to fight, he did all that lay in his power to assure himself of success, ployed the interval in exercising his soldiers and seamen at sea. and em He was soon informed that the Carthaginian fleet drew near, under the command of Hanno, who landed in a small island called Hiera, opposite to Drepanum. His design was to reach Eryx undiscovered by the Romans, in order to supply the army there; to reinforce his troops, and take Barcha on board to assist him in the expected engagement. But the consul, suspecting his intention, was beforehand with him; and having assembled all his best forces, sailed for the small island Egusa,* which lay near the other. He acquainted his officers with the design he had of attacking the enemy on the mor row. Accordingly, at day-break, he prepared to engage; unfortunately the wind was favourable for the enemy, which made him hesitate whether he should give them battle. But considering that the Carthaginian fleet, when unloaded of its provisions, would become lighter and more fit for action, and besides would be considerably strengthened by the forces and presence of Barcha, he came to a resolution at once; and, notwithstanding the foul weather, made directly to the enemy. The consul had choice forces. able seamen, and excellent ships, built after the model of a galley that had been lately taken from the enemy; and which was the most complete of its kind that had ever been seen. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, were destitute of all these advantages. As they had been the entire masters at sea for some years, and the Romans did not once dare to face them, they had them in the highest contempt, and looked upon themselves as invincible. On the first report of the enemy being in motion, the Carthaginians had put to sea a fleet fitted out in haste, as appeared from every circumstance of it: the soldiers and seamen being all mercenaries, newly levied, without the least experience, resolution, or zeal, since it was not for their own country they were going to fight. This soon appeared in the engagement. They could not sustain the first attack. Fifty of their vessels were sunk, and seventy taken, with their whole crews. The rest, favoured by a wind which rose very seasonably for them, made the best of their way to the little island from whence they had sailed. There were upwards of ten thousand taken prisoners. The consul sailed immediately for Lilybæum, and joined his forces to those of the besiegers. When the news of this defeat arrived at Carthage, it occasioned so much the greater surprise and terror, as it was less expected. The senate, however, did not lose their courage, though they saw themselves quite unable to continue the war. As the Romans were now masters of the sea, it was impossible for the Carthaginians to send either provisions or reinforcements to the armies in Sicily. An express was therefore immediately despatched to Barcha, the general there, empowering him to act as he should think proper. Barcha, so long as he had room to entertain the least hopes, had done every thing that could be expected from the most intrepid courage, and the most consummate wisdom. But having now no resource left, he sent a deputation to the consul, in order to treat about a peace. Prudence, says Polybius, consists in knowing how to resist or to yield at a seasonable conjuncture. Lutatius was not insensible how tired the Romans were grown of a war, which had exhausted them both of men and money; and the dreadful consequences which had attended on the inexorable and imprudent obstinacy of Regulus was fresh in his memory. He therefore complied without difficulty, and dictated the following treaty: "There shall be peace between Rome and Carthage (in case the Roman people approve of it,) on the following conditions: The Carthaginians shall entirely evacuate all Sicily; shall no longer make war upon Hiero, the Syracusans, or their allies; they shall restore to the Romans without ransom, all the prisoners which they have taken from them; and pay them, within twenty years, two thousand two hundred Euboic talents of silver." It is worth the reader's remark *They are now called gates. †This sum amounts to near six millions one hundred and eighty thousand French livres, or $2,286,600. ing, by the way, the simple, exact, and clear terms in which this treaty is expressed: that, in so short a compass, adjusts the interests, both by sea and land, of two powerful republics and their allies. When these conditions were brought to Rome, the people, not approving of them, sent ten commissioners to Sicily, to terminate the affair. These made no alteration as to the substance of the treaty; only shortening the time appointed for the payment, reducing it to ten years: a thousand talents were added to the sum that had been stipulated, which was to be paid immediately and the Carthaginians were required to depart from all the islands situated between Italy and Sicily.* Sardinia was not comprehended in this treaty, but they gave it up by another treaty some years after. Such was the conclusion of this war, the longest mentioned in history, since it continued twenty-four years without intermission. The obstinacy, in disputing for empire, was equal on either side; the same resolution, the same greatness of soul, in forming as well as in executing projects, being conspicuous on both sides. The Carthaginians had the superiority with regard to experience in naval affairs; in the strength and swiftness of their vessels; the working of them; the skill and capacity of the pilots; the knowledge of coasts, shallows, roads, and winds; and in the inexhaustible fund of wealth, which furnished all the expenses of so long and obstinate a war. The Romans had none of these advantages; but their courage, zeal for the public good, love of their country, and a noble emulation of glory, supplied all other deficiencies. We are astonished to see a nation, so raw and inexperienced in naval affairs, not only disputing the sea with a people who were best skilled in them, and more powerful than any that had ever been before; but even gaining several victories over them at sea. No difficulties or calamities could discourage them. They certainly would not have thought of peace, in the circumstances under which the Carthaginians demanded it. One unfortunate campaign dispirits the next; whereas the Romans were not shaken by a succession of them. As to the soldiers there was no comparison between those of Rome and of Carthage, the former being infinitely superior in point of courage; among the generals who commanded in this war, Hamilcar, surnamed Barcha, was doubtLess the most conspicuous for his bravery and prudence. THE LIBYAN WAR, OR WAR AGAINST THE MERCENARIES. THE war which the Carthaginians waged against the Romans was succeeded immediately by another. The very same year, which, though of much shorter continuance, was infinitely more dangerous; as it was carried on in the very heart of the republic, and attended with such cruelty and barbarity, as scarcely to be paralleled in history; I mean the war which the Carthaginians were obliged to sustain against their mercenary troops, who had served under them in Sicily, and commonly called the African or Libyan war. It continued only three years and a half, but was a very bloody one. The only occasion of it was this: As soon as the treaty was concluded with the Romans, Hamilcar having carried to Lilybæum the forces which were in Eryx, resigned his commission, and left to Gisco, governor of the place, the care of transporting these forces into Africa. Gisco, as though he had foreseen what would happen, did not ship them all off at once, but in small and separate parties; in order that those who came first might be paid off, and sent home, before the arrival of the rest. This conduct evinced great forecast and wisdom, but was not seconded equally at Carthage. As the republic had been exhausted by the expense of a long war, and the payment of nearly three millions French livres to the Ro Polyb. 1. iii. p. 182. Polyb. 1. i. p. 65-89. † A. M. 3736. A. Carth. 605. A. Rome, 507. Ant. J. C. 241. And sometimes ɛvinov, or the war with the mercenaries, fans on signing the peace, the forces were not paid off in proportion as they arrived; but it was thought proper to wait for the rest, in the hopes of obtain ing from them, when they should be all together, a remission of some part of their arrears. This was the first oversight. Here we discover the genius of a state composed of merchants, who know the full value of money, but do not estimate suficiently the merit of soldiers; who bargain for blood as if it were an article of trade, and always go to the cheapest market. In such a republic, when an exigency is once answered, the merit of services is no longer remembered. These soldiers, most of whom came to Carthage, being long accustomed to a licentious life, caused great disturbances in the city; to remedy which, it was proposed to their officers, to march them all to a little neighbouring town called Sicca, and there supply them with whatever was necessary for their subsistence, till the arrival of the rest of their companions; and that then they should all be paid off, and sent home. This was a second oversight. A third was, the refusing to let them leave their baggage, their wives and children, in Carthage, as they desired, and the forcing them to remove these to Sicca; whereas, had they staid in Carthage, they would have been in a manner so many hostages. Being all met together at Sicca, they began, having little else to do, to compute the arrears of their pay, which they made much more than was really due to them. To this computation they added the mighty promises which had been made them, at different times, as an encouragement for them to do their duty; and pretended that these likewise ought to be placed to account. Hanno, who was then governor of Africa, and had been sent to them from the magistrates of Carthage, proposed to these soldiers some remission of their arrears; and desired that they would content themselves with receiving a part in consideration of the great distress to which the commonwealth was reduced, and its present unhappy circumstances. The reader will easily guess how such a proposal was received. Complaints, murmurs, seditious and insolent clamours, were every where heard. These troops being composed of different nations, who were strangers to one another's language, were incapable of hearing reason when they once mutinied. Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians, inhabitants of the Balearic isles, Greeks, the greatest part of them slaves or deserters, and a very great number of Africans, composed these mercenary forces. Transported with rage, they immediately break up, march towards Carthage, being upwards of twenty thousand, and encamp at Tunis, not far from that metropolis. The Carthaginians too late discovered their error. There was no compliance, how grovelling soever, to which they did not stoop, to sooth these exasperated soldiers; who on their side practised every knavish art which could be thought of, in order to extort money from them. When one point was gained, they immediately had recourse to a new artifice, on which to ground some new demand. Was their pay settled beyond the agreement made with them, they still would be reimbursed for the losses which they pretended to have sustained, either by the death of horses, or by the excessive price which at certain times they had paid for bread-corn; and still insisted on the recompense which had been promised them. As nothing could be fixed, the Carthaginians, with great difficulty, prevailed on them to refer themselves to the opinion of some gereral who had commanded in Sicily. Accordingly, they pitched upon Gisco, who had always been very acceptable to them. This general harangued them in a mild and insinuating manner; recalled to their memories the long time they had been in the Carthaginian service; the considerable sums they had received from the republic; and granted almost all their demands. The treaty was upon the point of being concluded, when two mutineers occasioned a tumult in every part of the camp. One of these was Spendius, a Capuan, who had been a slave at Rome, and fled to the Carthaginians. He was tall, stout, and bold. The fear he was under of falling into the hands of his old master, by whom he was sure to be hanged, as was the custom, prompted him to break off the accommodation. He was seconded by one Matho,* who had been very active in forming the conspiracy. These two represented to the Africans, that the instant after their companions should be discharged and sent home, they, being thus left alone in their own country, would fall a sacrifice to the rage of the Carthaginians, who would take vengeance upon them for the common rebellion. This was sufficient to raise them to fury. They immediately made choice of Spendius and Matho for their chiefs. No remonstrances were heard; and whoever offered to make any, was immediately put to death. They ran to Gisco's tent, plundered it of the money designed for the payment of the forces; dragged even that general himself to prison, with all his attendants, after having treated them with the utmost indignities. All the cities of Africa to whom they had sent deputies, to exhort them to recover their liberty, came over to them, Utica and Hippacra excepted, which they therefore besieged. Carthage had never before been exposed to such imminent danger. The citizens of it, to a man, drew their particular subsistence from the rents and revenues of their lands, and the public expenses from the tribute paid from Africa. But all this was stopped at once, and, a much worse circumstance, was urned against them. They found themselves destitute of arms and forces ither for sea or land; of all necessary preparations either for the sustaining f a siege or the equipping of a fleet; and, to complete their misfortunes, ithout any hopes of foreign assistance, either from their friends or allies. They might in some sense accuse themselves for the distress to which they ere reduced. During the last war, they had treated the African nations with e utmost rigour, by imposing excessive tributes on them, in the exaction of hich, no allowance was made for poverty and extreme misery; and governors, uch as Hanno, were treated with the greater respect, the more severe they had been in levying those tributes. So that these Africans were easily prevail ed upon to engage in this rebellion. At the very first signal that was made, it broke out, and in a moment became general. The women, who had often, with the deepest affliction, seen their husbands and fathers dragged to prison for non-payment, were more exasperated than the men, and with pleasure gave up all their ornaments towards the expenses of the war; so that the chiefs of the rebels, after paying all they had promised the soldiers, found themselves, still in the midst of plenty. An instructive lesson, says Polybius, to ministers; as it teaches them to look, not only to the present occasion, but to extend their views to futurity. The Carthaginians, notwithstanding their present distress, did not despond, but made the most extraordinary efforts for their defence. The command of the army was given to Hanno. Troops were levied by land and sea, horse as well as foot. All citizens, capable of bearing arms, were mustered, mercenaries were invited from all parts, and all the ships which the republic had left were refitted. The rebels discovered no less ardour. We related before, that they had besieged two cities which refused to join them. Their army was now increased to seventy thousand men. After detachments had been drawn from it to carry on these sieges, they pitched their camp at Tunis, and thereby held Carthage in a kind of blockade, filling it with perpetual alarms, and frequently advancing up to its very walls, by day as well as by night. Hanno had marched to the relief of Utica, and gained a considerable advantage, which, had he made a proper use of it, might have proved decisive: Matho was an African, and free-born; but as he had been active in raising the rebellion, an accommodation would have ruined him. He therefore, despairing of a pardon, embraced the interest of Spendius with more zeal than any of the rebels; and first insinuated to the Africans the danger of concluding a peace, as this would leave them alone, and exposed to the rage of their old masters.-Polyb. p. 98. Edit Gronov. but entering the city, and only diverting himself there, the mercenaries, whe were posted on a neighbouring hill covered with trees, hearing how careles the enemy were, poured down upon them, found the soldiers every where of their duty, took and plundered the camp, and seized upon all their provisions &c. brought from Carthage to succour the besieged. Nor was this the only error committed by Hanno; and errors, on such occasions, are by much the most fatal. Hamilcar, surnamed Barcha, was therefore appointed to succee him. This general answered the idea which had been entertained of him and his first success was in obliging the rebels to raise the siege of Utica He then marched against their army, which was encamped near Carthage defeated part of it, and seized almost all their advantageous posts. Thes successes revived the courage of the Carthaginians. The arrival of a young Numidian nobleman, Naravasus by name, who, ou! of his esteem for the person and merit of Barcha, joined him with two thousand Numidians, and was of great service to that general. Animated by this rein forcement, he fell upon the rebels, who had enclosed him in a valley, killed ten thousand of them, and took four thousand prisoners. The young Numidia distinguished himself greatly in his battle. Barcha received among his troop as many of the prisoners as were desirous of being enlisted, and gave the rest liberty to go wherever they pleased, on condition that they should never take up arms again against the Carthaginians; otherwise, that every man of ther who was taken should be put to death. This conduct proves the wisdom o that general. He thought this a better expedient than extreme severity And indeed, where a multitude of mutineers are concerned, the greatest pa of whom were drawn in by the persuasion of the most hot-headed, or throug fear of the most furious, clemency seldom fails of being successful. Spendius, the chief of the rebels, fearing that this affected lenity of Barch might occasion a defection among his troops, thought the only expedient le him to prevent it would be, to put them upon some signal action, in order t deprive them of all hopes of being ever reconciled to the enemy. With th view, after having read to them some fictitious letters, by which advice wa given him of a secret design, concerted between some of their comrades an Gisco, for the rescuing him out of prison, where he had been so long detainee he brought them to the barbarous resolution of murdering him and all the re of the prisoners; and any man who durst offer any milder counsel was imme diately sacrificed to their fury. Accordingly, this unfortunate general, an seven hundred prisoners, who were confined with him, were brought out t the head of the camp, where Gisco fell the first sacrifice, and afterwards a the rest. Their hands were cut off, their thighs broke, and their bodies, sti breathing, were thrown into a hole. The Carthaginians sent a herald to de mand their remains, in order to pay them the last sad office, but were reftsed; and the herald was further told, that whoever presumed to come upo the like errand, should meet with Gisco's fate. And indeed the rebels imme diately came to this unanimous resolution, viz. to treat all such Carthaginian as should fall into their hands in the same barbarous manner; and decree further, that if any of their allies were taken, they should, after their hand were cut off, be sent back to Carthage. This bloody resolution was but to strictly executed. The Carthaginians were now just beginning to breathe, as it were, and re cover their spirits, when a number of unlucky accidents plunged them again into fresh dangers. A division arose among their generals: and the provisions, of which they were in extreme necessity, coming to them by sea, were all cast away in a storm. But their most grievous misfortune was, the sudden defection of the two only cities which till then had preserved their allegiance, and in all times adhered inviolably to the commonwealth. These were Utica and Hippacra. These cities, without the least reason, or even so much as a pretence, went over at once to the rebels, and, transported with the like rage and fury, murdered the governor, with the garrison sent to their |