virtue, are the divine appointment (fince they take place in confequence of his conftitution of the courfe of nature) they may be confidered as the natural punishments of vice, and the natural rewards of virtue, distributed according to the rules of justice and equity, and intended to inculcate the moft ufeful moral leffons on all his intelligent offspring, the fubjects of his moral government.

of

We, alfo, fee fomething like the exercise

mercy in the conduct of the divine providence; fince the natural punishments of vice feldom take place immediately, but leave a man room to recollect, and recover himself; and, if, after a man has been addicted to vice, he become truly reformed, the inconveniences he has brought upon himself are, in general, either removed, or mitigated; fo that he finds his condition. the better for it.

It may, also, according to the reasoning applied in a former cafe, be confidered as an argument for all the perfections of God,

that

that we are fo formed, that we cannot but approve of, and efteem every branch of virtue. For it cannot be fuppofed that our maker would have formed us in fuch a manner, as that he himself should be the object of our dislike and abhorrence. Our natural love of goodness and virtue, therefore, is a proof that every branch of it enters into the character of the divine being, and confequently that thofe qualities are the objects of his favour and approbation.

Since, however, all the moral perfections of God are derived from his benevolence; fo that holiness, juftice, mercy, and truth, are in him only modifications, as it were, of fimple goodness; we should endeavour to conceive of him, as much as poffible, according to his real nature; confidering benevolence as his fole ruling principle, and the proper spring of all his actions. This is, also, the most honourable and the most amiable light in which we can view him, remembering that goodness neceffarily implies what we call justice, though its more natural form be that of mercy.

Upon

Upon the whole, it must be acknowledged, that it is but a very imperfect idea that we can form of the moral perfections of God from the light of nature. It hardly amounts to what may be called an idea of his character. We know nothing of God by the light of nature but through the medium of his works; and these are such as we cannot fully comprehend; both the efficient and the final caufes being, in many cafes, unknown to us: whereas the clearer ideas we have of the characters of men, are acquired from a reflection upon fuch parts of their conduct as we can both fully comprehend, and are capable of ourfelves; so that we can tell precisely how we should feel and be difpofed, if we acted in the fame manner. The knowledge, alfo, of the manner in which men express themfelves, upon known occafions, is a great help to us in judging of what they feel, and confequently in inveftigating their proper character; and this is an advantage of which we are entirely destitute with respect to God, on the principles of the light of nature.

It is from revelation chiefly, if not only, that we get a juft idea of what we may call the proper character of the divine being. There we may both hear his declarations, and fee various fpecimens of his conduct, with refpect to a variety of perfons and occafions; by which means we have the best opportunity of entering, as it were, into his fentiments, perceiving his difpofition, learning what are the objects of his approbation or dislike, in fhort, of gaining a proper and diftinct idea of his moral cha

racter.

PART

PART II.

OF THE DUTY, AND FUTURE EXPECTATIONS

OF MANKIND.

SECTION I.

Of the rule of right and

HA

wrong.

AVING feen what it is that nature teaches us concerning GOD, our next inquiry respects the proper rule of human conduct, and our expectations, grounded upon that conduct. No man comes into

the world to be idle. Every man is furnished with a variety of paffions, which will continually engage him in fome pursuit or other; and the great question we have to decide is what paffions we ought to indulge, and what pursuits we ought to engage in. Now there are feveral very proper rules by which to form our judgment in this cafe; because there are feveral juft objects that

we