BOOK IV.1

CHAPTER I.

principle.

3

THAT is called a principle2 from whence any- 1. Different thing Las had motion imparted to it in the first meanings of instance; for example, the principle of length and px, or first of a way from hence, indeed, is the actual principle, but from the contrary a different one; but, again, that is called a first principle from whence each thing would spring in the most beautiful manner: as, for instance, even in the case of discipline the beginning must be made sometimes not from what is first, and the principle of a thing, but from whence one may learn with the greatest facility. And, again, that is a principle from whence is produced the first of a thing that is inherent; as, for example, a keel of a vessel and a foundation of a house and some suppose the heart of animals to be a thing of this sort; but others the brain, and others whatever else of this kind they may happen with. And, again, that is a principle from whence the first of a thing not inherent is produced, and whence motion and change have first been naturally fitted to commence; as, for example, the child from the father and the mother, and the battle from abuse. And that is a first principle according to the free impulse of which things in motion are moved, and things undergoing a change, are changed, as in cities do

1 In the Commentaries of Alexander this book stands fourth. Thomas Aquinas regards it as the fifth book of the Metaphysics. According to the plan explained previously, Aristotle having settled the "modus considerandi" in the case of the science of ontology, now proceeds to examine into those things that are inherent in entity, or common to it as such, and which are employed by the other sciences. It is, then, a book of definitions; and a most useful one it is, and well worthy of the attention of the metaphysician.

2 There are seven different senses of the word àpxǹ given here. 'Apxǹ is a prominent term in metaphysics, as we are informed in the first chapter of the first book. Origen entitles a certain physico-theological (metaphysical) work of his Пepì dpxŵv.

3 Vide the Categories, chap. viii.

minions and dynasties, and kingdoms and tyrannies are styled principles. And both the arts, and especially those of them that are architectonic, are called principles. Further, whence a thing is known first, this is called a principle of that thing; as, for example, the hypotheses are principles of demonstration. In as many ways, also, as first principles are styled are causes in like manner denominated; for all causes are first principles.

2. What is

Common to all first principles is the beir g the common to all original from whence a thing either is, or is ἀρχαὶ as such. produced, or is known. But of these principles some, indeed, are inherent, and others are extrinsic. Wherefore, Nature constitutes both a first principle, and an element is so likewise, and understanding, and free-will, and substance, and the final cause; for, in the case of many things, the principle of knowledge and of motion is the good and the fair.2

1. Definitions

of the expression cause.

CHAPTER II.

IN one way that is called cause3 from which, as inherent, anything is produced; as, for example, the brass of a statue, and the silver of a cup, and the genera of these; but, in another way, the form and exemplar are regarded as causes: and this is the reason of the formal cause and the genera of these; as, for instance, in the diapason the cause is the ratio of two to one; and, in general, number and the parts, those that are in the ratio, belong to this order of cause. But, further, that constitutes a cause from whence is the first principle of change or of rest; as, for instance, the designing cause and

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1 This word is used in the Epistles of St. Paul in reference to an order in the celestial hierarchy. Vide Eph. i. 21; Col. ii. 10.

2 Some MSS. read кakóν.

3 Aristotle now considers the meaning of the term cause, and next in order after that of ȧpxn: because he says that the significations of both are equivalent in regard of their number. What is laid down in this chapter we find in the second book of the Physics, chap. iii., where Aristotle is likewise discussing the subject of ætiology.

Diapason, dià Taσŵv: this is a phrase taken from music, as the flling up, the ellipsis as follows will show; ἡ διὰ πασῶν χορδῶν συμφωνία, or, in other words, the concord of the first and last note, that is, the octave. Vide Philo Judæus, vol I. p. 13, Bohn's edition.

the father of a child; and, generally speaking, the forming of that which is being formed, and that capable of effecting a change of that which is undergoing a change. Further, a cause is as the end; this, however, is the final cause, as, for instance, health of walking. For why does one walk? we say, that he may have good health; and, saying so, we think that we have assigned the cause. And as many operations, doubtless, as take place between any other source of motion and the end are regarded as causes; for example, of health, tenuity, or purging, or medicines, or instruments, for all these are on account of the end; but they differ from one another in respect of being, some as instruments, and others as things done. Causes, indeed, therefore, are enumerated almost somehow after this manner.

finitions.

And seeing that causes are thus multifariously 2. Results denominated, it happens that many of them are from these decauses of the same thing, not according to accident; for instance, of the statue both the statuary art and the brass, not according to anything that is different, but so far forth as it is a statue; this, however, does not take place in the same manner, but the brass is as matter, and the art as the origin of motion, or the efficient cause. And some things are reciprocally1 causes of one another; as, for example, labour of a good habit of body, and this latter, again, of labour: yet not in the same manner, but the one is as the end, and the other as the principle of motion. Further, the same thing sometimes is the cause of things that are contrary; for that which when present is the cause of this particular thing, this when absent we sometimes denominate the cause of the contrary: for example, the absence of the pilot is the cause of the capsizing of the boat, the presence of whom is the cause of its preservation. Both, however, as well the presence as the absence of the pilot, are as efficient causes, that is, causes imparting motion.

3. Causes re

Now, all the causes just enumerated fall under four modes the most evident. For, indeed, the duced into four elements of syllables, and the matter of things constructed by art, and the fire and earth, and all such

modes.

'This is an important distinction, and might be illustrated further In the case of the growth of our active principles as well as moral sentiments.

bodies, and the parts of a whole, and the hypotheses of the conclusion, are causes, as that whereof other things are produced. But of these some are as the subject; as, for instance, the parts: but others, as the formal cause; for example, both the whole, and the composition, and the form. But the seed, and the physician, and the deliberator, and, in short, the maker, all are the causes of the principle of change or of stability. But the rest, as the end and the good,1 are causes of other things; for the final cause aims at being the best, and an end to the other things: let there be, however, no actual difference in saying a thing is good or appears good.

4. Modes of

These causes, indeed, therefore, are so many causes further in species, but the modes of causes are, doubtexplained. less, many in number; these, however, become less numerous by being reduced under heads. For causes are called so in many ways; and of those things of the same species, antecedently and subsequently, one thing is the cause of another; as, for example, of health the physician and the artisan, and of the diapason 2 the double and number, and always those things that comprise anything whatsoever of singulars. But, moreover, cause is denominated as the accident and the genera of these; as, for instance, of a statue, in one sense, Polycletus is the cause, and, in another, the statuary, because it is accidental with the statuary to be Polycletus: and the things embracing the accidental are causes; for instance, man is a cause of a statue, or also, in general, animal, because Polycletus is a man, and man is an animal. But also of the accidents one is more remote, and another more contiguous than others; for example, just as if the white and the musical should be termed a cause of the statue, but not merely Polycletus, or man. But besides all things, both those that are denominated appropriately or strictly, and those according to accident, some causes are denominated as things

1 As regards the rò ayaedy viewed as a cause, Aristotle has already examined the subject in the first book. The Stagyrite ranks it as a final cause; and thus most wonderfully betrays his consciousness of the tie that binds moral and physical causes together. Vide Ethics, L i. sqq.; and Niebuhr s Lectures on Roman History, Lect. LXIL

For the meaning of this word, vide p. 112.

cudued with a capacity, but others as things energizing; as the cause of the house being built is the builder, or the builder considered as in the act of building. In like manner with what has been stated will be mentioned, also, the causes in the case of which there are causes; as, for example, of this statue, as far forth as it is a statue, or, in general, of an image, or of this brass, so far forth as it is brass, or, in short, matter; and in the case of the accidents it is so in like manner. Further, also, these and those shall be predicated as connected together; as, for example, not Polycletus nor a statuary, but Polycletus a statuary. But, however, all these, at least, are six in number, yet are expressed in a twofold manner. For either as a singular are they denominated, or as the genus thereof, or as the accident, or as genus of the accident, or as these connected together or simply expressed; further, all of them as energizing, or according to capacity. But thus far is there a difference, that causes energizing and singulars,1 and those of which they are the causes, subsist at the same time and at the same time cease to be; as, for example, the person healing with that person that is being restored to health, and this person the builder with that which is being built. Not invariably, however, is this the case with regard to causes in capacity; for not at the same time sink into decay the house and the builder.

CHAPTER III.

significations of

χείων.

AN element is called that from which, as an 1. Different inherent first principle and indivisible in species, the term elesomething is compounded into a different spe- ment, or σTo cies; as, for instance, the elements of voice are those things of which the voice is composed, and into which it is ultimately divided: those elements, however, no longer 1 The Leipsic edition inserts here the words autá Te éσTí: they are omitted in some MSS., for they only perplex the sentence.

2 In assigning a different signification to the word "element" from that usually given to apxh, or first principle, Aristotle differed from Thales, and, no doubt, from other philosophers of antiquity. Vide Plutarch, De Placitis, lib. I. c. 2; and Thomas Stanley, in his "History of Philosophy," who awards the credit of this distinction to Plato, part V. chap. vii. on Plato's Inventions.