many official and other documents relating to the questions at issue and particularly selections from the manuscripts of Braddock and Washington captured at the battle of the Monongahela, July 9, 1755. Previous to 1755 six years had been spent in unavailing attempts at negotiations between England and France with the design of effecting a reconciliation of difficulties. It seems neither party was really anxious to avoid a war, although the French were magnanimous enough in many ways.

Hostilities commenced in time of peace and each nation charged the other with being the aggressor. Two French vessels en route to Canada were captured by the British admiral, Boscowen, and to justify this procedure, the British ministry sent out the "Observations." In this book the British maintained the French had actually begun the war by their encroachments with military forces on the Ohio. They referred to Washington's operations as the weak and small efforts of the English. These facts have all been reverted to in this work. To repel the charge of the British government and to prove the British had been first to transgress, was the object of this French "Memoire." It is obvious that the French were well informed of British intentions. They found them fully expressed in the documents captured with Braddock's baggage. It is equally obvious that had they destroyed these documents much of the history of the great events in this region in those years would have been lost.

Craig has given us 135 pages of this matter in "The Olden Time," and it is a mine of wealth for historians. We find in the extracts much relating to the Marquis du Quesne de Menneville, and much about the "murder of Jumonville" by Washington. We find Duquesne spelled Du Quesne when it refers to the fort and du Quesne referring to the marquis with the title prefixed.

It is noticeable in Washington's Journal, which the French reproduced, the mention of Ensign Ward as "Wart" throughout, and Craig does not correct him, but says in a footnote that Ward is meant. Washington was a phonetic speller.15

The exhaustive treatment of the French claims appeals to us as scholarly and the deduction seems reasonable if we accept their premises. They go back to the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle and tell of the invasion of the English traders in the French country about the Ohio. They also tell of Celoron's expedition and the moderation of the governor, the Count de Galissoniere, and other French authorities. One statement puts the gist of the French claim in a few words, to wit:

The Ohio, or La Belle Riviere, as it is sometimes called, forms a natural communication between Canada and Louisiana by Lake Erie, the French being concerned both to discover and preserve that communication, were the first that traced out the whole course of that river, part of which was visited by M. de la Salle, a gentleman of Normandy, in the year 1679. In 1712, the King in his Letters Patent for the settling of Louisiana comprehended the River Wabash which empties itself into the Ohio and in general, all the rivers that fall into the Mississippi. Since that time, the Ohio has never been frequented by any but the French, nor did the English ever make any pretentions

15"Olden Time;" Vol. I, p. 140, et seq. "Life and Writings of Washington;" Sparks, Vol. II, p. 21. See Parkman's citations also, in Vol. I, "Montcalm and Wolfe."

to the lands watered by it. The Appalachian Mountains have always been looked upon as the bounds of their colonies.

That brings us to the story of La Salle, and the evidence that he was ever at the Forks of the Ohio is so slight that it would be rejected in a court of justice. He was on other parts of the Ohio beyond a doubt, hence it will not be discussed here. However, that is a long drawn-out historical controversy and the libraries are full of books relative to La Salle.

Concluding the story of Washington's first campaign, we may have recourse to the remarks of Samuel Adams Drake: "It thus fell out that the building of a log fort to command the Ohio had brought on actual war. The struggle for the possession of the Great West now passed from words to deeds. But with their unbroken chain of posts, their depots so conveniently placed, their Indian alliances so secured by the prestige of a first success, the French entered upon the conflict with strong advantage."

Drake quotes Thackeray: "It was strange that in a savage forest of Pennsylvania, a young Virginia officer should fire a shot and waken up a war which was to last for sixty years, to cost France her American colonies, to sever ours from us, to create the great Western Republic, to rage over the Old World when extinguished in the New, and of all the myriads engaged in the vast contest, to leave the prize of the greatest fame with him who struck the first blow."16

16"Making of Ohio Valley States;" Drake, p. 58. "The Virginians;" W. M. Thackeray, Vol. I. Harper Ed., 1914, p. 51.

CHAPTER XV.

Two Famous Hostages.

The hostages given at the capitulation of Fort Necessity July 3, 1754, became the sources of pages of history. Robert Stobo and Jacob Van Braam, Scot and Dutchman, captains by appointment of Governor Dinwiddie in Washington's regiment of Virginia troops, voluntary or involuntary chosen for the purpose, little thought they would be subjected to hardships, privations and finally imprisonment and long suffering. Ordinarily the status of a hostage is one of ease. In the camps and garrisons of his enemy keepers he is on his honor not to reveal the secrets unavoidably brought to his notice. His case is one of detention only with a degree of liberty consistent with his character and standing as a soldier. Stobo violated all the traditions of a hostage, and while his letter-writing with a plan of Fort Duquesne and specific information of affairs there, was more than indiscreet, it was successful, and the information most valuable to the English. Stobo and his fellow hostage would not have been long detained had Governor Dinwiddie adhered to the terms of the capitulation of July 3rd and released M. la Force and the cadets taken at the Jumonville affair in May, but Dinwiddie absolutely refused to release them. La Force was too valuable to the enemy, and must be kept or he would make trouble again. Washington knew La Force well, and Van Braam also, and how much La Force was missed became apparent at once to the astute Stobo when he reached Fort Duquesne. After a short detention at the fort, and finding Dinwiddie was determined to hold the French officers, Stobo and Van Braam were sent to Quebec, where they enjoyed a large measure of liberty and had a good time, though it must have been monotonous at times. In the fortune of war, Stobo's duplicity was revealed to the French, as will appear. Unmistakably he stood revealed as a spy, and then his liberty was cut short. He was tried as a spy and received the usual sentence of death, but the findings of the court that condemned him had to be reviewed in France and approved by the proper authorities there. Events of greater moment occupied the constant attention of the French ministry, and the case of an obscure English officer in far-off Canada did not require prompt action. He was in prison and could be disposed of any time. This in time of peace, for though the peace of Aix-laChapelle was still intact, both England and France were preparing for another outbreak. Formal declaration of war did not come until a year after Braddock's battle. We behold the anomalous state of a hostage in time of peace condemned as a spy. No historian, however, has characterized this peace as a profound peace.

The victorious French under De Villiers returned to Fort Duquesne the way they went out, taking Stobo and Van Braam along. Stobo was but a short time at the fort when he found opportunity to send out two letters. He furnished timely information and an accurate plan of the fort.

Pitts.-19

He is plalosophic and much too patriotic. From his first letter we may quote:

When we engaged to serve our country, it was expected we were to do it with our lives. Let them not be disappointed. Consider the good of the expedition, without the least regard to us. For my part I would rather die a thousand deaths, to have the pleasure of possessing this Fort one day. They are so vain of their success at the Meadows, it is worse than death to hear them. Strike this fall as soon as possible. Make the Indians ours. Prevent intelligence. Get the best and 'tis done. 100 trusty Indians might surprise this Fort. They have access all day, and might lodge themselves so that they might secure the guard with tomahawks; shut the sally gate, and the Fort is ours. None but the guard and Contrecoeur stay in the Fort. For God's sake communicate this to but few and them you can trust. Intelligence comes here unaccountably. If they should know I wrote I would lose the little liberty I have. I should be glad to hear from you. But take no notice of this in yours.

Stobo said "Springes" had been at the fort, probably meaning Shingiss. There is no other mention of Springes in our pre-colonial history. It is most apparent Stobo knew the risks he was taking. The Indian who cunningly got the letter through was a brother-in-law of Monacatootha, or Scarrooady, as he is most frequently mentioned in the history of those days. In the second letter to Dinwiddie, written the very next day, Stobo gives this Indian's name "Long, or Mono." The second letter went by Delaware George. Stobo is newsy in this letter; also fearsome. He has heard that the Half King and Monacatootha had been killed and their families given to the Cherokees as slaves. He wishes for peace between the Catawbas and the nations about the fort, saying the French are much afraid of the Catawbas, and goes on to say:

You had as just a plan of the fort as time and opportunity would allow. The French manage the Indians with the greatest artifice. I mentioned yesterday a council the Shawanese had with the French, the present they gave (wampum, ammunition, guns, clothing, etc.), and if they made the French a speech, the bearer, who was present, will inform you to what purport.

If yesterday's letter reaches you it will give you a particular account of most things. The Indians have great liberty here; they go out and in when they please without notice. If 100 trusty Shawanese, Mingoes and Delawares were picked out they might surprise the fort.

All this you have more particular in yesterday's account. Your humble servant, etc. La Force is greatly missed here. Let the good of the expedition be considered preferable to our safety. Haste to strike.

A list of deserters and prisoners to the French followed. On one of Capt. Mercer's company, John Ramsey, Stobo is severe. He says:

This man is the cause of all our misfortunes. He deserted the day before the battle. The French got to Gist's at dawn of day, surrounding the fort, imagining we were still there, gave a general fire. But when they found we were gone they were determined to return with all expedition, thinking we had returned to the inhabitantswhen up comes Mr. Driscall,1 told them he had deserted the day before, and the regiment was still at the Meadows, in a starving condition which caused his deserting, and hearing they were coming, deserted to them. They confined him. Told him if true he should be rewarded, if false hanged. This I had from the English interpreters.

1 Craig thinks this name a misprint for "rascal:" the sense implies that some epithet be used. No Driscall is mentioned previously and the reference is plainly to Ramsey. See "Olden Time," Vol. II, p. 61. "History of Pittsburgh," original edition, p. 37, the words "Mr. Rascall" occur and so followed in the edition of 1917.

From Stobo's account it can be readily deduced that the French under De Villiers had little fear in the taking of Washington's Fort Necessity, which in name alone tells of his desperate condition.

Stobo also relates the fate of some of the prisoners and traders captured by the French and Indians. Some of those allotted to the Indians were offered for sale; "40 pistoles each." "A good ransom," commented Stobo. A pistole was a Spanish gold coin worth 16 shillings. Some of the wounded died and four prisoners were shot. Stobo remonstrated several times with Contrecœur, but to no purpose. In view of the capitulation, Stobo claimed the French had no right to make them prisoners. Contrecœur replied they belonged to the Indians and he could not get them from them.

The expedition was almost a year in coming to take the fort, and then it did not accomplish the purpose for which it was sent. One word tells the story-the name of the commander-Braddock. Stobo's fears that ill would come to him if these letters should ever come to the knowledge of the French were destined to be fulfilled.

Copies of the letters and Stobo's plan of Fort Duquesne had been given to Gen. Braddock, the plan a most important requisite. All of Braddock's baggage fell into the hands of the enemy and with it the plans and the letters and they were published.

Stobo had made use of his non-combatant status as a hostage in the character of a spy. Naturally the kind treatment of his captors ceased. They were justly incensed. Previous to the battle on the Monongahela, Stobo and Van Braam had been sent to Quebec.

From Craig's introduction to the edition of Stobo's Memoirs published by him in Pittsburgh in 1854 these extracts are taken. They tell their own story:

On the 3rd of July, 1754, the English garrison withdrew from the basin of the Ohio, and then, in the eloquent language of Bancroft, "In the whole valley of the Mississippi to its headsprings in the Allegheny, no standard floated but that of France." Such was the condition of affairs in this region when Stobo and Van Braam were conveyed as prisoners and hostages to Fort Duquesne, within the site of our present city, truly the prospects of poor Stobo were then gloomy and discouraging indeed. Of Van Braam's fidelity some doubts have perhaps unjustly been entertained. These doubts whether well or ill founded must always blunt the keenness of our conviction of his feelings.

But of Stobo's feeling no doubt can exist. His whole future life, so far as we have any knowledge of it, proves him to have been an ardent lover of his country and a most enterprising and daring man. Cut off as he was in Fort Duquesne from all direct intercourse with his countrymen, surrounded by Frenchmen and Indians, it could scarcely be expected that he would be disposed to think of anything but escape. He, however, was a man of indomitable spirit, and even while thus secluded, instead of sinking into despondency and listless inactivity, he spent his time in writing letters stimulating his countrymen to action and furnishing information necessary to success.

Craig is wrong in stating that Stobo was a prisoner at Fort Duquesne, and it is plainly evident that Stobo was over-zealous-far too ardent. Better, indeed, had he not employed his time in stimulating his countrymen, and the time thus spent must have been brief. Craig proceeds to say: "When the writer of this article (himself) first read those letters,