tate, in proportion to the doubts we entertain on either of these heads.

The more perfons there are who relate the fame tranfaction, of which they are equally credible witneffes, the ftronger is the evidence for it. But the more perfons there are through whose hands the fame narration is conveyed to us, the weaker is the evidence. In this latter cafe, the witneffes are called dependent ones; but in the former they are faid to be independent. Whatever imperfection there may be in any one of a number of independent witneffes, it is in part removed by the testimony of others; but every imperfection in the original evidence is increafed in proportion to the number of dependent witneffes, through whofe hands the same story is transmitted.

The marks of a story being related by a number of independent witneffes, of full credit, is their agreement in the principal articles, and their difagreement with respect to things of less confequence, or at least a variety,

T 2

variety, or diverfity in their manner of relating the fame story.

The reafon of this is, that to things of principal importance they will all equally attend, and therefore they will have their minds equally impreffed with the ideas of them; but that to things of lefs confequence they will not give the fame attention, and therefore they will be apt to conceive differently concerning them.

If a number of perfons agree very minutely with respect to all the facts of any narrative, general and particular, and also in the order and manner of the narration, it will amount to a proof that they have agreed together to tell the fame ftory; and in this they will be fuppofed to have been influenced by fome motive not favourable to the value of their teftimony; and befides, having learned circumftances one of another, they cannot be confidered as independent of one another. All hiftories which have been written by different perfons,

in

in all refpects equally credible, agree in the main things, but they are as certainly found to differ with respect to things of lefs confequence.

We likewife diftinguish with respect to the nature of the fact to which our affent is required, for we expect more numerous, more exprefs, and in all refpects, more unexceptionable evidence, according to the degree of its previous improbability, arifing from its want of analogy to other facts already known; and in this there is a gradation, from things which are antecedently highly probable, and therefore require but little pofitive evidence, to things which are utterly incredible, being fo contrary to what we already know of the courfe of nature, and the author of it, that no evidence could convince us of it.

my

If fervant should tell me that, as he was paffing through a certain place, he faw a friend of mine, who I knew had bufinefs in that neighbourhood, and the character of my servant was such that I had never

known him to tell me a wanton lie, I fhould readily believe him; and if I had any thing to do in the cafe, I fhould, without hesitation, act upon the fuppofition that what he told me was true. But if the fame fervant should say that, coming through the fame place, he faw another of my friends whom I knew to have been dead, I fhould not believe him, though the thing in itself was not naturally impoffible; and if ten or a dozen perfons of our common acquaintance, perfons of knowledge and curiofity, should, independently of one another, feriously inform me that they were present themselves, and had no doubt of the fact, I might believe it.

It follows, however, from this obfervation, that miracles require a much stronger teftimony than common facts. The latter are analogous to fuch other facts as are the fubject of every day's experience, so that we are continually expecting fuch things, and they are never any furprize to us; whereas the former are contrary to that analogy, and are therefore unexpected.

By

By the help of thefe maxims I shall now proceed to examine the evidence of the Jewish and chriftian revelations, fhewing how far they are in themfelves credible or incredible upon the whole; then examining the evidence which has been produced in their favour, and laftly confidering fome particular objections which have been made to them.

SECTION V.

Of the antecedent credibility of the Jewish and Chriftian revelations.

TH

HE belief of the Jewish and christian revelations, which have fo close a connection that they muft ftand or fall together, is to believe that the divine being has, from time to time, interpofed in the moral government of the world; having, upon feveral important occafions, spoken to mankind by perfons called prophets, in T 4 order