This information changed Johnston's plans. He suspended the movement by Mechanicsville and north of the Chickahominy, and decided to attack the left wing south of the Chickahominy. Preparations were immediately begun to fall upon the corps of Keyes at Seven Pines. Orders were issued on the evening of the 30th. Huger's division was to form the right wing of the attack extending to White Oak Swamp. D. H. Hill's division formed the centre and was to make the main attack, supported by Longstreet. G. W. Smith's division formed the left wing. The attack was to be made early in the morning of the 31st. That night the rain fell in torrents. General Johnston says:

"Heavy and protracted rains during the afternoon and night, by swelling the streams of the Chickahominy, increased the probability of our having to deal with other troops than those of Keyes. The same cause prevented the prompt and punctual movement of the troops. Those of Smith, Hill, and Longstreet, however, were in position early enough to be ready to commence operations by 8 A. M. Major-general Longstreet, unwilling to make a partial attack, instead of the combined movement which had been planned, waited from hour to hour for General Huger's division. At length, at 2 P. M., he determined to attack without those troops."

Longstreet's attack was completely successful and drove the enemy back for more than two miles. The attack of General Smith was delayed until four o'clock, owing to the fact that he was instructed to attack as soon as he heard the firing from Longstreet, but this firing was not heard, owing to peculiar atmospheric conditions. Notwithstanding the failure of Huger to arrive and other accidents, the Confederates gained the day. General Johnston says:

"Had Major-general Huger's division been in position and ready for action when those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill moved, I am satisfied that Keyes' Corps would have been destroyed instead of being merely defeated."

At seven o'clock in the evening, General Johnston was severely wounded by a shell and was borne from the field. General G. W. Smith succeeded to the command. The Federals were heavily reinforced during the afternoon and night of May 31st by Sumner's corps and other troops. Early the next morning, June 1st, General Smith renewed the battle. The Confederate attack was repulsed and the Federal advance was likewise unsuccessful. The fighting had ceased, each army holding its line of the morning, when General Robert E. Lee arrived upon the field about 2 p. M. and assumed command. He devoted the rest of the day to caring for and removing the wounded and collecting the trophies of the first day's victory, which were scattered over the field. That night he withdrew the Confederate troops, and the Federals remained on the field. The first day of the battle was a Confederate victory. The second day was a drawn battle so far as fighting was concerned, but it foiled the Confederate plans and left the Federals to hold their lines. The Federal loss for the two days, as reported by General McClellan, was 5,739. The Confederate loss has not been exactly ascertained. That of General Longstreet, including all the troops of the right wing, which bore the brunt of the fight, was 4,851. The loss in Whiting's division was 1,273. This makes a total of 6,124 and includes nearly all the losses. Phisterer's Register states the Confederate loss at 7,997, but gives no authority.

CHAPTER VIII

CAMPAIGNS OF 1862—IN THE EAST (Continued)

MCCLELLAN and Lee now faced each other, their armies inactive. The two generals, however, were preparing for offensive operations. McClellan's force on May 31st was 126,089, in five corps. Lee had a force of 57,000 men, which he speedily increased to 72,000 by reinforcements from the South, and was planning to bring Stonewall Jackson to Richmond with 16,000 men.

McClellan, despairing of active assistance by any movement of McDowell from Fredericksburg, and suspecting, as is shown by his letters, that Jackson would suddenly move to Richmond, had now no object in maintaining his long line on the north side of the Chickahominy. He was beginning to make arrangements to contract his lines by throwing all his troops south of that river. In order to do this it was necessary to "change his base." He sent engineers to inquire into the feasibility of a base on James River, to be reached by way of White Oak Swamp, but after consultation with trusted officers, took no active steps. Had he changed at that time he would have secured a safer base and would have avoided the ridicule which attached to the movement when he finally made it under compulsion. He kept one corps under Fitz-John Porter north of the Chickahominy, and held the other four on the south side, constantly pressing forward by slow approaches toward Richmond, until his advanced posts were about four and a half miles from the city.

Lee, as early as June 8th, wrote to Jackson suggesting that the latter should move rapidly to Richmond to unite in the attack on McClellan. On June 17th Jackson was on the way, having taken the steps previously related to deceive the enemy. He had reached Ashland on June 25th, and was moving, in accordance with General Lee's plan of attack, upon McClellan's rear.

It was on the 25th that McClellan made his first movement, which was to direct General Hooker to take a position one mile in advance on the Fair Oaks Farm, on the Williamsburg Road leading directly to Richmond. The move was a tentative one by which it was hoped to gain an advantage in one of two ways. It was thought that the movement might arouse a general resistance from the Confederates and so renew the battle of Fair Oaks, in which event, by the advantage of the bridges, the whole army could be concentrated. On the other hand, should the battle not be renewed, it would be one step gained in the march toward Richmond. The ground General Hooker was ordered to occupy was taken, lost, and retaken at a cost of four or five hundred men, Brigadier-generals C. Grover and D. E. Sickles ably supporting Hooker. During the ensuing night the news was received that General Jackson had returned from the Shenandoah Valley and was in force near Hanover Court House. Knowing that this signified the concentration of the Confederate forces, and believing that Jackson's object was to cut off Federal communications by seizing the York River railroad in their rear, Hooker was recalled from his position the following day. The advance upon Richmond had been checked.

Jackson was instructed to move upon the right flank of the Federal army, and if McDowell remained inactive in his position near Fredericksburg a general attack was to be made on McClellan's whole line. Jackson was to leave Ashland early in the morning of the 26th and turn Beaver Dam. A. P. Hill was to cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge as soon as Jackson's advance beyond that point