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proposed to have a large extent of country, and a better frontier against France. The emperor hoped to recover the monarchy of Spain, or some part of it, for his younger son, chiefly at the expence of us and Holland. The king of Portugal had received intelligence, that Philip designed to renew the old pretensions of Spain upon that kingdom, which is surrounded by the other on all sides, except toward the sea; and could therefore only be defended by maritime powers. This, with the advantageous terms offered by king Charles, as well as by us, prevailed with that prince to enter into the alliance. The duke of Savoy's temptations and fears were yet greater: the main charge of the war on that side was to be supplied by England, and the profit to redound to him. In case Milan should be conquered, it was stipulated, that his highness should have the duchy of Montserrat belonging to the duke of Mantua, the provinces of Alexandria and Valencia and Lomellino, with other lands between the Po and the Tanaro, together with the Vigevenasco, or in lieu of it an equivalent out of the province of Novara, adjoining to his own state; beside whatever else could be taken from France on that side by the confederate forces. Then he was in terrible apprehensions of being surrounded by France, who had so many troops in the Milanese, and might have easily swallowed up his whole duchy.
The rest of the allies came in purely for subsidies, whereof they sunk considerable sums into their own coffers, and refused to send their contingent to the Emperor, alleging their troops were already hired by England and Holland.
Some time after the duke of Anjou's succeeding to the monarchy of Spain in breach of the partition treaty, the question here in England was, whether the peace should be continued, or a new war begun. Those who were for the former, alleged the debts aud difficulties we laboured under; that both we and
the Dutch had already acknowledged Philip for king of Spain; that the inclinations of the Spaniards to the house of Austria, and their aversion for that of Bourbon, were not so surely to be reckoned upon as some would pretend: that we thought it a piece of insolence, as well as injustice, in the French, to offer putting a king upon us, and the Spaniards would conceive we had as little reason to force one upon them: that it was true, the nature and genius of those two people differed very much, and so would probably continue to do, as well under a king of French blood, as one of Austrian: but that if we would engage in a war for dethroning the duke of Anjou, we should certainly effect what by the pro-1 gress and operations of it we endeavoured to prevent, I mean a union of interest and affections between the two nations; for the Spaniards must, of necessity, call in French troops to their assistance; this would introduce French counsellors into king Philip's court, and this, by degrees, would habituate and reconcile the two nations: that to assist king Charles by English and Dutch forces, would render him odious to his new subjects, who have nothing in so great abomination as those whom they hold for hereticks; that the French would by this means become masters of the treasures in the Spanish West Indies; that in the last war, when Spain, Cologne, and Bavaria, were in our alliance, and by a modest computation brought sixty thousand men into the field against the common enemy; when Flanders, the seat of war, was on our side, and his majesty, a prince of great valour and conduct, at the head of the whole confederate army;
To offer putting is ungrammatical; it should be-' to offer to put,' &c. or if in order to avoid the close conjunction of the two infinitives, and the repetition of the particle, to,' the participial mode be preferred, it should be- to offer the putting of a king upon us.' S.
yet we had no reason to boast of our success: how then should we be able to oppose France with those powers against us, which would carry sixty thousand men from us to the enemy; and so make us upon the balance weaker by one hundred and twenty thousand men at the beginning of this war, than of that in 1688?
On the other side, those, whose opinion, or some private motives inclined them to give their advice for entering into a new war, alleged, how dangerous it would be for England that Philip should be king of Spain; that we could have no security for our trade while that kingdom was subject to a prince of the Bourbon family, nor any hopes of preserving the balance of Europe, because the grandfather would in effect be king, while his grandson had but the title, and thereby have a better opportunity than ever of pursuing his design for universal monarchy. These, and the like arguments prevailed; and so without taking time to consider the consequences, or to reflect on our own condition, we hastily engaged in a war, which has cost us sixty millions; and after repeated, as well as unexpected success in arms, has put us and our posterity in a worse condition, not only than any of our allies, but even our conquered enemies themselves.
The part we have acted in the conduct of this whole war, with reference to our allies abroad, and to a prevailing faction at home, is what I shall now particularly examine: where, I presume, it will ap pear by plain matters of fact, that no nation was ever so long or so scandalously abused, by the folly, the temerity, the corruption, and the ambition of its domestick enemies; or treated with so much insolence, injustice, and ingratitude by its foreign friends.
This will be manifest by proving the three following points:
First, that against all manner of prudence or com
mon reason, we engaged in this war as principals, when we ought to have acted only as auxiliaries.
Secondly, that we spent all our vigour in pursuing that part of the war, which could least answer the end we proposed by beginning it and made no efforts at all, where we could have most weakened the common enemy, and at the same time enriched ourselves.
Lastly, that we suffered each of our allies to break every article in those treaties and agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the burden upon us.
Upon the first of these points, that we ought to have entered into this war only as auxiliaries, let any man reflect upon our condition at that time: just come out of the most tedious, expensive, and unsuccessful war, that ever England had been engaged in*; sinking under heavy debts, of a nature and degree never heard of by us or our ancestors; the bulk of the gentry and people, heartily tired of the war, and glad of a peace, although it brought no other advantage but itself; no sudden prospect of lessening our taxes, which were grown as necessary to pay our debts, as to raise armies; a sort of artificial wealth of funds and stocks, in the hands of those, who, for ten years before, had been plundering the pubJick; many corruptions in every branch of our governments that needed reformation. Under these difficulties, from which, twenty years peace and the wisest management could hardly recover us, we declare war against France, fortified by the accession and alliance of those powers, I mentioned before, and which, in the former war, had been parties in our confederacy. It is very obvious, what a change must be made in the balance, by such weights taken
"I was then lean, being just come out of a fit of illness." John Bull.
out of our scale, and put into theirs; since it was manifest, by ten years experience, that France, without those additions of strength, was able to maintain itselt against us. So that human probability ran with mighty odds on the other side; and in this case, nothing, under the most extreme necessity, should force any state to engage in a war. We had already acknowledged Philip for king of Spain; neither does the queen's declaration of war take notice of the duke of Anjou's succession to that monarchy, as a subject of quarrel, but the French king's governing it as if it were his own; his seizing Cadiz, Milan, and the Spanish Low-countries, with the indignity of proclaiming the Pretender. In all which, we charge that prince with nothing directly relating to us, excepting the last; and this, although indeed a great affront, might easily have been redressed without a war; for the French court declared they did not acknowledge the pretender, but only gave him the title of king, which was allowed to Augustus by his enemy of Sweden, who had driven him out of Poland, and forced him to acknowlege Stanislaus.
It is true, indeed, the danger of the Dutch, by so ill a neighbourhood in Flanders, might affect us very much in the consequences of it; and the loss of Spain to the house of Austria, if it should be governed by French influence, and French politics, might, in time, be very pernicious to our trade. would therefore have been prudent, as well as generous and charitable, to help our neighbour; and so we might have done without injuring ourselves; for, by an old treaty with Holland, we were bound to assist that republick with ten thousand men, whenever they were attacked by the French; whose troops, upon the king of Spain's death, taking possession of Flanders in right of Philip, and securing the Dutch garrisons till they would acknowledge him, the Statesgeneral, by memorials from their envoy here, demand