trained soldier. He died for his countrymen, but he committed a fatal mistake in separating his inadequate force and awaiting attack in two entrenched camps ten or twelve miles apart and with difficult and hazardous communications between them, and especially in holding the main body of his force in a position where it could be so easily flanked and thrown hors de combat. General McClellan, with the eye of genius, saw and seized the advantage. He held Garnett's attention by feigning to attack, as the Confederate general expected him to do. Perhaps McClellan knew that General Garnett had reported the camps on Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill as the "gates to the northwestern country"; and so they were gates to the highway of travel, but the rear could be reached without going through the gates. McClellan flanked the pass on Rich Mountain, which was much nearer to Beverly—the base of supply and retreat. Thus the fate of the campaign rested on the three hundred and ten men who fought heroically to defend the rear against a brigade. When they were overborne by numbers, the rest of the Confederate forces were helpless, and the main body, twelve miles away on Laurel Hill, was unable to strike a blow. The whole command was entrapped; the only thought was how to escape, for there was no way to fight. Thus the only battle of this much lauded campaign was the battle fought by the three hundred and ten under command of Captain De Lagnel in the rear of Colonel Pegram's camp on Rich Mountain. The skirmishes at Carrick's Ford and the other fords were mere incidents of the pursuit. General McClellan managed this campaign with a master hand. He did what was to be done. Perhaps if there had been a greater obstacle to overcome or adequate forces to oppose, he might still have been successful; but, taking the campaign as it was, neither proclamations, nor adulation, can raise it to the rank of Napoleon's Italian campaign. A few days later General McClellan was called to Washington, where he was assigned to duties of a much wider sphere. He proved himself to be the best organizer of troops in either army. He gave evidence of his military genius by organizing and perfecting the plan of invasion upon which the war was subsequently fought, and which all his successors adopted. In the comprehensiveness of his plans he had no equal in the Federal army. In executing movements in the field he did not seem so successful as in planning them. In fact, there were contradictions in his character. He was scientific and bold in thought, but slow and deliberate in action. It would seem that he was cautious by nature, and from reading acquired an admiration for Napoleon and became a student of his campaigns and methods. In his western Virginia campaign he acted with rapidity and vigor. In his subsequent career and greater sphere he planned like Napoleon and executed like Fabius. While the events above related were in progress in the north part of western Virginia, a campaign was begun by the invasion of the southwestern section along the line of Kanawha River. General McClellan, being engrossed with the operations in the northern part of the State, committed the more southern campaign to Brigadier-general J. D. Cox. The inauguration and objects of this campaign cannot be more clearly and succinctly stated than by quoting General McClellan's order, as follows: "Headquarters, Department Of The Ohio, "buckhannon, Va., July 2, 1861. "Brigadier-general J. D. Cox, Camp Dennison, Ohio. "general: On receipt of this you will at once assume command of the First and Second Kentucky Regiments and the Twelfth Ohio. Call upon Governor Dennison to supply you with one company of cavalry and six guns. Captain Kingsbury probably has State guns enough to give you. "You will expedite the equipment of those regiments and move them at once to Gallipolis, via Hamden and Portland, hiring teams for the supplies of the troops between Portland and Gallipolis, sending to the quartermaster in advance to have teams ready. With the regiment first ready to move proceed to Gallipolis and assume command of the Twenty-first. Cross the river and occupy Point Pleasant. With the regiment that next arrives occupy Letart's Falls, and then move the two regiments to the mouth of Ten-mile Creek, or the point near there where the road from Letart's Falls intersects the Kanawha River. Place the last regiment in reserve at Point Pleasant, or any proper point in the rear of your line of defence. Intrench two guns at Letart's and four at your advanced position on the Kanawha. Remain on the defensive, and endeavor to keep the rebels near Charleston until I can cut off their retreat by movement from Beverly. Should you receive certain intelligence that I am hard pressed seek to relieve me by a rapid advance on Charleston, but place no credit in rumors, for I shall be successful. Use your cavalry as pickets, not exposing them. Punish Ripley, if you can. Repress any outbreaks that may occur at Guyandotte or Barboursville. "Remember, my plan is to cut them off, and do all you can to assist that object. Always keep two or three boats on hand. Call on Captain J. Kountz, at Marietta or Ripley, to supply boats from his fleet. If the two companies of Seventeenth Ohio are still at Ravenswood when you reach Gallipolis, order them to rejoin their regiment, via Parkersburg or Webster. Communicate frequently. telegraph line follows me out. "Very respectfully, yours, A "GEO. B. McClellan, "Major-general, Commanding." Such was the original plan—an inactive campaign to await the results of movements from the north. On the Confederate side, some preparation had been made to meet invasion. General Henry A. Wise had been appointed, June 6, 1861, to command in the Kanawha Valley. He brought with him a small force, and was instructed to "rally the people of that valley and the adjoining counties to resist and repel the invading army." He |