SECTION V.

Of the properties of the divine goodness.

I'

F goodness, or benevolence, be the great governing principle, or fpring of action in the divine being, happiness must prevail amongst those of his creatures that are capable of it. If it were poffible that there fhould be, upon the whole, more mifery than happiness in the creation, it would be an argument that the fuprême being was malevolent. For fince all the tendencies and iffues of things were, from the first, perfectly known to him, he would, fuppofing him to be benevolent, have produced no system at all, rather than one in which mifery might prevail. No fcheme, therefore, which fuppofes the greater number of the creatures of God to be miferable upon the whole, can be confiftent with the fuppofition of the divine benevolence. The means, or the manner by which the creatures of God are involved in mifery makes

no

no difference in this cafe; for if it arife even from themselves, it arifes from the nature

that God has given them. feen that the conftitution

If he had forewhich he gave them would, in the circumftances in which he placed them, iffue in their final ruin, he would not have given them that conftitution, or have difpofed of them in that manner; unless he had intended that they fhould be finally miferable; that is, unless he himself had taken pleafure in mifery, in confequence of his being of a malevolent difpofition.

It must be impoffible, for the fame reafon, that the divine being fhould be сараble of facrificing the interefts of a greater number, to that of a few of his creatures; though it may, perhaps, be neceffary, that' the interefts of a few give place to that of à greater number. For if he had a defire to produce happiness at all, it feems to be an evident confequence, that he must prefer a greater degree of happiness to a lefs; and a greater fum of happiness can exift in a greater number, than in a smaller.

For

For the fame reafon, alfo, the goodness of God must be impartial. Since the fupreme being ftands in an equal relation to all his creatures and offspring, he must be incapable of that kind of partiality, by which we often give the preference to one perfon above another. There must be a good reafon for every thing that looks like preference in the conduct and government of God; and no reafon can be a good one, with refpect to a benevolent being, but what is founded upon benevolence. therefore, fome creatures enjoy more happinefs than others, it must be because the happiness of the creation in general requires that they should have that preference, and becaufe a lefs fum of good would have been produced upon any other difpofition of things.

If,

Thus it is probable that a variety in the ranks of creatures, whereby fome have a much greater capacity of happiness than others, and are therefore more favoured by divine providence than others, makes a better fyftem, and one more favourable to general happiness,

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happiness, than any other, in which there fhould have been a perfect equality in all. advantages and enjoyments. We are not, therefore, to fay that God is partial to men,. because they have greater powers, and enjoy more happiness than worms; but must fuppofe, that the system in which there was provifion for the greatest fum of happiness required that there fhould be fome creatures in the rank of men, and others in the rank of worms; and that each has reason to rejoice in the divine goodness, though they partake of it in different degrees. Indeed, it were abfurd to fuppofe, that, properly fpeaking, there was any thing like preference in the divine being chufing to make this a man, and the other a worm; because they had no being before they were created; and therefore it could not be any thing like affection to the one more than the other that determined his conduct. In reality it is improper to fay that God chofe to make this a man, and that a worm; for the for the proper expreffion is, that he chofe to make a man, and a worm.

Among

Among creatures of the fame general clafs or rank, there may be differences in advantages and in happiness; but they must be founded on the fame confiderations with the differences in the ranks themfelves; that is, it must be favourable to the happinefs of the whole that there fhould be thofe differences; and it cannot arife from any arbitrary or partial preference of one to another, independent of a regard to the happiness of the whole; which is what we mean by an arbitrary and partial affection.

There is a variety of cafes in which we may plainly fee, that the happiness of one has a reference to, and is productive of the happiness of others; as in the principle of benevolence, whereby we are naturally dif posed to rejoice in the happiness of others. For we cannot procure ourselves these fympathetic pleasures, at least, in any confiderable degree, without contributing to the happinefs of thofe around us. This, being a fource of pleasure to ourselves, is a conftant motive to benevolent actions.

Laftly,