a stammer, inasmuch as it was new as regards first principles, and a thing the first in its kind. For Empedocles says that a bone exists from form by the principle of composition; but this is the essence and the substance of that thing. But, truly, if this be admitted, in like manner, also, is it necessary that of both flesh, and everything else of the other things. there should subsist this principle of concretion, or that it should not subsist as a principle of anything at all; for on account of this are both flesh and bone, and each of the other things, in existence, and not on account of the matter, which he says is fire, and earth, and water, and air. But, also, with any other, indeed, who would make these assertions, he would of necessity concur; but he has not expressed himself with clearness respecting them. The case regarding such points, therefore, has been made evident on a former occasion; but as many doubts as any one might indulge in respecting these same, we will a second time enumerate; for perhaps we shall thereby acquire a facility for having our difficulties resolved in reference to subsequent questions o doubt.

BOOK I. THE LESS.'

CHAPTER I.

partly easy.

SPECULATION respecting truth is partly difficult 1. Speculative and partly easy. And a proof is the following, pursuit of truth that, in the pursuit of truth, neither is any one philosopher, in a way worthy of the dignity of the subject, able to attain this; nor can all investigators fail in reaching it, but that each says something to the point concerning Nature and individually that, indeed, they add nothing. or but little, to this speculation respecting truth, but fron all these collected together that there ensues something o magnitude. Wherefore, if, indeed, it so seems to be the case, as we happen to say in the proverb, "Who will miss the door?" in this way, truly, would the speculation of truth be

easy.

This book, as to the title of which all are not agreed, has given rise to some discussion amongst the commentators. Alexander Aphrodisiensis and Asclepius seem to think that it is, as set down in the Metaphysics, quite out of place; and Augustine Niphus appears to regard it as a fragment of some larger work,-"propter exiguitatem." That it is out of place here has been inferred from the fact of the conclusion of the first book and the beginning of this being wholly devoid of connexion, whereas it is quite the reverse with the first and third books compared with each other. It has been conjectured that it belongs in some way or other to the Physics; chiefly from the words which occur at the end,-"first must we investigate what Nature (pois) is." But notwithstanding, as Thomas Aquinas reminds us, this book is not entirely without reference to what has gone before. The science under investigation in the first book is the science of sciences, and makes universal truth the subject-matter of inquiry, which brings Aristotle, in this, to the consideration of truth in general. Forasmuch, however, as the term truth is employed in the same sense as theoretic philosophy, the latter is compared with practical philosophy. But, indeed, a further proof of its connexion with the foregoing may be found in the fact that dexaí, or first principles, are the theme of discussion in both cases. Though, certainly, we must admit that the discussion about the infinite progression of causes, with Aristotle, should find its place in the physical rather than the metaphysical por tion of his writings. Alexander. Asclepius, Niphus, and Thomas Aquinas, are well worth being consulted on this question.

2. Partly diffi

cult, and a

cause thereof.

But for philosophers to have a certain whole. and not to be able to have each some portion, indicates the difficulty of it: and perhaps, also, from the fact that the difficulty arises in two ways, the cause of this may not be so much in things themselves as in us; for as the eyes of bats are to the light that follows the dawn of day, so also is the mind of our soul to those things which, above all, are naturally the most splendid.

3. Union of men for the discovery of

truth.

But not only is it just to return thanks to those whose opinions one may have fellowship with, but also to those, moreover, who have enun. ciated their sentiments more superficially; for even these, likewise. contribute something, for they have previously exercised our speculative habit. For if there had not been a Timotheus, we would not have had much melody; and unless there had been a Phrynis, there would not have been such a person as Timotheus. But, in the same manner, also, it is in the case of those who have declared their sentiments concerning truth; for, indeed, from some of them we have inherited certain opinions: but others have been the causes of these becoming opinions of theirs.

marks on truth

4. The applicabi- But it is correct, also, that philosophy should lity of these re- be styled a science, speculative of truth. For to the present of speculative science the end is truth, but of Investigation. practical science, a work; for even though they may examine how a thing is, practical men do not investi. gate into the cause of that thing in itself, but in relation tc something else, and as connected with the present time: but we do not know the truth without the knowledge of cause. But, especially, is each thing that amongst other things according to which, also, there subsists in other things that which is synonymous,-as, for example, fire is a thing most

1 "Our habit." Alexander interprets the word is by dúvaμis (capacity); for which, vide his commentary on the passage. What Aris totle is aiming at, and illustrates from the case of Timotheus, is to show how previous discoveries in science bear on subsequent ones, and the progressive character of truth. This point is beautifully put by Dr. Wheweil in nis Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences."

2 Aristotle having considered the speculation of truth in general. proceeds to show how this consideration bears on the present inquiry His reasoning rests on the assumption of the words "truth," and "theoretic philosophy," being interchangeable terms.

hot; for also in the rest of entities is this a cause of their heat. Wherefore, also, most true is that which is a cause to posterior natures of their being true. Wherefore, is it necessary that the first principles of things, always existing, should always be most true; for not sometimes are they true, neither is anything the cause of being to those, but those are the causes of being in other things. Wherefore, as each thing is disposed in regard of existence, so, also, is it in regard of truth.

CHAPTER II.1

either material,

BUT, truly, that there is, at least, some first 1. No infinity principle, and that the causes of entities are not of causesinfinite, either in a progress in a straight forward efficient, final. direction, or according to form, is evident. For or formal. neither, as of matter, is it possible that this particular entity proceed from this to infinity; for instance, flesh, indeed, from earth, and earth from air, and air from fire, and this without ever coming to a stand-still. Nor can there an infinite progression take place with the origin of the principle of motion; as, for instance, that man should have been moved by the air, and this by the sun, and the sun by discord; and of this that there should be no end. Nor, in like manner, can this infinite progression take place with the final cause,—that walking, for instance, should be gone through for the sake of health, and this for the sake of enjoyment, and this enjoyment for the sake of something else; and, similarly, that one thing invariably should subsist on account of another. And, in like manner, is it the case with the formal cause. For of media, to which externally there is something last and first, it is necessary that what is first should be a cause of those things which are subsequent to it. For if we must declare what is the cause of three things, we will assert that it is the first of the three; for, doubtless, it is not the last, at least, for that is not, at any rate, at the extremity of anything as a cause: but, truly, neither is it the middle, for this is the cause of one thing only. But it makes no difference whether one or many media be

This is an important chapter, and seems to have suggested to modern philosophers their phraseology, as well as mode of arguing, in regard of the à priori demonstration of the existence of God.

2. No progression of causes downwards.

assumed, nor whether they are things infinite or finite; but in this way all the portions of things infinite, and of the Infinite in general, are similarly media up to the extremity; so that if there is nothing that is the first, there is, in short, no cause. But neither, truly, is it possible, as regards a progression downwards, to proceed to infinity, in case that which is in a progression upwards involves a first principle; as, for example, that from fire, indeed, water should be produced, but from this earth, and so invariably that a certain different genus be produced. For, in a twofold manner,1 is one thing produced from another, -not as this particular thing is said to take place after that; for example, the Olympic games from the Isthmaan, eithe as a man is produced from a boy undergoing a change, or air from water.

3. Twofold difference between these.

As, indeed, then, we say that a man is produced from a boy as a thing that has been from that which is in a process of formation, or that which has been finished from that which is being finished, or tends towards perfection, for always is there a certain medium; as production is a medium between existence and non-existence, so also is the thing that is being produced between entity and nonentity: and a person receiving instruction is one becoming scientifically learned. And this is the meaning of what is affirmed,-that from a person learning is produced one that is scientifically learned; and just as water is generated from air on account of the air having undergone corruption. Wherefore, in the former instance, the things adduced, indeed, do not revert into one another, nor is a child produced from a man; for that which is being produced does not arise from the act of generation, but is subsequent to generation: for so, also, the day is generated from the dawn, because it is posterior to this; wherefore, neither is the dawn generated from the day : but the other instances revert into each other.

4. According to In both these cases, however, it is impossible neither of these to pursue the progress on to infinity; for, in the finity of causes. one case, of those that are media there must

is there an in

1 In a twofold manner, ὑλίκως και πραγματοείδως : that is, when one system of matter is produced from another, and when that is a tran sition from what is immature to what is finished.