For the cause of the one, is indefinite, but of the other a certain affection of the understanding; and both are conversant about the remaining genus of entity, and do not render manifest any nature that is of an higher order than entity. Wherefore, let these points be omitted, to be sure; but we must examine the causes and the first principles of entity itself, so far forth as it is entity. And it is evident, in what we have laid down concerning the multifarious predication cf everything, that entity is denominated in many ways. BOOK VI.2 :. The first division of the "ens" into the τό τι εστί, shown to be of the same import with substance, ουσία. CHAPTER I. ENTITY is denominated in many ways, as we have previously made the division in the case of those statements relating to its multifarious predications ;3 for one signification of entity is "the what a thing is," or quiddity, and this certain particular thing; and another is quality or quantity, or each of the rest of the things that are so predicated. Now, seeing that entity is spoken of in thus many ways, it is evident that the first entity amongst these is quiddity, or "the what a thing is," which signifies substance. For when we say that this particular thing is of a certain quality, we term it either good or bad; but not as of three cubits, or that it is a man: when, however, we say what a thing is, we term it not white or warm, or of three cubits; but a man or a god. But the other entities are deno 1 Other MSS. read τapá. 2 Aristotle having put out of the way certain senses in which the expression "ens" is received by certain philosophers, now proceeds to institute a more direct examination into the subject-matter of metaphysics, by an analysis of the To by into its component significations. Vide book IV. chap. vii. Taylor makes Teρl Tоû Tоλλáк ́s refer to the subject in general of multifarious predication. In this case Aris. totle refers to the Categories, chaps. ii. iii. iv. minated so in regard of belonging to entity that is really such; some, to wit, as being quantities, and some qualities, and some passions, and others, some other things of the sort. Wherefore, one might feel perplexed as to whether walking,1 and health, and sitting, were each of them an entity or a nonentity. And, in like manner, also, is it the case with any whatsoever of the other things of this kind respecting which similar doubts are entertained; for none of them is adapted by nature either to subsist essentially or is capable of being separated from substance, but rather (if I may express myself so) this is to be said of any amongst the entities which is walking, and sitting, and being in sound health. And these rather than those appear to be entities, because they have some definite subject, and this is substance, and the singular which appears in the category of this kind; for that which is good, or the sitting posture, is not expressed without this 2 also. It is evident, therefore, that each of those also subsists on account of this.3 Wherefore, that which is primarily entity, and not any particular entity, but entity simply or absolutely, will constitute substance. 2. Why ουσία stands foremost amongst the categories. Therefore, that which is first is denominated in many ways; nevertheless, first of all is substance, both in reason, and knowledge, and time, and nature. For no one of the rest of the categories is capable of a separate subsistence, but this alone; and in definition is this first: for in the definition of everything there is a necessity that the definition of substance be inherent. And then we think we know each particular thing, especially, when we know what man is, or fire is, rather than when we know the quality, or the quantity, or the situation of a thing; since we then come to know each of these things when we know what the quantity of them is, or the quality. And unquestionably, also, was that originally, 3. obcía, as a and at the present time, and always, a subject of subject for in 4 quiry-its 1 Aristotle shows that these are not substances, but mere qualities themselves, presupposing certain ultimate subjects wherein they reside as such. Vide Mr. Maurice's "Analysis of the Metaphysics." 66 * ἄνευ τούτου, i. e. a definite subject." 3 διὰ ταύτην, i. e. οὐσίαν, “substance.” This observation may be verified in the case of Parmenides, Anax agoras, Empedocles, the Platonists, and the Stoics. from usage. claims shown investigation, and invariably of doubt; namely, what entity is, that is, what substance is: for some say that this is one, but others, that it is more than one; and some maintain that things which are finite are this entity, but others, things that are infinite. Wherefore, also, especially, and primarily, and exclusively, as I may say, we must investigate concerning that which subsists as entity after this manner, as to what it is. 1. Opinions about sub stance, whether natural or supranatural. CHAPTER II.1 Now, substance seems to subsist, no doubt, in bodies most palpably. Wherefore, we say that both animals, and plants, and the parts of them, are substances; and we say the same of natural or physical bodies, as fire, and water, and earth, and everything of this sort; and as many as are either parts of these or are composed of these, either partly or entirely, as both the heaven and its parts, stars, and moon, and sun. Whether, however, these are the only substances, or whether there are others besides, or whether no one of these, but certain different ones, are substances? this must be examined into. But to some the boundaries of bodies (as superficies, and line, and point, and monad) seem to be substances, and that, too, rather than body and solidity. Further, with the exception of things that are sensible, some are not of opinion that there is anything in existence of the kind, but others, that there are many such, and that especially those entities have a subsistence which are eternal; as Plato considered both forms and mathematical entities as two substances, and, as a third, the substance of sensible bodies. But Speusippus, starting 3 This chapter contains an examination into the primary one of the categories. Vide Categories, chaps. ii. iii. He 2 Aristotle here gives us a condensed view concerning the theories Teplovoía, which already had been discussed at large in book I. glances at the systems of Plato, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedocles, and Speusippus. 3 Speusippus was a pupil of Plato, and succeeded his master; he was the earliest adherent to what was called the first academy. The successor to Speusippus was Xenocrates, who held similar opinions to those ascribed to Speusippus in the text. Tenneman, p. 111, Bohn's edition. from one, says that there are many substances and first principles of each substance; one of numbers, but another of magnitudes, then another of soul; and in this way extends, therefore, the classes of substance. And some affirm that forms and numbers have the same nature, but that other things that are connected therewith, as lines and surfaces, belong to a second class of substances as far as to the substance of the heaven and to sensibles. stance. Accordingly, respecting these we must consider what it is that is said well or not well, and what inquiries as re2. Proposed substances exist, and whether there are certain gards subones besides sensibles,1 or are not, and how these subsist? also, whether there is any separable suostance, and why there is, and after what mode of subsistence; or whether there is no substance besides sensibles? This, I say, must form the subject of our investigation, having first delineated substance in a sketch of what it is. CHAPTER III. Now, substance is denominated, if not multi- 1. Matter is fariously, yet, at least, in four ways particularly; substance re-. for both the essence or the formal cause, and the primary subuniversal, and the genus, seem to be substance in ject. each thing; and fourth of these is the subject. But the subject is that of which other things are predicated, while itself is no longer predicated of any other thing. Wherefore, concerning this point we must come to a determination in the first instance; for substance appears especially to be the primary subject. Now, in some such manner is matter denominated substance, but in another way form, and in a third, that which results from, or is a compound of, these; now, I mean by matter, brass, for instance, but by form the figure of the idea, and by that which is composed of these the statue in its entirety. Wherefore, if form be prior to 1 Such philosophers as Hippo, surnamed the Atheist, and, in aftertimes, the followers of Epicurus, maintained the existence merely of what was cognisant by the scuses. Plato, Speusippus, and Xenocrates, in their speculations, developed an element exclusively transcendental. Vide Tenneman, sect. 128; Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philoso phers, Introduction, p. 10, sqq.ranslated in “Bohn's Classical Library." matter, and rather than it is entity or being, also for the same reason will be prior that which is a compound of both. Now therefore, by way of a rough delineation has it been declared what substance is at all; namely, that it is not that which is predicated of the subject, but is that of which other things are predicated. It must needs, however, be spoken of not in this manner solely, for such is not sufficient; for this account of it is obscure. 2. This proved from the fact that the various qualities of pose a sub they inhere. And, further, matter becomes substance: for if matter is not substance, what else is escapes our comprehension; for when other things are matter presup- removed away, nothing appears remaining. For stance wherein other things are the passive conditions 1 of bodies, and are productions, and potentialities; but length, and breadth, and depth, are certain quantities, but not substances: for quantity is not substance, but rather that wherein these very qualities are inherent primarily that is substance. But, unquestionably, if we take away length, and depth, and breadth, we see nothing left except whatsoever is bounded by these. Wherefore, to persons conducting the inquiry in this way, matter must needs appear only as substance; and I call matter that which essentially is termed neither quiddity, nor quantity, nor anything else of those things whereby entity is defined. For there is something of which each of these is predicated from which "the being" is different, as well as from each of the categories; for the other things are predicated of substance, but this of matter. Wherefore, that which is ultimate essentially is neither quiddity, nor quantity, nor quality, nor any other such thing. Neither, therefore, are negations so; for these also will have a subsistence according to accident. In consequence of these things, no doubt, therefore, it happens with speculators that matter is regarded as substance. 3. Others would This, however, is impossible; for both a capamake form, and bility of separation in its subsistence, and the subsisting as this particular thing, seem to inhere especially in substance. Wherefore, form, and that which is composed of both, would appear to be substance rather than matter. Indeed, then, as regards the substance which is composed of both (I mean composed that which is composed of matter and form, to be sub stance. 1 This argument has already been noticed by Aristotle, in his Review of Greek Philosophy in book I. |