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5. Laftly, as foon as we begin to distinguish among our actions, and are fenfible that there are reafons for fome of them, and against others, we get a notion of some of them as what ought to be performed, and of others of them as what are, or ought to be refrained from. In this manner we get the abstract ideas of right and wrong in human actions, and a variety of pleasing circumftances attending the former, and disagreeable ones accompanying the latter, we come in time to love some kind of actions, and to abhor others, without regard to any other confideration. For the fame reafon certain tempers, or difpofitions of mind, as leading to certain kinds of conduct, become the objects of this moral approbation, or difapprobation; and from the whole, arifes what we call a moral fenfe, or a love of virtue and a hatred of vice in the abftract. This is the greatest refinement of which we are capable, and in the due exercife and gratification of it confifts the highest perfection and happinefs of our natures.

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Of the ruling paffion, and an estimate of the propriety and value of the different pursuits of mankind.

AVING given this general delineation

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of the various paffions and affections of human nature, which may be called the springs of all our actions (fince every thing that we do is something that we are prompted to by one or more of them) I fhall now proceed to examine them separately, in order to ascertain how far we ought to be influenced by any of them, and in what cafes, or degrees, the indulgence of any of them becomes wrong and criminal.

Actuated as we are by a variety of paffions, it can hardly be, but that fome of them will have more influence over us than others. These are sometimes called ruling paffions, becaufe, whenever it happens that the gratification of fome interferes with

that

that of others, all the reft will give place to thefe. If, for inftance, any man's ruling paffion be the love of money, he will deny himself any of the pleasures of life for the fake of it; whereas, if the love of pleasure were his ruling paffion, he would often ṛun the rifque of impoverishing himself, rather than not procure his favourite indulgence.

It must be of great importance, therefore, to know which ought to be our ruling paffions through life, or what are thofe gratifications and pursuits to which we ought to facrifice every thing else. This is the object of our prefent enquiry, in conducting which we must confider how far the indulgence of any particular paffion is confiftent with our regard to the four rules of conduct that have been explained; namely, the will of God, our own beft intereft, the good of others, and the natural dictates of our conscience; and in estimating the value of any particular enjoyment, with refpect to the happiness we receive from it, we must confider how great or intense it is, how long it will continue, whether we regard the nature

of

of the fenfe from which it is derived, or the opportunities we may have of procuring the gratification of it, and lastly, how far it is confiftent, or inconfiftent, with other pleafures of our nature, more or lefs valuable than itself.

§ 1. Of the pleasures of fenfe.

Since no appetite or paffion belonging to our frame was given us in vain, we may conclude, that there cannot be any thing wrong in the fimple gratification of any defire that our maker has implanted in us, under certain limitations and in certain circumftances; and if we confider the proper object of any of our appetites, or the end it is calculated to anfwer, it will be a rule for us in determining how far the divine being intended that they should be indulged. Now some of our sensual appetites have for their proper object the fupport of life, and others the propagation of the fpecies. They fhould, therefore, be indulged as far as is neceffary for thefe purposes, and where the indulgence is not fo exceffive, or fo circum

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ftanced, as to interfere with the greater good of ourselves and others.

1. But to make the gratification of our fenfes our primary pursuit, must be abfurd; for the appetite for food is given us for the fike of fupporting life, and not life for the fake of confuming food. The like may be faid of other fenfual appetites. Since, therefore, we certainly err from the intention of nature when we make that an end, which was plainly meant to be no more than a means to fome farther end; whatever this great end of life be, we may conclude that it cannot be the gratification of our sensual appetites, for they themselves are only a means to fomething elfe.

2. To make the gratification of our bodily fenfes the chief end of living would tend to defeat itfelf; for a man who should have no other end in view would be apt fo to overcharge and furfeit his fenfes, that they would become indifpofed for their proper functions, and indulgence would occafion nothing but a painful loathing. By intem

VOL. I.

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perance

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