual occupancy of nearly the whole coast of Central America, including the island of Ruatan, in the very same manner that they were before its conclusion. This delay, on their part, surely cannot proceed from any obscurity in the language of the convention.

The first article declares that the government of the United States and Great Britain agree, that neither will "occupy or fortify or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America.' And from abundant caution in view of the Mosquito protectorate, the article proceeds as follows: "Nor will either make use of any protection which either affords or may afford, or any alliance which either has or may have to or with any state or people for the purpose of * * * occupying, fortifying, or colonizing Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America, or of assuming or exercising dominion over the same." This rendered into plain English is, that the parties shall not exercise dominion over any part of Central America, either directly or indirectly, either by themselves or in the name of others.

It has been said that the first article of the convention acknowledged, by implication, the right of Great Britain to the Mosquito protectorate-a right which the United States have always contested and resisted; a right which would continue to Great Britain that entire control over the Nicaragua ship canal, and the other avenues of communication between the two oceans, which it was the very object of the convention to abolish, and to defeat that equality between the parties in Central America which was its special purpose to secure. Surely, the United States could never have been guilty of such a suicidal absurdity.

But, admitting, for the sake of argument merely, that the United States have acknowledged the existence of this protectorate, it would be difficult, restricted in its use as it has been by the convention, to conceive for what object of the least importance it could be employed. It assuredly could not be for the purpose of "occupying" "the Mosquito coast," or "of assuming or exercising dominion over the same,' because this has been expressly prohibited by the convention.

Great Britain has not even retired from the island of Ruatan, in obedience to the convention. Here no question can possibly arise from any alleged Mosquito protectorate. This is clearly a Central American island, belonging to the State of Honduras, and but thirty miles distant from her port of Truxillo. If the convention plainly embraces any object whatever, this must be Ruatan. And yet Great Britain has not only continued to occupy this island, but, since the date of the convention, she has actually established a colonial government over it. And not over it alone, but, adding thereto five other neighboring islands on the Central American coast, has converted them all into the British colony of the "Bay Islands." Public sentiment is quite unanimous, in the United States, that the establishment of this colony is a palpable violation both of the letter and spirit of the Clayton and Bulwer convention.

Ruatan is well known to be an island of great value and importance, on account of its excellent harbors, which are rare along that coast. Indeed, it has been described by a Spanish author "as the key of the Bay of Honduras, and the focus of the trade of the neighboring countries." Such is its commanding geographical position that Great Britain, in possession of it, could completely arrest the trade of the United States in its passage to and from the isthmus. In vain may the convention have prohibited Great Britain from erecting or maintaining any fortifications commanding the Nicaragua canal, or in other portions of Central America, if she shall continue to exercise dominion over "the Bay Islands.'

The United States now only ask that this convention shall be faithfully executed by both parties. They wish that every avenue of communication across the isthmus shall be opened, not merely for their own benefit, but for that of Great Britain and the whole world. In this respect they would not, if they could, acquire any peculiar advantages, because these might arouse the jealousy and distrust of other nations.

The rights and duties of the respective parties have been ascertained and determined by the convention itself; but as the justice of