we ought to have in view in our conduct. It is very happy, however, that this variety in our views can never mislead us, fince all the great ends we ought to keep in view are gained by the fame means. They are, therefore, like fo many different clues to lead to the fame end; and in the following enquiry I fhall make use of any one of them, or all of them, as it may happen that, in any particular cafe, they can be applied to the most advantage.

Strialy speaking, there are no more than two juft and independent rules of human conduct, according to the light of nature, one of which is obedience to the will of God, and the other a regard to our own real happiness; for another rule, which is a regard to the good of others, exacly coincides with a regard to the will of God ; fince all that we know of the will of God, according to the light of nature, is his defire that all his creatures fhould be happy, and therefore that they fhould all contribute to the happiness of each other. In revelation we learn the will of God in a more

direct

direct method, and then obedience to God, and a regard to the good of others will be diftinct and independent principles of action, though they both enjoin the fame thing. The fourth, and laft rule of human condut, is a regard to the dictates of confcience. But this is only the substitute of the other principles, and, in fact, arifes from them; prompting to right conduct on emergencies, where there is no time for reafoning or reflection; and where, confequently, no proper rule of conduct could be applied.

Having thus pointed out the proper diftination and connection of these rules, I shall confider each of them separately. The first object of enquiry, in order to investigate the proper rule of right and wrong, is what kind of conduct the divine being most approves.

Now the divine being, whofe own object, as has been fhewn, is the happiness of his creatures, will certainly moft approve of

those

thofe fentiments, and of that conduct of ours, by which that happiness is best provided for; and this conduct must deferve to be called right and proper in the strictest fense of the words. If we examine the workmanship of any artist, our only rule of judging of what is right or wrong, with respect to it, is its fitness to answer his defign in making it. Whatever, in its ftructure, is adapted to gain that end, we immediately pronounce to be as it should be, and whatever obftrus his defign, we pronounce to be wrong, and to want correction. fame method of judging may be transferred to the works of God; fo that whatever it be, in the fentiments or conduct of men, that concurs with, and promotes the defign of our maker, we muft pronounce to be, therefore, right; and whatever tends to thwart and obftruct his end, we ought to call wrong: becaufe, when the former prevails, the great object of the whole system is gained: whereas, when the latter takes place, that end and defign is defeated.

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2. On the other hand, if we were to form a rule for our conduct independent of any regard to the divine being, we should certainly conclude that it is the part of wifdom, to provide for our greatest happiness ; and, confequently, that we should cherish thofe fentiments, and adopt that conduct, by which it will be beft fecured. But this rule must coincide with the former; because our happiness is an object with the divine being no less than it is with ourselves; for it has been fhewn, that benevolence is the fpring of all his actions, and that he made us to be happy.

3. Since, however, the divine goodness is general, and impartial; and he muft, confequently, prefer the happiness of the whole, to that of any individuals, it cannot be his pleasure, that we should confult our own intereft, at the expence of that of others. Confidering ourselves, therefore, not as feparate individuals, but as members of fociety, another object that we ought to have in view is the welfare of our fellow creatures, and of mankind at large. But ftill VOL. I.

F.

there

there is no real difagreement among these different rules of conduct, because we are fo made, as social beings, that every man provides the most effectually for his own happiness, when he cultivates those sentiments, and purfues that conduct, which, at the fame time, most eminently conduce to the welfare of those with whom he is connected. Such is the wisdom of this admirable conftitution, that every individual of the fyftem gains his own ends, and those of his maker, by the fame means.

The last rule is confcience, which is the result of a great variety of impreffions, the conclufions of our own minds, and the opinions of others, refpecting what is right and fit in our conduct, forming a fet of maxims which are ready to be applied upon every emergency, where there would be no time for reafon or reflection. Confcience, being a principle thus formed, is properly confidered as a fubftitute for the three other rules, viz. a regard to the will of God, to our own greatest happiness, and the good of others, and it is, in fact, improved and cor

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