B. Stay a little, Sir, if you please, till I ask you a few more questions.

A. I wish I could stay longer, gentlemen; for your conversation is very engaging: but I have an affair to despatch which will not admit of a delay. To-morrow I will wait on you again and then we shall finish this subject at our leisure.

B. Adieu, then, Sir, till to-morrrow.

6

THE SECOND DIALOGUE.

B. YOU are extremely kind, Sir, in coming so punctually. Your conversation yesterday was so agreeably instructive, that we longed impatiently to hear you again upon the same subject.

C. For my part, I made what haste I could, lest I should have come too late for, I was unwilling to lose any part of your dis

course.

A. Such conferences are very useful, among those who really love truth, and talk with temper: for then they exchange their best thoughts, and express them as clearly as they can. As for myself, gentlemen, I find an advantage in conversing with you; seeing you are not displeased at the freedom I take.

B. Let us leave off compliments, Sir; I know best how to judge of myself: and I perceive clearly that without your assistance I should have continued in several errors. I intreat you, Sir, to go on, and set me entirely right in my notions of eloquence.

A. Your mistakes, (if you will allow me to call them so,) prevail among most people of worth and learning who have not examined this matter to the bottom.

B. Let us lose no time in preamble: we shall have a thousand things to say. Proceed

therefore, Sir, to rectify my mistakes; and begin at the point where we left off yesterday. A. Of what point were we talking, when we parted? I have really forgot.

C. You were speaking of that kind of eloquence which consists entirely in moving the passions.

B. Yes: but I could not well comprehend that the whole design of rhetoric is to move the passions. Is that your opinion, Sir? A. By no means.

C. It seems then I mistook you yesterday. A. What would you say of a man who should persuade without any proof; and affect his hearers, without enlightening them? You could not reckon him a true orator. He might seduce people by this art of persuading them to what he would, without shewing them that what he recommends is right. Such a person must prove very dangerous in the commonwealth as we have seen before from : the reasoning of Socrates.

B. It is very true.

or

A. But on the other hand, what would you think of a man, who in his public discourses should demonstrate the truth, in a plain, dry, exact, methodical manner; make use of the geometrical way of reasoning; without adding any thing to adorn or enliven his discourse? Would you reckon him an orator?

B. No: I should think him a philosopher only.

A. To make a complete orator then, we must find a philosopher who knows both how to demonstrate any truth; and at the same time, to give his accurate reasoning all the natural beauty and vehemence of an agreeable, moving discourse, to render it entirely eloquent. And herein lies the difference betwixt the clear, convincing method of philosophy; and the affecting, persuasive art of eloquence.

C. What do you say is the difference?

A. I say a philosopher's aim is merely to demonstrate the truth, and gain your assent; while the orator not only convinces your judgment, but commands your passions.

C. I do not take your meaning exactly yet. When a hearer is fully convinced, what is there more to be done?

A. There is still wanting what an orator would do more than a metaphysician, in proving the existence of God. The metaphysician would give you a plain demonstration of it; and stop at the speculative view of that important truth. But the orator would further add whatever is proper to excite the most affecting sentiments in your mind; and make you love that glorious Being whose existence he had proved. And this is what we call persuasion.

C. Now I understand you perfectly well. 4. You see then what reason Cicero had to say, that we must never separate philosophy from eloquence. For, the art of per

suading without wisdom, and previous instruction, must be pernicious: and wisdom alone, without the art of persuasion, can never have a sufficient influence on the minds of men; nor allure them to the love and practice of virtue. I thought it proper to observe this by the by, to shew you how much those of the last age were mistaken in their notions of this matter. For, on the one hand there were some men of polite learning, who valued nothing but the purity of languages, and books elegantly written; but having no solid principles of knowledge, with their politeness and erudition, they were generally libertines. On the other hand, there were a set of dry, formal scholars, who delivered their instructions in such a perplexed, dogmatical, unaffecting manner as disgusted every body. Excuse this digression. I return now to the point; and must remind you that persuasion has this advantage beyond mere conviction, or demonstration; that it not only sets truth in the fullest light, but represents it as amiable; and engages men to love and pursue it.* The whole art of eloquence therefore consists in enforcing the clearest proofs of any truth,

*-Omnes animorum motus, quos hominum generi rerum natura tribuit, penitus pernoscendi ; quod omnis vis ratioque dicendi in eorum qui audiunt, mentibus aut sedandis, aut excitandis, exprimenda est. CIC. De Orat. lib. i. §. 5. Maximaque pars orationis admovenda est ad animorum motus nonnunquam aut cohortatione, aut commemoratione, aliqua, aut in spem, aut in metum, aut ad cupiditatem, aut ad glori am concitandos : sæpe etiam a temeritate, iracundia, spé, injuria, credulitate revocandos. Ibid. lib.ii. §.82.