3. With refpect to many pèrfons, a great refinement of tafte is attended with the fame inconveniences as an addictednefs to fenfual pleafure; for it is apt to lead them into many expences, and make them defpife plain honeft induftry; whereby they are frequently brought into a state of poverty, furrounded with a thoufand artificial wants, and without the means of gratifying them.

A tafte for the pleafures of imagination. ought, more particularly, to be indulged, and even encouraged, in younger life, in the interval between a ftate of mere animal nature, in a child, and the ferious pursuits of manhood. It is alfo a means of relaxing the mind from too clofe an attention to ferious bufinefs, through the whole of life, promoting innocent amufement, chearfulness, and good humour. Befides, a taste for natural, and alfo for artificial propriety, beauty, and fublimity, has a connection with a tafte for moral propriety, moral beauty, and dignity; and when properly cultivated, enables us to take more pleafure in the contemplation of the works, perfections, and

providence

providence of God. Here, indeed, it is, that a juft tafte for thefe refined pleasures finds its highest and most perfect gratification for it is in thefe contemplations, that inftances of the most exquifite propriety, beauty, and grandeur occur.

A regard to our greateft happiness was allowed before to be one of the proper rules of our conduct; but at the fame time it was fhewn to be only one of four; and in fact the proper end of it, or our greatest happiness as individuals, is moft effectually gained, when it is not itfelf the immediate fcope of our actions; that is, when we have not our intereft directly in view, but when we are actuated by a difinterefted regard to the good of others, to the commands of God, and to the dictates of confcience.

1. When we keep up a regard to ourfelves in our conduct, we can never exclude fuch a degree of anxiety, and jealousy of others, as will always make us in fome de

gree

gree unhappy; and we find by experience, that no perfons have fo true and unallayed enjoyments, as those who lofe fight of themselves, and of all regard to their own happiness, in higher and greater pursuits.

2. Though it be true, that, when our intereft is perfectly understood, it will be found to be beft promoted by those actions which are dictated by a regard to the good of others, &c. it requires great comprehenfion of mind even to fee this, and much more to act upon it; fo that if the bulk of mankind were taught to pursue their own proper happiness, as the ultimate end of life, they would be led to do many things injurious to others, not being able to fee how they could otherwise make the best provifion for themselves.

3. If we confult the unperverted dictates of our minds, we fhall feel that there is a kind of meanness in a man's acting from a view to his own intereft only; and if any perfon were known to have no higher motive for his conduct, though he should have

fo

fo much comprehenfion of mind, as that this principle fhould never mislead him, and every particular action which he was led to by it should be, in itself, always right, he would not be allowed to have any moral worth, fo as to command our esteem; and he would not, at all engage our love. All we could fay in his favour would be that he was a prudent man, not that he was virtuous. Nay, we should not allow that any man's conduct was even right, in the higheft and most proper fenfe of the word, unless he was influenced by motives of a higher and purer nature; namely, a regard to the will of God, to the good of others, or to the dictates of conscience.

It feems to follow from these confiderations, that this principle, of a regard to our highest intereft, holds a kind of middle rank between the vices and the virtues; and that its principal ufe is to be a means of raifing us above all the lower and vicious pursuits, to those that are higher, and properly speaking virtuous and praife worthy. From a regard to our true intereft, or mere felf love,

we

we are first of all made fenfible that we should injure ourselves by making the gratification of our fenfes, or the pleasures of imagination, &c. our chief purfuit, and the great bufinefs and end of life; and we are convinced that it is our wisdom to pay a fupreme regard to the will of our maker, to employ ourselves in doing good to others, and, univerfally, to obey the dictates of our confciences. This perfuafion will lead us to do thofe things which we know to be agreeable to thofe higher principles, though we cannot immediately fee them to be for our interest; and, by degrees, we shall get a habit of acting in the most pious, generous, and confcientious manner, without ever having our own happiness in view, or in the leaft attending to any connection, immediate or diftant, that our conduct has with it.

On thefe accounts, it feems better not to confider any kind of felf intereft as an ultimate rule of our condut; but that, independent of any regard to our own happinefs, we should think ourselves obliged confcientiously