brought into account at the day of judgment, but be very offensive in the eyes of God.* For my part, I am not offended with Dr. Priestley, or any other Socinian, for calling the worship that I pay to Christ, idolatry and blasphemy; because, if he be only a man, what they say is just. If they can acquit themselves of sin in thinking meanly of Christ, they certainly can do the same in speaking meanly of him; and words ought to correspond with thoughts. I only think they should not trifle in such a manner as they do with error, when it is supposed to have place in themselves, any more than when they charge it upon their opponents.

If Dr. Priestley had formed his estimate of human virtue by that great standard which requires love to God with all the heart, soul, mind, and strength, and to our neighbour as ourselves; instead of representing men by nature as having "more virtue than vice,"f he must have acknowledged, with the scriptures, that the whole world lieth in wickedness-that every thought and imagination of their heart is only evil continually- and that there is none of them that doeth good, no not one.

If Mr. Belsham, in the midst of that "marvellous light" which he professes lately to have received, had only seen the extent and goodness of that law which requires us to love God with all our hearts, and our neighbour as ourselves, in the light in which revelation places it; he could not have trifled, in the manner he has, with the nature of sin, calling it "human frailty," and the subjects of it "the frail and erring children of men ;" nor could he have represented God, in, "marking and punishing every instance of it, as acting the part of a merciless tyrant." Mr. Belsham talks of "Unitarians being led to form just sentiments of the reasonableness of the divine law, and the equity of the divine government;" but of what divine law does he speak? Not of that, surely, which requires love to God with all the heart, soul, mind, and strength, and our neighbour as ourselves; nor of that government which

*1 Cor. vi. 9, 10.

Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever, Part I. p. 80.

threatens the curse of God on every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them; for this allows not of a single transgression, and punishes every instance of human folly, which Mr. Belsham considers as "merciless tyranny." He means to insinuate, I suppose, that for the law to take cognizance of the very thoughts and intents of the heart, at least of every instance that occurs, is unreasonable; and that to inflict punishment accordingly is inequitable. He conceives, therefore, of a law, it seems, that is more accommodated to the propensities, or, as he would call them, frailties of the erring children of men; a law that may not cut off all hopes of a sinner's acceptance with God by the deeds of it, so as to render an atoning mediator absolutely necessary, and this he calls reasonable; and of a government that will not bring every secret thing into judgment, nor make men accountable for every idle word, and this he calls equitable. And this is the "marvellous light" of Socinianism; this is the doctrine that is to promote a holy life; this is the scheme of those who are continually branding the Calvinistic system with Antinomianism.

If the moral law require love to God with all the heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, and to our neighbour as ourselves; it cannot allow the least degree of alienation of the heart from God, or of the smallest instance of malevolence to man. And, if it be what the scripture says it is, holy, just, and good; then, though it require all the heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, it cannot be too strict; and if it be not too strict, it cannot be unworthy of God, nor can it be " merciless tyranny" to abide by it. On the contrary, it must be worthy of God to say of a just law, Not a jot or tittle of it shall fail.

Dr. M'Gill, in his Practical Essay on the death of Jesus Christ, maintains, that "the Supreme Lawgiver determined from the beginning to mitigate the rigour of the law, to make allowances for human error and imperfection, and to accept of repentance and sincere obedience, instead of sinless perfection." But, if this were the determination of the lawgiver, it was either considered as a matter of right, or of undeserved favour. If the former, why was not the law so framed as to correspond with the determination of the lawgiver? How was it, especially, that a new edition of it

should be published from Mount Sinai, and that without any such allowances? Or, if this could be accounted for, how was it that Jesus Christ should declare, that not a jót or tittle of it should fail, and make it his business to condemn the conduct of the scribes and pharisees, who had lowered its demands, and softened its penalties, with a view to "make allowance for human error and imperfection?" It could answer no good end, one should think, to load the divine precepts with threatnings of cruelty. A law so loaded would not bear to be put in execution: and we have been taught by Dr. Priestley, in what he has written on the TestAct, to consider "the continuance of a law which will not bear to be put in execution, as needless and oppressive, and as what ought to be abrogated."* If repentance and sincere obedience be all that ought to be required of men in their present state, then the law ought to be so framed, and allowance to be made by it for error and imperfection. But then it would follow, that where men do repent, and are sincere, there are no errors and imperfections to be allowed for. Errors and imperfections imply a law from which they are deviations; but if we be under no law, except one that allows for deviations, then we are as holy as we ought to be, and need no forgiveness.

If, on the other hand, it be allowed that the relaxation of the law of innocence is not what we have any right to expect, but that God has granted us this indulgence out of pure grace; I would then ask the reason, why these gentlemen are continually exclaiming against our principles as making the Almighty a tyrant, and his law unreasonble, and cruel? Is it tyrannical, unreasonable, or cruel, for God to withhold what we have no right to expect?t

*Familiar Letters, Letter VI.

+ The Intelligent reader, who is acquainted with the different sentiments that are embraced in the religious world, will easily perceive the agreement between the Socinian and Armenian systems on this subject. By their exclamations on the injustice of God as represented by the Calvinistic system, they both render that a debt, which God in the whole tenor of his word declares to be of grace. Neither of them will admit the equity of the divine law, and that man is thereby righteously condemned to eternal punishment, antecedently to the grace of the gospel; or, if they admit it in words, they will be ever contradicting it by the tenor of their reasoning.

Dr. Priestley defines justice, as being "such a degree of severity, or pains and penalties so inflicted, as will produce the best effect with respect both to those who are exposed to them, and to others who are under the same government: or, in other words, that degree of evil which is calculated to produce the greatest degree of good and, if the punishment exceed this measure; if, in any instance, it be an unnecessary or useless suffering, it is always censured as cruelty and is not even called justice, but real injustice." To this he adds " If, in any particular case, the strict execution of the law would do more harm than good, it is universally agreed, that the punishment ought to be remitted." With an observation or two on the above passage, I shall close this letter.

First, That all punishments are designed for the good of the whole, and less (or corrective) punishments for the good of the offender, is admitted. Every instance of divine punishment will be not only proportioned to the laws of equity, but adapted to promote the good of the universe at large. God never inflicts punishment for the sake of punishing. He has no such pleasure in the death of a sinner as to put him to pain, whatever may be his desert, without some great and good end to be answered by it: but that, in the case of the finally-impenitent, this end should necessarily include the good of the offender, is as contrary to reason as it is to scripture, it does not appear, from any thing we know of governments, either human or divine, that the good of the offender is necessarily, and in all cases, the end of punishment. When a murderer is executed, it is necessary for the good of the community but it would sound very strange to say, it was necessary for his own good; and that, unless his good were promoted by it, as well as that of the community, it must be an act of cruelty!

Secondly, that there are cases in human government, in which it is right and necessary to relax in the execution of the sentence of the law, is also admitted. But this arises from the imperfection of human laws. Laws are general rules for the conduct of a community, with suitable punishments annexed to the breach of them. But no general rules can be made by men, that will apply

* Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever, Part I. pp. 100, 101

to every particular case. If legislators were wise and good men, and could foresee every particular case that would arise in the different stages of society, they would so frame their laws as that they need not be relaxed when those cases should occur. But God is wise and good; and, previous to his giving us the law which requires us to love him with all our hearts, and our neighbour as ourselves, knew every change that could possibly arise, and every case that could occur. The question, therefore, is not, "If in any particular case the strict execution of the law would do more harm than good, whether it ought not to be remitted ;" but, whether an omniscient, wise and good lawgiver, can be supposed to have made a law, the penalty of which, if put in execution, would do more harm than good? Would a being of such a character make a law, the penalty of which, according to strict equity, requires to be remitted; a law by which he could not in justice abide; and that not only in a few singular cases, but in the case of every individual, in every age, to whom it is given?

It is possible these considerations may suffice to show that the divine law is not relaxed; but be that as it may, the question at issue is, what is the moral tendency of supposing that it is? To relax a bad law would indeed have a good effect, and to abrogate it would have a better; but not so respecting a good one. If the divine law be what the scripture says it is, holy, just and good; to relax it in the precept, or even to mitigate the penalty, without some expedient to secure its honors, must be subversive of good order; and the scheme which pleads for such relaxation, must be unfavorable to holiness, justice, and goodness.

I am, &c.