BOOK VII.'

CHAPTER I.

1. An epitome

substances.

FROM the statements that have been now made it is necessary to draw our inference, and, collect- as to what are ing together a summary of the foregoing, to impose upon our remarks some termination or conclusion. It has, therefore, been stated that the causes, and the first principles, and the elements of substances, are the subjects, under investigation in the present Treatise. Now, as to substances, some are acknowledged to have a subsistence by all philosophers; respecting others, however, certain speculators have put forth from time to time certain peculiar opinions of their own. Physical or natural substances are acknowledged to have a subsistence; for example, fire, earth, water, air, and the rest of simple bodies: in the next place, plants, and the parts of these; animals, also, and their parts; and lastly, the heaven and the parts of the heaven: but those certain philosophers, who hold peculiar sentiments respecting substances, affirm that both forms and mathematical entities or species are substances. But, unquestionably, from the foregoing reasonings the consequence ensues of there being other substances-I mean, the essence or very nature of a thing, and the subject. Further, in other respects we may assume that the genus is substance in preference to the species, and the universal to the singulars. With the universal, however, and the genus, the ideas, also, are connected, for they seem to be substances according with the same process of reasoning.

tle was led to

Since, however, the essence or very nature of 2 Why Aristoa thing appears to be substance, and the reason the discussions or principle of this is definition, on this account found in book we have settled various points respecting defini

VI.

1 In book VII., which is according to others book VIII., we have a sort of application of the logical principles in regard of substance, arrived at in book VI., to the case of substance regarded as what is cognisant by the senses.

tion, and respecting that which is essential. But since definition is a sentence, and since a sentence has parts, we found it requisite also to examine concerning a part, what sort are the parts of substance, and what sort they are not, and whether these ought to be the same with the parts of the definition likewise? Further, then, neither is the universal1 nor the genus substance. But concerning ideas and mathematical entities we will subsequently 2 institute an inquiry; for, beside the substances of things cognisant by the senses, certain speculators assert these to have a subsistence. At present, however, let us treat of those substances that are acknowledged to have a subsistence; but these are sensible substances, or the substances of those things that fall beneath the notice of the

3. The inquiry in book VII.

senses.

4. Substances

sense have

subject.

Now, all sensible substances involve matter.4 cognisant by But substance may be considered as those matter as their things that may be classed amongst subjects in one sense as matter, but in another as the definition; now, I mean by matter that which is not this certain particular thing in energy, but in capacity is this certain particular thing; and in a different sense definition and form are subjects. That which is this certain particular thing is separable from the formal principle of it, and third is that which is composed of these, of which alone there are generation and corruption, and which is a thing that simply has a separable subsistence; for of those substances which subsist according to a formal principle some are capable of a separate subsistence, but some are not so. But that matter is a substance is evident, for in all opposite changes is there something which is the subject of the changes; as, for instance, in place, that which is now here, but again is elsewhere; and according to increase, that which is at the present moment of such a size, and the next less or larger; and according to alteration, a person who is now healthy, and

1 Vide book VI. chap. xiii.

2 In book XII.

3 Some MSS. read περὶ instead of παρά. 4 In objects that are cognised by our senses, what we perceive is matter moulded into such and such a form; and this presupposes

Ânce in which the thing resides, which it would be a contradic Wen la terms to say could fall beneath the comprehension of sense.

at another time indisposed: and in like manner, also, according to substance, a thing which now subsists in a state of generation is again, however, in a state of corruption, and that which is at the present time a subject, as this certain particular thing, yet is at some future period a subject as according to privation. And, doubtless, the rest of the changes follow upon this; yet this does not follow one or two of the other changes: for there is no necessity, should even anything involve local or topical matter, that this also involve matter, both such as is generable and corruptible. What, then, is the difference between simple production, and that which is not simple production, has been declared in our Treatise on Physical Phenomena.

CHAPTER II.

is viewed as

opinion of De

BUT since the subsistence of substance as a sub- 1. What sen ject and as matter is admitted by philosophers, and sible substance this is that which subsists in capacity, it remains energy; the that we should state what that substance is amongst mocritus on sensibles which subsists as energy. Democritus, this point. therefore, assuredly seems to be a person who considered that, in regard of this, there are three differences; for he was of opinion that the subject-body and the matter were one and the same thing, but that the difference lay either in the rysmos,1 which is figure, or in the trope, which is position, or in the diathege, which is order.

view, the sub

differences.

But there appear many existing differences; 2. Substance, in as, for example, some things are termed sub- this point of stance from the composition of matter: as, to ject of many give an instance, whatsoever things are formed by mixture, such as mead, which is a mixture of honey and water; and others are termed so from a wooden fastening, as a chest ;2 and others from a string, such as a bundle and others from glue, as a book; and others from many of these; and others, again, are said to subsist from position, as a threshold and the lintel of a door: for these differ from

;

1 This has been already noticed by Aristotle, in book I. chap. iv. 2 yoμow I have translated "wooden fastening," on the authority of Liddell and Scott. Taylor renders it by the word "nail."

circumstances of position in a certain respect; other things, however, derive their being from time, as 1 dinner and breakfast, and some from place, as the winds. And some things are styled differences from the passive properties of sensibles; as, for example, hardness and softness, and thickness and thinness, and dryness and moistness: and some are so termed from certain of these qualities, and others from all of them; and, in general, some from excess, but others from defect. Wherefore, it is evident that the fact of a thing's subsistence is denominated in thus many ways, for a threshold is a threshold because it is situated thus, and its subsistence signifies that it has this position in this way; and the subsistence of ice signifies the fact of its congelation in this form. And the subsistence of some things will be defined by even all of these circumstances; and this because some things consist from the mixture of some things, but others from their temperament, and some from their connexion, and some from their condensation, and some from their employment of other differential qualities, as either the hand or foot. Therefore, must we take into consideration the genera of differences, for these will be the first principles of subsistence; as, for example, those things which have their subsistence in the more and the less, or the dense and the rare, and the other properties of this kind; for all these belong to excess and defect. If anything, however, has its subsistence in figure, or smoothness and roughness, all things will subsist in what is right-lined and curved. Now, to some things their subsistence will consist in their being mingled, and, in an opposite way, their non-subsistence will consist in not being mingled.

3. Certain de

by Aristotle

It is, therefore, evident from these foregoing ductions drawn statements, that if substance is a cause of the subsistence of each thing, that in these must be sought the solution of the question what the subsistence of each of these is. Substance, in

from the fore

going points.

cause of the

1 δεῖπνον καὶ ἄριστον. I have differed from Taylor, who translates these words "supper and dinner." ▲eînvov-deî nivew-was regarded as the principal meal; and the Homeric use of the word apiσTOV was to designate the morning meal, Il. 24; 124-and this harmonizes with its being a derivative from pt, our "early." I know, however, that ǎpiσTo in after times was made to signify the midday meal, or prandium, of the Pomans.

deed, then, is not any of these, or a thing that is connected together; nevertheless, it subsists analogically in each thing. And as in substances whatsoever is predicated of matter is actual energy, this also in an eminent degree is the case with the other definitions; as, for example, if it be necessary to define a threshold, we will say that it is a piece of wood or stone situated in this way, and if a house, that it is bricks and timbers disposed in such or such a way; cr, shall we further say that likewise the final cause exists in the case of some things? And if we are called on to define a lump of ice, we would reply, that it is water congealed or condensed in this form; and if symphony is to be defined, that it is a particular sort of mixture of the sharp and the flat; and we must proceed in the same manner with other things also.

It is evident, therefore, from these statements, 4. Different that there is of different matter a different matter, therefore, involves a energy, and a different definition; for of some different things composition is the energy and form, energy. and of other things mixture, and of others something else of those particulars enumerated above. Wherefore, of persons engaged in defining things, those, on the one hand, who say what a house is, that it is stones, bricks, timbers, speak of the house in respect of potentiality or capacity, for these are matter; but those who say, in addition, that it is a receptacle preservative of goods and bodies, or that it is some other such thing, speak of the house in regard of its energy; and those who put both of these together, speak of the third substance-I mean, the substance composed of these, that is, of potentiality and energy.2 For the definition that subsists by means of differences seems to be that of form and energy, but that which consists from things

1 To show what Aristotle means by energy or activity, vépyea, we must bear in mind what has been already laid down touching the relation of matter and form; it is a sort of mediating principle between both, for where capacity exists there must be likewise some operating power to move such capacities into action. Now, this is precisely what takes place in the case before us. Matter, which is the capacity, is moulded into its several shapes by form, which is the energy. The thing may be well illustrated by the relation subsisting between voli. tion and muscular action.

2 As to the relation between capacity and energy, we must refer to book VIII, where the subject is discussed at large.