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ship, April 12. The troops were landed the same night without opposition. On Vogdes's request, Adams landed some of his marines, and held in readiness five hundred seamen and marines to go if needed.1

Despite the conviction of the chief of engineers, General Totten, expressed in an elaborate paper of April 3 upon the situation at Sumter and Pickens, "that neither these measures nor any others now within our reach will in my opinion prevent the loss of Fort Pickens," there was, after April 12, no danger whatever; nor would there, with any display of energy and initiative, have been danger at any time. The despatch of the Powhatan was thus a perfectly useless measure unless Pensacola was to be taken, which it should have been, as Porter proposed and intended. Worden, it should be said, attempted to return by land, was taken prisoner and kept in confinement seven months, returning in time to command the Monitor in 1862.

Meigs to Seward, in War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 375. "War Records, Serial No. 1, pp. 232–235.

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AMON'S officiousness resulted in giving both to Anderson and to the Confederate authorities an impression that Sumter would surely be evacuated; hence Beauregard, March 26, wrote to Anderson offering facilities for removal, but asking his word of honor that the fort would be left without any preparation for its destruction or injury. This demand deeply wounded Anderson, and he resented it in a letter of the same date, saying, "If I can only be permitted to leave on the pledge you mention, I shall never, so help me God, leave this fort alive."1 Beauregard hastened to state that he had only alluded to the "pledge" on account of the "high source" from which the rumors appeared to come, and made a full amend, which re-established their usual relations.


(APRIL, 1861)

Anderson had informed Fox that, by placing the command on a short allowance, he could make the provisions last until after April 10; but not receiving instructions from the war department that it was 1 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 222.

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desirable to do so, it had not been done.1 He had already reported, March 31, that his last barrel of flour had been issued two days before.”

Anderson's little command, as he explained to Washington April 1, would now face starvation should the daily supply of fresh meat and vegetables, still allowed from Charleston, be cut off. Being in daily expectation, since the return of Colonel Lamon to Washington, of receiving orders to vacate the post, he had, to the great disadvantage of the food supply, kept the engineer laborers as long as he could. He. now asked permission to send them from Sumter; but the request, referred to Montgomery April 2 by Beauregard, was refused, unless all the garrison should go.3


April 1 an ice-laden schooner bound for Savannah entered Charleston harbor by mistake, and was fired upon by a Morris Island battery. Again the Sumter batteries were manned and a consultation held, at which five of the eight officers declared in favor of opening fire, but no action was taken by Anderson beyond sending an officer to the offending battery, from which word was returned by its commanding officer that he was simply carrying out his orders to fire upon any vessel carrying the United States colors which attempted to enter.

On April 4, Anderson assembled his officers, and for the first time made known to them the orders of

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January 10 and February 23, directing him to act strictly on the defensive. As Lieutenant Talbot had just been promoted captain and ordered to Washington, Anderson determined to send by him his despatches. In order to arrange for his departure, Talbot, April 4, accompanied Lieutenant Snyder, under a white flag, to call the attention of the governor to the fact that the schooner fired upon had not been warned by one of their own vessels, as had been arranged. It developed that the guard-vessel on duty had come in on account of heavy weather, and the commanding officer was consequently dismissed. The request to allow Talbot to proceed brought out the fact that orders had been received from Montgomery not to allow any portion of the 'garrison to leave the fort unless all should go,1—which, however, Beauregard construed, for the benefit of Talbot, to apply more particularly to laborers and enlisted men,2-and also that the following telegram from Commissioner Crawford had reached Charleston April 1: "I am authorized to say that this Government will not undertake to supply Sumter without notice to you. My opinion is that the President has not the courage to execute the order agreed upon in Cabinet for the evacuation of the fort, but that he intends to shift the responsibility upon Major Anderson by suffering him to be starved out. Would it not be

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well to aid in this by cutting off all supplies?" ' Beauregard had, the same day, sent the message to the Confederate secretary of war, with the remark, "Batteries here ready to open Wednesday or Thursday. What instructions?”

The knowledge of these telegrams called from Anderson, April 5, a pathetic despatch to the war department: "I cannot but think Mr. Crawford has misunderstood what he has heard in Washington, as I cannot think the Government could abandon, without instructions and without advice, a command which has tried to do all its duty to our country." He ended a fervent appeal for this act of justice with, "Unless we receive supplies I shall be compelled to stay here without food, or to abandon this post very early next week.' "At this time," says Doubleday, "the seeming indifference of the politicians to our fate made us feel like orphan children of the Republic, deserted by both the State and Federal administration." "

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War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 283.

* Doubleday, Sumter and Moultrie, 98.

• War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 235.

Two days later Anderson received a letter of April 4 from the secretary of war, informing him of the government's purpose to send the Fox expedition, and hoping that he would be able to sustain himself until the 11th or 12th. The same day he was informed by the Confederate authorities that the supply of provisions had been stopped, and late that



• Ibid., p 241.

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