An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Volume 1J. Johnson [and 18 others], 1805 - 510 pages |
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Page 11
... whilst we sleep . 6-8 . The idea of succession not from motion . 9-11 . The train of ideas has a certain degree of quick- ness . 12. This train , the measure of other successions . 13-15 . The mind cannot fix long on one invariable idea ...
... whilst we sleep . 6-8 . The idea of succession not from motion . 9-11 . The train of ideas has a certain degree of quick- ness . 12. This train , the measure of other successions . 13-15 . The mind cannot fix long on one invariable idea ...
Page 16
... whilst it makes us see and per- ceive all other things , takes no notice of itself ; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance , and make it its own object . But , whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this ...
... whilst it makes us see and per- ceive all other things , takes no notice of itself ; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance , and make it its own object . But , whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this ...
Page 16
... whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being ; as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted pos- session of our understandings , wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions , or that escaped ...
... whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being ; as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted pos- session of our understandings , wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions , or that escaped ...
Page 16
... whilst it pre- tends to assert the contrary , says nothing different from those , who deny innate principles . For nobody , I think , ever denied that the mind was capable of know- ing several truths . The capacity , they say , is ...
... whilst it pre- tends to assert the contrary , says nothing different from those , who deny innate principles . For nobody , I think , ever denied that the mind was capable of know- ing several truths . The capacity , they say , is ...
Page 18
... whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts . For all reasoning is search , and casting about , and requires pains and application . And how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed ...
... whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts . For all reasoning is search , and casting about , and requires pains and application . And how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed ...
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Common terms and phrases
actions amongst appear assent bishop of Worcester body capable cause ceive cerning certainly clear and distinct colours complex ideas conceive concerning consciousness consider consists desire determined discourse distance distinct ideas distinguish doubt eternity evident existence extension faculties farther finite happiness hath idea of infinite idea of space idea of substance imagine imprinted infi infinity innate ideas innate principles Julian period knowledge liberty lordship mankind measure memory men's mind motion names nature ness never objects observe operations particles of matter particular perceive perception perhaps personal identity positive idea primary qualities produce propositions prove reason received relation resurrection sensation and reflection sensation or reflection senses sensible qualities sidered signify simple ideas Socrates soever solidity sort soul speak stance stand substratum suppose taken notice ther things thoughts tion truth understanding uneasiness whereby wherein whereof whilst words
Popular passages
Page 77 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.
Page 78 - This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself: and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense.
Page 142 - For methinks the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little opening left to let in external visible resemblances or ideas of things without: would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them.
Page 130 - Thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth often die before us ; and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching ; where though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours ; and if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear.
Page 333 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...
Page 112 - Qualities thus considered in bodies are, first such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate soever it be; such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter, which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses.
Page 92 - These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce.
Page 16 - It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking...