of Paris, on the close of the Crimean war, an agreement was reached by the parties there represented, pronouncing priva

teering to be piracy. During the American civil war, when much injury was done to United States shipping by southern privateers, Mr. Seward proposed to accede to the Paris declaration, but this was objected to by England and France, who, by this course, virtually cancelled any pretension on their part to treat privateering as piracy by the law of nations. The United States government subsequently withdrew its offer to accede to the treaty of Paris in this respect, though it took at the same time the position that it would consent to the abolition of privateering if coupled with the recognition of the position that private property of an enemy, not contraband of war, is not open to capture at sea.'-But be this as it may, the objections urged to privateering are obviated, as we have seen, by putting privateers under naval control, and placing their rights to prize money under the direction of prize courts. When thus limited, there are many reasons why there should be, at present, no international prohibitions of privateering. It is not desirable that the control of the sea should be secured by sovereigns who adopt the unwise and exhaustive policy of keeping up enormous permanent navies. To such a monopoly there is even a greater objection than there is to giving a particular great corporation (e. g., the East India Company) the monopoly of a particular trade. The monopoly of such a corporation is not necessarily immoral, and has no extraterritorial effects. But the monopoly

ing others at sea, unless empowered by letters of marque, are to be considered pirates."

At the close of the late civil war the United States government declined to prosecute for piracy the officers of Confederate privateers, on the ground that to do so would be to countenance the position that privateering was piracy by the law of nations. See letters of Mr. Bolles, solicitor of the navy, in the Atlantic Monthly for July and August, 1872. These articles are discussed in Sir A. Cockburn's review of the Geneva Arbitration, and in Mr. Bulloch's work on the Secret Service of the Confederate States (New York, 1880), vol. ii. pp. 116 et seq.

That the belligerent privateers were not pirates, see argument of Harlan, J., in Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 619; citing Dole v. Ins. Co., 6 Allen, 373; Planter's Bank v. Union Bank, 16 Wall. 483; Dole v. Ins. Co., 2 Cliff. 394; Fifield v. Ins. Co., 47 Penn. St. 166; and other cases. And see Bulloch's Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, cited above.

That one nation cannot, without violating the law of nations, send out privateers from neutral ports, see Talbot v. Jansen, 3 Dal. 133; Moodie v. The Betty, 3 Dal. 288, note.

1 Spain and Mexico were not parties to the peace of Paris.

of naval power on the seas can only be secured by oppressive and exhaustive taxation, and when it is secured, it dominates the world. Were the claims of the great naval powers to seize private property on the high seas abandoned, this monopoly would be less prejudicial. But, directed as it is to the appropriation of such spoils, it is virtually, if conceded, a monopoly to powers of a particular class, to seize whatever is afloat on the waters which their prize courts may condemn. The suppression of privateering, therefore, is not called for in the interests of peace. Such suppression would only add another stimulus to the increase of naval armaments already bearing so oppressively on the old world; and the effect would be to force on this continent a competition in the ruinous race for naval supremacy in which at present the maritime powers of Europe are engaged. And it should also be observed that a privateer navy is the militia of the seas, consistent as is the militia of the land with industrial pursuits, adding to the wealth and comfort of the community when war does not exist. When the calamity of war does come, then there will be enough shipping and sailors disengaged from their prior employments to man such militia fleets. It is no doubt a choice of evils. But as long as the seizure of belligerent private property on the high seas is countenanced by the European marine powers, so long it is better for the United States to hold the right to turn their merchant service into naval service in case of war, than for them to overburden the country by an enormous navy in times of peace. It is also to be observed that if the restrictions above proposed be adopted, it is hard to see in what respect privateering would differ from the system of volunteer naval war adopted by Prussia in the Franco-German war of 1870. "She invited ship-owners to lend their ships for the war for a remuneration. The crews were to be hired by the owners, but were 'to enter the Federal navy for the continuance of the war, wear its uniform, acknowledge its competency, and take oath to the articles of war.' In case these ships destroyed or captured ships of the enemy, certain premiums were to be paid to the owners for distribution among the crews. The French govern ment complained to Lord Granville about this decree, alle ing that it was under a disguised form the re-establishme

of privateering; but Lord Granville, after consulting the then law officers, Sir Travers Twiss, Sir R. Collier, and Sir John Coleridge, replied: They advise me that there are, in their opinion, substantial differences between the proposed naval volunteer force sanctioned by the Prussian government, and the system of privateering which, under the designation of "la course," the declaration of Paris was intended to suppress, and that her majesty's government cannot object to the decree of the Prussian government as infringing the declaration of Paris." To the same effect is the opinion of Bluntschli. "Nothing," declares that eminent publicist, "prevents a state from forming a body of volunteers to be employed as a part of the auxiliary force of its army; so a maritime nation may, with entire propriety, reinforce its fleet by adding vessels previously employed in commerce. An appeal may even be made to all the forces of the nation-to a sort of naval Landsturmto combat the enemy.'

פיי

1 Mr. Lawrence in North Amer. Rev. for July, 1878, p. 32; citing Solicitors' Journal, vol. xxii. p. 523. See, also, Twiss, Duties in Time of War, p. 423. 2 Revue de Droit Int., vol. ix. p. 552. It is stated that the late "Confederate government," owing "to the disabilities to which their privateers were exposed in foreign ports," discontinued privateering, and its cruisers "claimed the right of public ships-of-war, and were commanded by officers commissioned by the Confederate state." North Amer. Rev., ut supra, p. 31.

Mr. Seward's circular of April 24, 1861, proposing to abolish privateering, shows on its face that the proposition was a mere temporary expedient induced by the exigencies of the civil war. He recites the propositions of the Paris congress, (1) that privateering be abolished; (2) that neutral flags should cover enemy's goods; (3) that neutral goods should not be liable to capture under enemy's flag; and (4) that blockades must be effective. He then calls attention to the fact that

when the president (Mr. Pierce), on July 14, 1856, declined to accede to these propositions, Mr. Marcy, then secretary of state, said that the United States were willing to accept the abolition of privateering "with an amendment which should exempt the private property of individuals, though belonging to belligerent states, from seizure, or confiscation by national vessels in maritime war." This, however, was not acceded to by England, and the proposition, in Mr. Buchanan's administration, was withdrawn. Since then, however, things have changed. "Europe seems once more on the verge of quite general wars. On the other hand, a portion of the American people have raised the standard of insurrection, and proclaimed a provisional government, and, through their organs, have taken the bad resolution to invite privateers to prey upon the peaceful commerce of the United States. Prudence and humanity combine in persuading the president, under the circumstances, that it is wise to secure the lesser good

XII. PACIFIC REMEDIES FOR WRONGS.

Interna

wrongs must be delicts by

the law of

§ 203. Not every international quarrel is ground for a formal application for redress. One sovereign, for instance, may treat another with supercilious con- tional tempt; but if so, unless there is something to sustain a demand for an apology, the only remedy is suspension of intercourse. Nor can one nation com- nations. plain internationally because it is distanced in the race for international eminence by another; nor because its products have lost a market by the legislation of such other nation. The wrongs for which international redress can be had must be intentionally committed or attempted by force against the dignity of the offended state, or against the property or persons of its subjects. They must be delicts by the law of nations. § 204. If the question is dependent on a treaty, it is easily settled. Where a treaty says that neither party shall permit the coaling of steamers of a power at war with the other party, then such coaling at the ports of the neutral, if negligent or malicious,

offered by the Paris congress, without waiting indefinitely in hope to obtain the greater one offered to the maritime nations by the president of the United States." This proposition was not entertained by England and France, and that it was a mere transient impulse of Mr. Seward, and was speedily withdrawn, if not forgotten, is illustrated by his letter of July 12, 1862, to Mr. Adams, in which he says, "This transaction will furnish you a suitable occasion for informing Earl Russel that since the Oreto and other gun-boats are being received by the insurgents from Europe to renew demonstrations on national commerce, congress is about to authorize the issue of letters of marque and reprisal, and that if we find it necessary to suppress that piracy, we shall bring privateers into service for that purpose, and of course, for that purpose only." Congress did not author

Extent of such de. undeter

licts still

mined.

ize the issuing of letters of marque and reprisal, it not being "necessary;" but that such a step should be held by Mr. Seward to be the duty and right of the government shows that his circular of April 24, 1861, must have been regarded by him, if regarded at all, as recalled. It certainly was never acted on by any European power.

Citizens of the United States are forbidden by statute to take part in the equipment or manning of privateers to act against nations at peace with the United States. Act of June 14, 1797, and April 24, 1816. Treaties making privateering under such circumstances piracy have been negotiated with England, France, Prussia, Holland, Spain, and Sweden. See letter of Mr. Marcy, of April 28, 1854, and president's declaration of neutrality, of April 20, 1818.