Upon the death of that general, the suffrages of both the army and people concurred in raising Hannibal to the supreme command.* I know not whether it was not even then, or about that time, that the republic, to heighten his influence and authority, appointed him one of its suffetes, the first dignity of the state, which was sometimes conferred on generals. It is from Cornelius Nepost that we have borrowed this circumstance of his life, who, speaking of the prætorship bestowed on Hannibal, upon his return to Carthage, and the conclusion of the peace, says, that this was twenty-two years after he had been nominated king.

The moment he was created general, Hannibal, as if Italy had been allotted to him, and he was even then appointed to make war upon the Romans, se cretly turned his whole views on that side and lost no time, for fear of being prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. In Spain he took several strong towns, and conquered many nations: and although the Spaniards greatly exceeded him in the number of forces, their army amounting to up wards of one hundred thousand men, yet he chose his time and posts so judiciously, that he entirely defeated them. After this victory every thing submitted to his arms. But he still forbore laying siege to Saguntum, carefully avoiding every occasion of a rupture with the Romans, till he should be furnished with all things necessary for so important an enterprise, pursuant to the advice given by his father. He applied himself particularly to engage the affections of the citizens and allies, and to gain their confidence, by generously allotting them a large share of the plunder taken from the enemy, and by scrupulously paying them all their arrears :|| a wise step, which never fails of producing its advantage at a proper season.

The Saguntines, on their side, sensible of the danger with which they were threatened, informed the Romans of the progress of Hannibal's conquests. Upon this, deputies were nominated by the latter, and ordered to go and examine the state of affairs upon the spot; they were also to lay their complaints before Hannibal, if it should be thought proper; and in case he should refuse to do justice, they should then go directly to Carthage, and make the same complaints.

In the mean time Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, promising himself great advantages from the taking of this city. He was persuaded, that this would deprive the Romans of all hopes of carrying their war into Spain; that this new conquest would secure those he had already made; that as no enemy would be left behind him, his march would be more secure and unmolested; that he should find money enough in it for the execution of his designs; that the plunder of the city would inspire his soldiers with greater ardour, and make them follow him more cheerfully; that, lastly, the spoils which he should send to Carthage, would gain him the favour of the citizens. Animated by these motives, he carried on the siege with the utmost vigour. He himself set an example to his troops, was present at all the works, and exposed him. slf to the greatest dangers.

News was soon carried to Rome that Saguntum was besieged. But the Romans, instead of flying to its relief, lost their time in fruitless debates, and equally insignificant deputations. Hannibal sent word to the Roman deputies, that he was not at leisure to hear them; they therefore repaired to Carthage, but met with no better reception, the Barcinian faction having prevailed over the complaints of the Romans, and all the remonstrances of Hanno.

During all these voyages and negotiations, the siege was carried on with great vigour. The Saguntines were now reduced to the last extremity, and

* A. M. 3784. A. Carth, 626. A. Rome, 528. Polyb. 1. iii. p. 178, 179. Liv. 1. xxi. n. 3—5.

In Vit. Annib. c. 7.

Hic ut rediit prætor factus est, postquam rex fuerat anno secundo et vigesimo.

This city lay on the Carthaginian side of the Iberus, very near the mouth of that river, and in a country where the Carthaginians were allowed to make war; but Saguntum, as an ally of the Romans, was excepted from all hostilities, by virtue of the late treaty.

fbi large partiendo prædam, stipendia præterita cum fide exsolvendo, cunctos civium sociorumque, an imos in se firmavit.-Liv. 1. xxi. n. 5. Polyb. l. iii. p. 170, 171. Liv. l. xxi. n. 6-15

In want of all things. An accommodation was thereupon proposed; but the conditions on which it was offered appeared so harsh, that the Saguntines could not prevail upon themselves to accept them. Before they gave their final answer, the principal senators, bringing their gold and silver, and that of the public treasury, into the market-place, threw both into a fire lighted for that purpose, and afterwards rushed headlong into it themselves. At the same time a tower, which had been long assaulted by the battering rams, falling with a dreadful noise, the Carthaginians entered the city by the breach, soon made themselves masters of it, and cut to pieces all the inhabitants who were of age to bear arms. But, notwithstanding the fire, the Carthaginians got a very great booty. Hannibal did not reserve to himself any part of the spoils gained by his victories, but applied them solely to carrying on his enterprises. Accordingly Polybius remarks, that the taking of Saguntum was of service to him, as it awakened the ardour of his soldiers, by the sight of the rich booty which they had just obtained, and by the hopes of more; and it reconciled all the principal persons of Carthage to Hannibal, by the large presents he made to them out of the spoils.

Words could never express the grief and consternation with which the melancholy news of the capture and the cruel fate of Saguntum was received at Rome. Compassion for this unfortunate city; shame for having failed to succour such faithful allies; a just indignation against the Carthaginians, the authors of all these calamities; a strong alarm raised by the successes of Hannibal, whom the Romans fancied they saw already at their gates; all these sentiments caused so violent an emotion, that, during the first moments of their agitation, the Romans were unable to come to any resolution, or do any thing, but give way to the torrent of their passion, and sacrificed floods of tears to the memory of a city, which fell the victim of its inviolable fidelity! to the Romans, and had been betrayed by their unaccountable indolence and imprudent delays. When they were a little recovered, an assembly of the people was called, and war was unanimously decreed against the Carthaginians.

WAR PROCLAIMED.

THAT NO ceremony might be wanting, deputies were sent to Carthage, to inquire whether Saguntum had been besieged by order of the republic, and if so, to declare war ; or, in case this siege had been undertaken solely by the authority of Hannibal, to require that he should be delivered up to the Romans. The deputies perceiving that the senate gave no direct answer to their demands, one of them taking up the fold of his robe, I bring here, says he, in a haughty tone, either peace or war; the choice is left to yourselves. The senate answering, that they left the choice to him, I give you war then, says he, unfolding his robe: and we, replied the Carthaginians, with the same haughtiness, as heartily accept it, and are resolved to prosecute it with the same cheerfulness. Such was the beginning of the second Punic war.

If the cause of this war should be ascribed to the taking of Saguntum,§ the whole blame, says Polybius, lies upon the Carthaginians, who could not, with any colourable pretence, besiege à city that was in alliance with Rome, and as such, comprehended in the treaty, which forbade either party to make war upon the allies of the other. But, should the origin of this war be traced higher, and carried back to the time when the Carthaginians were dispossessed of Sardinia by the Romans, and a new tribute was so unreasonably imposed on them; it must be confessed, continues Polybius, that the conduct of ne Romans is entirely unjustifiable on these two points, as being founded merely on violence and injustice; and that, had the Carthaginians, without having recourse to ambiguous and frivolous pretences, plainly demanded

Polyb. p. 174, 175. Liv. l. xxi. n. 16, 17.

↑ Sanctitate disciplinæ, quâ fidem socialem usque ad perniciem suam coluerunt.-Liv. 1. xxi. a 2 Polyb. p. 187. Liv. l. xxi. n. 18, 19. Polyb. l. iii. p. 184, 185.

satisfaction upon these two grievances, and upon their being refused it, had declared war against Rome, in that case reason and justice had been entirely on their side.

The interval between the conclusion of the first, and the beginning of the second Punic war, was twenty-four years.

THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.

When war was resolved upon and proclaimed on both sides, Hannibal, who was then twenty-six or twenty-seven years of age, before he discovered his grand design, thought it incumbent on him to provide for the security of Spain and Africa. With this view, he marched the forces out of the one into the other, so that the Africans served in Spain, and the Spaniards in Africa. He was prompted to this from a persuasion, that these soldiers, being thus at a distance from their respective countries, would be fitter for service, and more firmly attached to him, as they would be a kind of hostages for each other's fidelity. The forces which he left in Africa amounted to about forty thousand men, twelve hundred whereof were cavalry: those of Spain were somewhat more than fifteen thousand, of which two thousand five hundred and fifty were cavalry. He left the command of the Spanish forces to his brother Asdrubal, with a fleet of about sixty ships to guard the coast; and at the same time gave him the wisest counsel for his conduct, both with regard to the Spaniards or the Romans, in case they should attack him.

Livy observes, that Hannibal, before he set forward on this expedition, went to Cadiz to discharge his vows made to Hercules; and that he engaged himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was entering upon. Polybius gives us, in few words, a very clear idea of the distance of the several places through which Hannibal was to march in his way to Italy. From New Carthage, whence he set out to the Iberus, was computed two thousand two hundred furlongs. From the Iberus to Emporium, a small maritime town, which separates Spain from the Gauls, according to Straboll was sixteen hundred furlongs. From Emporium to the pass of the Rhone, the like distance of sixteen hundred furlongs.** From the pass of the Rhone to the Alps fourteen hundred furlongs.tt From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred furlongs. Thus, from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, were eight thousand furlongs.§§

Hannibal had, long before, taken all proper measures to discover the nature and situation of the places through which he was to pass ; to know how the Gauls were affected to the Romans; to win over their chiefs, whom he knew to be very greedy of gold, by his bounty to them;¶¶ and to secure to himself the affection and fidelity of a part of the nations through whose country he was to march. He was not ignorant, that the passage of the Alps would be attended with great difficulties, but he knew they were not insurmountable, and that was enough for his purpose.

Hannibal began his march early in the spring, from New Carthage, where he had wintered. His army then consisted of more than a hundred thousand men, of which twelve thousand were cavalry, and he had nearly forty elephants. Having crossed the Iberus, he soon subdued the several nations which opposed him in his march, but lost a considerable part of his army in this expedition. He left Hanno to command all the country lying between the Iberus and the Pyrenean hills, with eleven thousand men, who were appointed to guard the baggage of

* A. M. 3787. A. Carth. 629. A. Rome, 531. Ant. J. C. 217. Polyb. 1. iii. p. 187. Liv. 1. xxi. n. 21, 22. † Polyb. l. iii. p. 192, 193. Two hundred and seventy-five miles. Polybius makes the distance from New Carthage to be 2600 furlongs; consequently the whole number of furlongs will be 8400, or, allowing 625 feet to the furlong, 994 English miles, and almost one third.-See Polyb. Edit. Gronov. p. 267. Polyb. I. iii. p. 199. ¶ 200 miles. #150 miles. §§ 1000 miles. Polyb. I. iii. p. 188, 189. TT Polyb. 1. iii. p. 190. Liv. 1. xxi. n. 22-24. **Audierunt præoccupatos jam ab Annibale Gallorum animos esse; sed ne illi quidem ipsi satis mitem gentem fore, ni subinde auro, cujus avidissima gens est, principum animi concilientur.-Liv. 1. xxi. n. 20

**200 miles. tt 175 miles.

those who were to follow him. He dismissed the like number, sending them back to their respective countries; thus securing to himself their affection when he should want recruits, and assuring the rest that they should be allowed to return whenever they should desire it. He passed the Pyrenean hills and advanced as far as the banks of the Rhone, at the head of fifty thousand foot, and nine thousand horse; a formidable army, but less so from the number, than from the valour of the troops that composed it; troops who had served several years in Spain, and learned the art of war, under the ablest captains that Carthage could ever boast.

PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.

HANNIBAL* being arrived within about four days march from the mouth of the Rhone,† attempted to cross it, because the river, in this place, took up only the breadth of its channel. He brought up all the ship boats and small vessels he could meet with, of which the inhabitants had a great number, because of their commerce. He likewise built with great diligence a prodigious number of boats, small vessels, and rafts. On his arrival, he found the Gauls encamped on the opposite bank, and prepared to dispute the passage. There was no possibility of his attacking them in front. He therefore ordered a considerable detachment of his forces, under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, to pass the river higher up; and, in order to conceal his march, and the design he had in view, from the enemy, he obliged them to set out in the night. All things succeeded as he desired; and the river was passed the next day without the least opposition.‡

They passed the rest of the day in refreshing themselves, and in the night they advanced silently towards the enemy. In the morning, when the signals agreed upon had been given, Hannibal prepared to attempt the passage. Part of his horses, completely harnessed, were put into boats, that their riders might, on their landing, immediately charge the enemy. The rest of the horses swam over on both sides of the boats, from which one single man held the bridles of three or four. The infantry crossed the river, either on rafts, or in small boats, and in a kind of gondolas, which were only the trunks of trees they themselves had made hollow. The large boats were drawn up in a line at the top of the channel, in order to break the force of the waves, and facilitate the passage to the rest of the fleet. When the Gauls saw it advancing on the river, they, according to their custom, broke into dreadful cries and howlings, and, clashing their bucklers over their heads, one against the other, let fly a shower of darts. But they were prodigiously astonished, when they heard a great noise behind them, saw their tents on fire, and themselves attacked both in front and rear. They now had no way left to save themselves but by flight, and accordingly retreated to their respective villages. After this, the rest of the troops crossed the river quietly, and without any opposition.

The elephants were still behind, and occasioned a great deal of trouble. They were wafted over the next day in the following manner: From the bank of the river was thrown a raft, two hundred feet in length, and fifty in breadth; this was strongly fixed to the banks by large ropes, and quite covered over with earth, so that the elephants, deceived by its appearance, thought themselves upon firm ground. From this first raft they proceeded to a second, which was built in the same form, but only a hundred feet long, and fastened to the former by chains that were easily loosened. The female elephants were put upon the first raft, and the males followed after; and, when they were got upon the second raft, it was loosened from the first, and by the help of small boats towed to the opposite shore. After this, it was sent back to fetch those which were behind. Some fell into the water, but they at last got safe to shore, and not a single elephant was drowned.

THE MARCH AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE RHONE.

THE two Roman consuls had, in the beginning of the spring, set out for their respective provinces; P. Scipio for Spain with sixty ships, two Roman legions, fourteen thousand foot, and twelve bindred horse of the allies; Tiberius Sempronius for Sicily, with a hundred and sixty ships, two legions, sixteen thou sand foot, and eighteen hundred horse of the allies.* The Roman legion con sisted, at that time, of four thousand foot, and three hundred horse. Sempronius had made extraordinary preparations at Lilybæum, a seaport town in Sicily, with the design of crossing over directly into Africa. Scipio was equally confident that he should find Hannibal still in Spain, and make that country the seat of war. But he was greatly astonished, when, on his arrival at Marseilles, advice was brought him that Hannibal was upon the banks of the Rhone, and preparing to cross it. He then detached three hundred horse, to view the posture of the enemy; and Hannibal detached five hundred Numidian horse for the same purpose, during which some of his soldiers were employed in transporting the elephants.

At the same time he gave audience, in the presence of his whole army, to ne of the princes of that part of Gaul which is situated near the Po, who assured him, by an interpreter, in the name of his subjects, that his arrival was impatiently expected, that the Gauls were ready to join him, and march against the Romans; that he himself would conduct his army through places where they should meet with a plentiful supply of provisions. When the prince was withdrawn, Hannibal, in a speech to his troops, magnified extremely this deputation from the Gauls; extolled with just praises, the bravery which his forces had shown hitherto, and exhorted them to sustain to the last their reputation and glory. The soldiers, inspired with fresh ardour and courage, declared, with uplifted hands, their readiness to follow wherever he should lead the way. Accordingly he appointed the next day for his march; and after offering up vows, and making supplications to the gods for the safety of his troops, he dismissed them, desiring, at the same time, that they would take necessary refreshments.

While this was doing the Numidians returned. They had met with and charged the Roman detachment: the conflict was very obstinate, and the slaughter great, considering the small number of combatants. A hundred and sixty of the Romans were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of their enemies. But the honour of this skirmish fell to the Romans, the Numidians having retired, and left them the field of battle. This first action was interpreted as an omen of the fate of the whole war, and seemed to promise success to the Romans, but which, at the same time, would be dearly bought, and strongly contested.† On both sides, those who had survived this engagement, and who had been engaged in reconnoitering, returned to inform their respective generals of what they had discovered.

Hannibal, as he had declared, decamped the next day, and crossing through the midst of Gaul, advanced northward; not that this was the shortest way to the Alps, but only as it led him from the sea, it prevented his meeting Scipio; and, by that means favoured the design he had of marching all his forces into Italy, without lessening them by fighting.

Though Scipio marched with the utmost expedition, he did not reach the place where Hannibal had passed the Rhone, till three days after he had set out from it. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he returned to his fleet, and reimbarked, fully resolved to wait for Hannibal at the foot of the Alps. But, in order that he might not leave Spain defenceless, he sent his brother Cneius thither, with the greatest part of his army, to make head against As

*Polyb. l. iii. p. 200-202, &c. Liv. l. xxi. n. 1, 32.

Hoc principium simulque omen belli, ut summâ rerum prosperus eventum, ita haud sanè incruent. ancipitisque certaminis victoriam Romanis portendit.--Liv, 1. xxi. n. 9.