finite. Thus, it has been accidental to a certain individual, his arriving at Ægina, if he has not left home for this purpose that he should go thither, but has been driven there by a storm, or captured by pirates. The accidental, doubtless, has been generated, and will have a subsistence, not, however, so far forth as itself is concerned, but as far as something else is; for the storm was the cause of his going to the port he was not sailing for, and this was Ægina. And in another way is a thing called an accident; for example, in the way whatsoever things are inherent in each thing essentially, and yet are not contained in the substance of that thing, as in a triangle to have angles equal to two right angles. And accidents of this sort it is admissible should be eternal, yet this is not the case with any of those others. The reason, however, of this may be found elsewhere. BOOK V.1 1. The chief distinction of metaphysics, as a science, that it investi ov, as such. CHAPTER I. THE first principles and causes of entities are under investigation; and it is evident that the investigation regards the causes and first pringates "ens," Tò ciples of entities, so far forth as they are entities. For there is a certain cause of health, and of a good habit of body, and of mathematical entities; likewise are there first principles, and elements, and causes; and in general, also, every science which is an intellectual one, or in any degree even partaking of the faculty of thought,2 is conversant about causes and first principles, which are either more accurate or more simple, as the case may be. All of these, however, being descriptive of one particular subject, 1 Aristotle in this book, which stands sixth in some copies, proceeds to expand further the fundamental notion of metaphysics as a science of entity. It harmonizes with physics, so far forth as both are speculative; and under ontology must be ranked theology, as being in its nature eminently speculative or theoretic. 2 diavolas. See note, p. 244 of the Orgar on, "Bohn's Classical Library." and a particular genus, are engaged about this; but not con cerning being or entity simply considered, nor so far forth. as it is entity: nor do they make any account of the substance of a thing, but from this one particular subject, partly from sense making this manifest, and partly assuming an hypothesis as to substance or quiddity; they, accordingly, demonstrate the things that are essentially inherent in the genus about which they subsist, either more necessarily or more feebly. Wherefore, it is evident that there is not a demonstration of substance, nor of "the what" a thing is, that is, of quiddity, by means of an induction of such a kind; but there is some other mode of manifestation. In like manner, also, these sciences say nothing as to whether the genus about which they are engaged is or is not, on account of its belonging to the same faculty of thought or understanding, and of its making manifest the nature of a thing, and whether it is this particular thing. 2. A fortiori proof of this from physical science, But since, also, physical science' happens to be conversant about a certain genus of entity, (for about such a sort of substance is it conversant in which is contained in itself the first principle of motion and of rest,) it is evident that it is neither practical, nor productive, that is, effective; for the first principle of things that are productive resides in the producer or efficient cause, whether that principle be mind, or art, or a certain capacity, but the first principle of things that are practical is free-will in the agent; for the same thing is an object of action and of free-will. Wherefore, if every dianoetic faculty be either practical, or productive, or speculative, the physical dianoetic energy would be some speculative science; but speculative about such an entity as it is possible should have motion imparted to it, and about such a substance as, existing according to reason, for the most part has not a separable subsistence merely. It is requisite, and from the however, as regards the essence or formal cause, mode of definition in phyand the definition how things are so, that this sics; should not escape our notice, as without this knowledge, at least, the present investigation would be the 1 In the Physics Aristotle defines what puois is, and discusses the abject of motion most fully and ably. Vide Physics, books I., III, and VIII. accomplishing of nothing. But of things that are defined, and to which the inquiry what they are belongs, some subsist in such a manner as the flat-nose,' and some as the hollow. And these differ, since flat-nose is conceived along with matter, for, in truth, a flat-nose is a hollow-nose; but hollowness or concavity is without sensible matter. If, therefore, all physical or natural things are predicated in the same way as flat-nose-as, for instance, nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, in short, animal, leaf, root, bark; in short, plant (for the definition of none of these subsists without motion, but such invariably involves matter)-it is plain how it is necessary in physical inquiries to investigate the nature of a thing, and to define it, and why, also, it is the part of the natural philosopher to institute an inquiry concerning a certain soul, namely, such a soul as is not unconnected with matter; that therefore the physical dianoetic energy is speculative is evident from these statements. But also the mathematical dianoetic energy is speculative also ; whether it is conversant, however, about entities that are immovable, and capable of a separate subsistence, is a point that at present is obscure: but that certain mathematical systems investigate certain entities, so far as they are immovable, and so far as they have a separable subsistence, is clear. and from the case of mathe matics. 3. The neces- ence, Now, if there is something that is eternal and immovable, and that involves a separate subsistit is evident that it is the province of the 2 speculative, that is, of the ontological, science to investigate such. It is not, certainly, the province of physical science, at any rate, (for physical science is conversant about certain movable natures,) nor of the mathematical, but of a science prior to both of these, that is, the science of metaphysics. For physical science, I admit, is conversant about things that are inseparable, to be sure, but not immovable; 1 In adducing here this illustration of ouórns "pugnosedness," so frequently found in this and other parts of his works, Aristotle is preparing the way for demonstrating the necessity of some such science being in existence as that of ontology. Vide Mr. Maurice's analysis of the Metaphysics, in his "History of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy." 2 These are remarkable words, and point out the connecting lins between ontology and theology. 3 I have supplied these words myself to complete the sense. and of mathematical science some are conversant about entities that are immovable, it is true, ye, perhaps, not separable, but subsisting as in matter. But Metaphysics, or the First Philosophy, is conversant about entities which both have a separate subsistence and are immovable; and it is necessary that causes should be eternal, all without exception, but particularly these for these are the causes of the things that are manifest or phenomenal amongst those that are divine. Wherefore, according to this view of things, 4. Threefold there would be three speculative philosophies; division of namely, the mathematical, the physical, the science. theological. For it is not obscure that if what speculative 5. Solution of gards ontology. is divine1 exists anywhere, it resides in such a nature as this; and it is requisite that that should be the most honourable science which is conversant about a genus of things which is most entitled to our respect. The speculative sciences, accordingly, are more eligible than the rest of the sciences; and of such as are speculative, this science of metaphysics, now under investigation, is more eligible than all the others, For one would feel a doubt as to whether at all the first philosophy, or ontology, is universal, a doubt as reor conversant about a certain genus and cne nature. For neither is there the same method of conducting our inquiries in the mathematical sciences; but geometry, in fact, and astronomy, are conversant about a certain peculiar nature: yet, in reply to this, I would say that pure mathematics universally 2 is common to all the branches of that science, and thus that the first philosophy universally is common to all the sciences. If, then, there is not some different substance besides those that consist by nature, the physical would be the first science; but if there is a certain immovable substance, this will be prior, and the subject of the first philosophy, and in this way will subsist universally, because it is the first of the sciences; and it would be the province of this science of metaphysics, or ontology, to elrep TO Oεtov vraрxol. This air of hesitation, here and elsewhere, in the mention of what is divine, has roused the suspicious of the Christian world as to the theological system of Aristotle; and has led many to brand him with the imputation of atheism. 2 I have adopted Taylor's paraphrastic rendering of these words, ἐκείνη δὲ καθόλου πασῶν κοινῇ. institute an inquiry respecting entity, so far forth as it is entity, and respecting quiddity, or the nature of a thing, and respecting those things that universally are inherent in it, so far forth as it is entity. 1. No science one of the sub- CHAPTER II.1 SINCE, however, entity, simply so called, is denominated in many ways, of which one was that which subsists according to accident, and another that which is as a thing that is true,2 and the non-being of which is as a thing that is false, and besides these, since these are figures of predication; as, for example, quiddity, and quality, and quantity, and the place where, and the time when, and whatever else there is that is significant in this way: further, besides all these, is there that which subsists in potentiality, and that which subsists in energy: since, however, I say entity is denominated in many ways; in the first instance, as far as regards that subsisting according to accident, must we declare that respecting this there exists no speculation." 2. Practical proof of this from housebuilding; And a proof of this statement is the following; for in no science is there any attention paid to this, neither in practical, nor productive, nor speculative science. For neither does one who builds a house make at the same time as many things as are accidental to the house when it is built, for these are infinite; there is no hindrance, for example, but that the house, when it has been constructed should prove to some persons agreeable, but to others injurious, and to others serviceable, and, as I may say, different from all entities, of none of which the building art is and a specula- productive. And, in the same manner, neither tive proof of it does the geometrician speculate into things which from geometry. in this way are accidental to figures, nor whether there is any difference between a wooden triangle and a triangle having angles equal to two right angles. 'Aristotle here shows that though there is no possibility of there being a science of accidents, yet that there may exist one conversant about the substances wherein these accidents inhere. 2 Vide book VIII. chap. x. • The reasoning that follows is well worthy of attention. |