subsist in this way, of which all participate, for the constitution or preservation of the entire.

3. False theories about the existence of what is good.

But whatever impossibilities or absurdities ensue to those who make assertions in a different way, and what sort of theories those put forward on the subject who express themselves in a more elegant or accomplished manner, and in the case of which of these there prevail the least number of doubts, we must not allow such inquiries to escape our observation. For all philosophers are for producing all things from contraries; neither, however, is the expression "all things," nor the expression "from contraries," correctly employed by these speculators; nor do they declare, as regards those things in which the contraries are inherent, in what manner they will consist of contraries, for contraries are mutually impassive. 4. How Aris- But by us is this controversy decided ratiototle settles the nally by the introduction of a certain third nature.1 Some, however, constitute some one of the contraries as matter, just as those do who make the odd subject for the even, or plurality for unity.2 And this, likewise, is decided in the same manner; for the matter which is one is not what is contrary to anything. Further, all things except unity will participate in what is worthless; for the evil itself constitutes one or other of the elements.

question.

5. After what mode is "the good" first principle?

The other speculators assert, however, that neither what is good and what is evil are first principles at all, notwithstanding that what is good is in a most eminent degree a first principle3 in all things. And some, I admit, correctly make this assertion of what is good-I mean, that we must consider it a first principle; after what mode, however, it is that what is good constitutes a first principle they do not state: whether

1 Aristotle's solution of the existence of Evil consists in tracing it to inatter as its prime source; thus coinciding with what was the fundamental principle of the Gnostic philosophy in after ages.

2 Vide book I. chap. iv.

3 The plain prevalence of Good in our system is, in a speculative point of view, as difficult to account for as that of Evil. The bearing of this fact on the controversy "De Origine Mali" is well explained by the Archbishop of Dublin in his Lectures on Political Economy. Vide Lect. IV., as well as his Grace's notes and appendix to Archbishop King's Discourse on the same s'bject.

it is to be regarded as an end, or as a moving cause, or as a formal principle.

Now, Empedocles also forms his opinions 6. Absurd soabsurdly upon this point, for he makes Harmony lution on this to constitute what is good; and this Harmony, point by Em pedocles. in his system, subsists even as a first principle that imparts motion, for it has the power of congregating entities; and it subsists as matter, for it is a portion of the mixture. Now, even on the supposition that to Harmony has it happened in this same system that it should subsist as matter and a first principle, and as a power that imparts motion, yet the essence of this is not the same with the essence of these; according to which of them, therefore, will Harmony subsist? And that Discord should be a thing that is incorruptible would be absurd likewise; and yet this very thing constitutes the nature of what is evil.

7. How Anaxa

**

good" a first principle.

But Anaxagoras regarded what is good as a first principle, so far as it is a power that imparts goras made motion, for Mind, in his system, imparts motion; it imparts motion, however, for the sake of something else. Wherefore, that is different from that for the sake of which it subsists, except it subsists as we say it actually does; for the medicinal art in a manner constitutes health. But it was also an absurdity contained in the Anaxagorean philosophy, the not having produced a contrary to what is good as well as to Mind. But all who assert contraries to be first principles do not employ contraries as such, unless one is disposed to handle the subject in a careless vein.

this "first prin

And why it is that some things' are corruptible, 8. Any system and some things incorruptible, no one declares; that ignores for they produce all entities from the same first ciple" must be principles. Further, some of these speculators false.. produce entities from what is nonentity;2 but some, that they may not be forced to this, make all things to be one.3 Further, no one lays down a reason why generation will always exist; and what the cause of generation is nobody declares. And for those who create two first principles will 1 Vide book II. chap. iv.

2 For instance, the Hesiodic school.

3 That is, Parmenides, whose system has been already examined, in book I. chap. viii.

it be necessary to have a different first principle which would be more dominant, as well as for those Philosophers who introduce forms, because there really exists another principle more dominant than these; for why has matter participated, or why does it participate, in these ideas?

9. Aristotle's ontology free from this absurdity.

And for others it is necessary that there should be something that is contrary to Wisdom, and to that which is the science most entitled to reverence; but to us this is not necessary, for there is nothing contrary to what is primary. For all the contraries involve matter, and these subsist in capacity: but contrary ignorance is opposed to what is contrary, yet nothing is contrary to what is primary.

10. Even theology and physics are free from it.

Further, on the supposition that there do not exist other things beside those that are cognisant by the senses, there will not subsist a first principle, and order, and generation ;1 and the celestial bodies will have no existence: but there is always a first principle of the principle, just as we find in the systems of Theologians and all Natural Philosophers.

11. Where, then,

are we to look principle in the

for this first

Ideal Hypothesis?

But,

Now, admitting that there will be forms or numbers, they will not constitute a cause of anything;2 and, if they are not a cause of anything, neither will they be a cause of motion at any rate. Further, how, let me ask, will magnitude and continuity arise from things that are devoid of magnitude? for number will not produce a continuous quantity, either as that which imparts motion or as form. certainly, there will not be anything, at least, belonging to the contraries which is both productive and motive, for it would admit of non-existence; but, surely, the energy or producing cause is subsequent to the capacity, and in such a case eternal entities do not exist-but yet they do exist. Accordingly, some one of these hypotheses must be rejected; and this has been declared in the above statement that capacity antecedes energy-as to how it must be accomplished. Further, in

This point is lucidly explained by Cudworth in the Intellectual System.

2 As he has demonstrated in his exaaunation of Platonism, in book I. 3 Vide book XII. chaps. iv. and v.

4 I have added these words for the sake of the sense. This manifestly is the absurdity to which he would reduce the Platonists. The

what way numbers may be one, or soul and body, and, in general, form, and the thing itself, no one says anything on this point; nor is it possible that one should declare his sentiments thereupon, unless he express himself as we do-namely, to the effect that it is the cause which imparts motion that is the agent of production.

12. Or is it to

theory?

But they who say that mathematical number is the first, and in this way continually suppose the be found in the existence of another substance adhering thereto in Pythagorean succession, and of different first principles belonging unto each, these make the substance of the Universe to be adventitious; for in no wise does one substance contribute anything towards another, as to whether it exists or does not exist and besides this they introduce many first principles.

The entities, however, do not choose to submit 13. Illustration to injudicious government. "The government of by a quotation many is not a good thing―let there be one ruler." Iliad, II. 204.

from Homer's

BOOK XII.2

CHAPTER I.

1. Why refer

ence is made to the opinions of

others in regard

RESPECTING, indeed, therefore, the substance of things that are cognisant by the senses, it has been declared what it is, in the mode of inquiry adopted by Natural Philosophers in their theories concerning matter, and subsequently antecedence of capacity to energy is a false principle, and its absurdity is exposed in book VIII. chap. viii.

of supra-sen

sual substance.

1 Zmeloodiúdn—"adventitious." This is the rendering of Themistius; the word itself is a most felicitous one for Aristotle's purpose at present. It literally is applied to poetry; e. g. the Catalogue of the ships in the second book of the Iliad would be called relσódios.

2 In book XII.-according to others, book XIII.—we have a discussion respecting number, mathematical natures, and ideas. The refutation of the Ideal Hypothesis in this book is more complete than that found in book I.

3 Taylor translates these words "the mode of inquiry adopted in our Physics."

in our own Treatise in regard of matter in a condition of energy or activity. Since, however, our present investigation has for its object to ascertain whether beside sensible substances there is in existence a certain Substance that is Immovable and Eternal, or there is not; and on the supposition of the existence of any such, what it is: in the first place we must take a glance at the assertions made by other speculators, in order that if they happen to make any assertion2 not after a correct manner, we may not become entangled in the same errors, and that if there subsists any dogma in common between ourselves and them, we may not be indignant with it, as a thing peculiarly in opposition to our present design; for it is a thing that we should remain content with, if one should make some statements with more propriety, but others in a way no wise inferior to ourselves.

2. The order of

inquiry deter

mined according to that of the opinions recited;

Now, there are two opinions respecting these subjects; for certain Philosophers affirm that mathematical entities are substances: such, for example, as numbers, and lines, and those things that are kindred to these: and, again, that ideas 4 are existences of this description. Since, however, some speculators constitute these as two distinct genera—I mean, both the ideas and the mathematical numbers-and others maintain, in opposition, that there is one nature of both, and certain other Philosophers say that mathematical entities are alone substances, in the first place we must mathematical institute an investigation respecting matheentities; matical entities, without annexing to them any other nature-as, for instance, might or might not be the case, according to whether they happen to be ideas or not? and whether these are first principles and substances of entities or not? but, as regards mathematical entities, attending to this point merely, whether they possess a subsistence or do not, and if they do, after what mode they subsist? In next, respect- the next place, after these inquiries, we shall, apart by itself, institute an investigation con

first, respecting

ing the ideas.

1 Vide book VIII. chap. vi.

2 Compare a note in book XI., at the beginning of chap. viii., on Aris totle's custom of examining into the literary labours of others.

That is, the Pythagoreans.

The Platonists.

This he does in chaps. ii. and iii. of this book.