In the first place, the king there spoken of, that is, Darius, was one of the most celebrated princes that ever reigned in Persia, and one of the most deserving, on account of his wisdom and prudence; though he had his failings. It is to him, as well as to Cyrus, that the greatest part of those excellent laws are ascribed, which have ever since subsisted in that country, and have been the foundation and standard of their government. Now, this prince, notwithstanding his extraordinary penetration and ability, thought he stood in need of council; nor did he apprehend, that the joining of a number of assistants to himself, for the determination of affairs, would be any discredit to his own understanding: by which proceeding, he really showed a superiority of genius which is very uncommon, and supposes a great fund of merit. For a prince of slender talents, and narrow capacity, is generally full of himself; and the less understanding he has, the more obstinate and untractable is he generally. He thinks it want of respect, to offer to discover any thing to him which he does not perceive; and is affronted, if you seem to doubt that he, who is supreme in power, is not the same in penetration and understanding. But Darius had a different way of thinking, and did nothing without counsel and advice: Illorum faciebat cuncta consilio.

Secondly, Darius, however absolute he was, and however jealous he might be of his prerogative, did not think he derogated from either, when he instituted that council; for the council did not at all interfere with the king's authority of ruling and commanding, which always resides in the person of the prince, but was confined entirely to that of reason, which consisted in communicating and imparting their knowledge and experience to the king. He was persuaded that the noblest character of sovereign power, when it is pure, and has neither degenerated from its origin, nor deviated from its end, is to govern by the laws; to make them the rule of his will and desire; and to think nothing allowable for him, which they prohibit.*

In the third place, this council, which every where accompanied the king, was a perpetual standing council, consisting of the greatest men, and the best heads in the kingdom; who, under the direction of the sovereign, and always with a dependency upon him, were in a manner the source of public order, and the principle of all the wise regulations and transactions at home and abroad. By this council the king discharged himself of several weighty cares, which must otherwise have overburdened him; and by them he likewise executed whatever had been resolved on. It was by means of this standing council, that the great maxims of the state were preserved; the knowledge of its true interest perpetuated; affairs carried on with harmony and order; and innovations, errors, and oversights, prevented. For in a public and general council, things are discussed by unsuspected persons; all the ministers are mutual inspectors of one another; all their knowledge and experience in public matters are united together; and they all become equally capable of every part of the administration; because, though, as to the executive part, they move only in one particular sphere of business, yet they are obliged to inform themselves in all affairs relating to the public, that they may be able to deliver their opinions in a judicious manner.

The fourth and last reflection I have to make on this head is, that we find it mentioned in Scripture, that the persons of which this council consisted, were thoroughly acquainted with the customs, laws, maxims, and rights of the kingdom.

Two things, which, as the Scripture informs us, were practised by the Persians, might very much contribute to instruct the king and his council in the methods of governing with wisdom and prudence. The first was, their having public registers, wherein all the prince's edicts and ordinances, all the privileges granted to the public, and all the favours conferred upon particular persons, were entered and recorded. The second was, the annals of the kingdom,

* Regimur a te, et subjecti tibi, sed quemadmodum legibus, sumus.-Plin. Paneg, Traj.
t1 Esd. v. 17, and vi. 2.

In which all the events of former reigns, all resolutions taken, regulations established, and services done by particular persons, were exactly entered.* These annals were carefully preserved, and frequently perused both by the kings and the ministers, that they might acquaint themselves with times past; might have a clear and true idea of the state of the kingdom; avoid an arbitrary, unequal, uncertain conduct; maintain a uniformity in the course of affairs; and in short, acquire such light from the perusal of these books, as should qualify them to govern the state with wisdom.

SECTION III.-THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

To be king, and to be judge, is but one and the same thing. The throne is but a tribunal, and the sovereign power is the highest authority for adminis tering justice. "God hath made you king over his people," said the queen of Sheba to Solomon, "to the end that you should judge them, and render justice and judgment unto them." God hath made every thing subject to princes, to put them in a condition of fearing none but him. His design, in making them independent, was to give them the more inviolable attachment to justice. That they might not excuse themselves on pretence of inability, or want of power, he has delegated his whole power unto them; he has made them masters of all the means requisite for restraining injustice and oppression, that iniquity should tremble in their presence, and be incapable of hurting any person whatever.

But what is that justice which God hath put into the hands of kings, and of which he hath made them depositaries? Surely it is nothing else than order; and order consists in observing a universal equity, and that force may not usurp the place of law; that one man's property be not exposed to the violence of another; that the common band of society be not broken: that artifice and fraud may not prevail over innocence and simplicity; that all things may rest in peace under the protection of the laws, and the weakest among the people may find his sanctuary in the public authority.

We learn from Josephus, that the kings of Persia used to administer justice in their own persons. And it was to qualify them for the due discharge of this duty, that care was taken to have them instructed, from their tenderest youth, in the knowledge of the laws of their country; and that in their public schools, as we have already mentioned in the history of Cyrus, they were taught equity and justice, in the same manner as rhetoric and philosophy are taught in other places.

These are the great and essential duties of the regal dignity. Indeed it is reasonable, and absolutely necessary, that the prince be assisted in the execution of that august function, as he is in others: but to be assisted is not to be deprived, or dispossessed. He continues judge, as long as he continues king.. Though he communicates his authority, yet does he not resign or divide it. It is therefore absolutely necessary for him to bestow some time upon the study of equity and justice; not that he need enter into the whole detail of particular laws, but only acquaint himself with the principal rules and maxims of the law of his country, that he may be capable of doing justice, and of speaking wisely upon important points. For this reason, the kings of Persia never ascended the throne, till they had been for some time under the care and instruction of the Magi, who were to teach them that science of which they were the only masters and professors, as well as of theology.

Now, since to the sovereign alone is committed the right of administering justice, and since, within his dominions, there is no other power of administering it, than what is delegated by him; how greatly does it behoove him to take care into what hands he commits a part of so great a trust; to know whether those he places so near the throne are worthy to partake of such a prerogative; and strictly to keep all such at a distance from it, as he judges un

Esd. iv. 15. and Esth. vi. 1.

† Antiq. Judaic, 1. xi, c. 3.

worthy! We find that in Persia, their kings were extremely careful to have justice rendered with integrity and impartiality. One of their royal judges, for so they called them, having suffered himself to be corrupted by bribery, was condemned by Cambyses to be put to death without mercy, and to have his skin put upon the seat where he used to sit and give judgment, and where his son, who succeeded him in his office, was to sit, that the very place whence he gave judgment should remind him of his duty.*

Their ordinary judges were taken out of the class of old men, into which none were admitted till the age of fifty years; so that a man could not exercise the office of a judge before that age, the Persians being of opinion, that too much maturity could not be required in an employment which disposed of the fortunes, reputations, and lives of their fellow-citizens.†

Among them, it was not lawful either for a private person to put any of his slaves to death, or for the prince to inflict capital punishment upon any of his subjects for the first offence; because it might rather be considered as an effect of human weakness and frailty, than of a confirmed malignity of mind.‡

The Persians thought it reasonable to put the good as well as the evil, the merits of the offender as well as his demerits, into the scales of justice: nor was it just, in their opinion, that one single crime should obliterate all the good actions a man had done during his life. Upon this principle it was that Darius, having condemned a judge to death for some prevarication in his office, and afterwards calling to mind the important services he had rendered both the state and the royal family, revoked the sentence at the very moment in which it was to be executed, and acknowledged that he had pronounced it with more precipitation than wisdom.||

But one important and essential rule which they observed in their judgments, was, in the first place, never to condemn any person without confronting him with his accuser, and without giving him time, and all other means necessary, for defending himself against the articles laid to his charge: and, in the second place, if the person accused was found innocent, to inflict the very same punishment upon the accuser, as the other was to have suffered, had he been found guilty. Artaxerxes gave a fine example of the just rigour which ought to be exercised on such occasions. One of the king's favourites, ambitious of getting a place possessed by one of his best officers, endeavoured to make the king suspect the fidelity of that officer; and to that end, sent informations to court full of calumnies against him, persuading himself that the king, from the great credit he had with his majesty, would believe the thing upon his bare word, without farther examination. For, such is the general character of calumniators. They are afraid of evidence and light; they make it their business to shut out the innocent from all access to the prince, and thereby put it out of their power to vindicate themselves. The officer was imprisoned; but he desired the king before he was condemned, that his cause might be heard, and his accusers ordered to produce their evidence against him. The king complied with his request: and as there was no proof but the letters which his enemy had written against him, he was cleared, and his innocence fully justified by the three commissioners that sat upon his trial. All the king's indignation fell upon the perfidious accuser, who had thus attempted to abuse the favour and confidence of his royal master. This prince, was very wise, and knew that one of the true signs of a prudent government, was to have the subjects stand more in fear of the laws than of informers.** He thought, that to act otherwise, would be a violation of the common rules of natural equity and humanity; itwould be opening a door to envy, hatred, calumny, and revenge; it would be exposing the honest simplicity of faithful subjects to the malice of detestable informers, and arming these with the sword of public authority :††

Herod. 1. v. c. 25.

Herod. I. vii. c. 194.

Xenoph. Cyrop. 1. i. p. 7.

Herod. 1. i. c. 137.

|| Γνὺς ὡς ταχύτερα αὐτὸς ἡ σοφώτερα εργασμένος εἴη, ελυσε. Diod. 1. xv. p. 333-336. **Non jam delatores, sed leges timentur.-Plin. in Paneg. Traj tt Princeps, qui delatores non castigat, irritat.-Sueton. in Vit. Domit. c. ix.

in a word, it would divest the throne of the most noble privilege belonging to it, namely, of being a sanctuary for innocence and justice, against violence and calumny.

There is upon record a still more memorable example of firmness and love of justice, in another king of Persia, before Artaxerxes; in him, I mean, whom the Scripture calls Ahasuerus, and who is thought to be the same as Darius the son of Hystaspes, from whom Haman had, by his earnest solicitations, extorted that fatal edict, which was calculated to exterminate the whole race of the Jews throughout the Persian empire in one day. When God had, by the means of Esther, opened his eyes, he made haste to make amends for his fault, not only by revoking his edict, and inflicting an exemplary punishment upon the impostor who had deceived him; but, which is more, by a public acknowledg ment of his error; which should be a pattern to all ages, and to all princes, and teach them, that far from debasing their dignity, or weakening their authority thereby they procure them both the more respect. After declaring, that it is but too common for calumniators to impose, by their misrepresentations and craftiness, on the goodness of their princes, whom their natural sincerity induces to judge favourably of others; he is not ashamed to acknowledge, that he had been so unhappy as to suffer himself to be prejudiced by such means against the Jews, who were his faithful subjects, and the children of the Most High God, through whose goodness he and his ancestors had attained to the throne.* The Persians were not only enemies of injustice, as we have now shown, but also abhorred lying, which always was deemed among them as a mean and infamous vice. What they esteemed most pitiful, next to lying, was to live upon trust, or by borrowing. Such a kind of life seemed to them idle, ignominious, servile, and the more despicable, because it makes people liars.f

SECTION IV. THE CARE OF THE PROVINCES.

It seems to be no difficult matter to maintain good order in the metropolis of a kingdom, where the conduct of the magistrates and judges is nearly inspected, and the very sight of the throne is capable of keeping the subjects in awe. The case is otherwise with respect to the provinces, where the distance from the sovereign, and the hopes of impunity, may occasion many misdemeanours on the part of the magistrates and officers, as well as great licentiousness and disorder on that of the people. In this the Persian policy exerted itself with the greatest care; and we may also say, with the greatest success.

The Persian empire was divided into a hundred and twenty-seven governments, the governors of which were called satraps. Over them were appointed three principal ministers, who inspected their conduct, to whom they gave an account of all the affairs of their several provinces, and who were afterwards to make their report of the same to the king. It was Darius the Mede, that is, Cyaxares, or rather Cyrus in the name of his uncle, who put the government of the empire into this excellent method. These satraps were, by the very design of their office, each in his respective district, to have the same care and regard for the interests of the people, as for those of the prince: for it was a maxim with Cyrus, that no difference ought to be admitted between these two interests, which are necessarily linked together; since neither the people can be happy, unless the prince is powerful, and in a condition to defend them; nor the prince truly powerful, unless his people be happy.

These satraps being the most considerable persons in the kingdom, Cyrus assigned them certain funds and revenues proportionable to their station, and the importance of their employments. He was willing they should live nobly in their respective provinces, that they might gain the respect of the nobility and common people within their jurisdiction; and for that reason their retinue, their equipage, and their table, should be answerable to their dignity, yet with

Esth. c. iii. &c.

Herod. l. i. c. 138.
Authors differ about the number of governments or provinces.-Xenoph. Cyrop. l. viii p. 229,232.

out exceeding the bounds of prudence and moderation. He, himself, was their model in this respect, as he desired they should be to all persons of distin guished rank within the extent of their authority: so that the same order which reigned in the prince's court, might likewise proportionably be observed in the courts of the satraps, and in the noblemen's families. And to prevent, as far as possible, all abuses which might be made of so extensive an authority as that of the satraps, the king reserved to himself alone the nomination of them, and caused the governors of places, the commanders of the troops, and other such Like officers, to depend immediately upon the r ce himself; from whom alone they were to receive their orders and instructions, that if the satraps were in clined to abuse their power, they might be sensible those officers were so many overseers and censors of their conduct. And, to make this correspondence by letters the more sure and expeditious, the king caused post-houses to be erected throughout all the empire, and appointed couriers, who travelled night and day, and made wonderful despatch. I shall speak more particularly on this article at the end of this section, that I may not break in upon the matter in hand,

The care of the provinces, however, was not entirely left to the satraps and governors; the king himself took cognizance of them in his own person, being persuaded, that the governing only by others is but to govern by halves. An officer of the household was ordered to repeat these words to the king every morning when he waked, "Rise, Sir, and think of discharging the duties for which Ŏromasdes has placed you upon the throne."* Oromasdes was the principal god anciently worshipped by the Persians. A good prince, says Plutarch, in the account he gives of this custom, has no occasion for an officer to give him this daily admonition; his own heart, and the love he has for his people, are sufficient monitors.

The king of Persia thought himself obliged, according to the ancient custom established in that country, from time to time, personally to visit all the provinces of his empire;t being persuaded, as Pliny says of Trajan, that the most solid glory, and the most exquisite pleasure, a good prince can enjoy, is from time to time to let the people see their common father; "to reconcile the dissensions and mutual animosities of rival cities; to calm commotions or seditions among the people, and that not so much by the dint of power and severity, as by reason and temper; to prevent injustice and oppression in magistrates; and cancel and reverse whatever has been decreed against law and equity in a word, like a beneficent planet, to shed his salutary influence universally; or rather like a divinity to be present every where, to see, to hear, and know every thing, without rejecting any man's petitions or complaint."

When the king was not able to visit the provinces himself, he sent, in his stead, some of the greatest men of the kingdom, such as were the most eminent for wisdom and virtue. These persons were generally called the eyes and the ears of the prince, because by their means he saw and was informed of every thing. When these or any other of his great ministers, or the members of his council, were said to be the eyes and ears of the prince, it was at once an admonition to the king, that he had his ministers, as we have the organs of our senses, not that he should lie still and be idle, but act by their means; and to the ministers, that they ought not to act for themselves, but for the king their head, and for the advantage of the whole body politic.

The particular detail of affairs, which the king, or the commissioners appointed by him, entered into, is highly worthy of admiration, and shows how well they understood in those days wherein the wisdom and ability of governors consist. The attention of the king and his ministers was not only employed upon great objects, as war, the revenue, justice, and commerce; but matters of less im

* Plut. ad Princ. indoct. p. 780.

Xenoph. in Econom. P. 228. Reconciliare æmulas civitates, tumentesque populos non imperio magis quam ratione compescere, in tercedere iniquitatibus magistratuum, infectumque reddere quicquid fieri non oportuerit: postremo, velo cissimi sideris more, omnia invisere, omnia audire, et undecumque invocatum, statim, velut numen, adesse et adistere-Plin. in Panegyr. Traj.