thing was meant by these two technical words, μίμησις and μέθεξις, Plato recognised the existence, beside sensibles and forms, of mathematical entities, as intermediate between both; the sensibles were regarded merely as substantive representations of the formsthe forms were the causes of these and all other objects-the elements of the one were the elements of the other; the assimilation of forms to numbers, and of unity to substance, as well as the recognition of the causality of numbers in respect of the essence of other things, these assertions of the Platonists were parallel with those of the Pythagoreans. Whereas, however, the Platonic school sought to establish the existence of numbers independent of sensible objects, the Pythagorics, on the other hand, affirmed that the former entirely constituted the latter, and they did not contend for the existence of those mathematical media which the Platonists did. These diverg encies of the philosophy of Plato from that of Pythagoras, Aristotle considers resulted from the logical investigations which were pursued by the former, and totally neglected in the schools of the latter. 44. Service But now, if the question should be asked, what serconferred by vice Plato performed for the progress of metaphysical Plato on philo- science, Aristotle replies, that it is comprehended in his ætiological system, in which the existence of two distinct genera of causes is acknowledged, namely, the formal and material, because the forms were the causes of the substance of things, the rò rí èori, and unity, as matter was the cause that constituted the forms; so that if this be the case, what novelties are to be found in Platonism that may not be discovered in the systems of the Italics in equal perfection? But, further, as regards their theory, to account for the phenomena of good and evil, the Platonists came short of systems quite anterior to them, namely, those of Empedocles and Anaxagoras.

sophy.

45. Summary

of this review of the Greek

philosophy in chap. vii.

We have now a valuable summary presented to us by Aristotle of the results of the foregoing review. In the first place, the Stagyrite reiterates the justice of the assertion made in the very outset of the inquiry; namely, that all schools, ancient and modern, prosecuted their aetiological investigations on the assumption of a fourfold classifi cation of causes-the very same that Aristotle has already established in his Physics. Still, however, their treatment of these causes has been, in general, obscure, and, indeed, partial, for one or two have been exalted above the rest; and thus a complete examination of the entire four has been nullified in the several theories of these philosophers. The material cause has had abundance of attention bestowed upon it, and by some it has been considered as single, but by others as manifold. And this may be observed in Platonism, where it is assimilated with the great and the small—τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν-in the Italic schools, who fixed upon the Infinite, the rò ameipov, as such, in the theory of Empedocles about the four elements, and in

that of Anaxagoras, about his favourite hypothesis of an infinite Homœomeriæ. But still the efficient cause has not been entirely forgotten in the Ancient Philosophy, and faint gleams of it may be discovered in the adoption by certain speculators of such principles into their systems as Harmony, Discord, Soul, and Mind. Still less notice has been vouchsafed to the formal cause, and the only traces of it are to be found in the Pythagoric system of numbers, and in the Ideal Hypothesis of Plato. But, after all, even these two schools laboured under the defects of being partial statements of truth, and it is not so easy to discern in them the material and efficient causes; at least in the Ideal Theory, Plato does not make the forms as matter for objects cognisant by the senses, and, far from the efficient principle being discoverable therein, the forms he views as causes of immobility rather. And as to the treatment of the final cause in the hands of the ancient philosophers, Aristotle considers that it likewise has come in but for a small share of attention, and that its nature has been imperfectly examined into in such systems as put forward the principles of Harmony, or Mind, or Entity and Unity both together, as such. There is nothing, however, definite in their theories, and any statement of the truth seems purely accidental with them. Thus Aristotle finds reason again to congratulate himself upon the correct view he has taken of the Ancient Philosophy, as to its treatment of causes, and, further, as to his own classification of causes, as well as the mode of inquiry adopted in regard of them.

in chap. viii.

In connexion with this review of Platonism, Aristotle 46. Those who glances at the systems of those who contended for the recognised one unity of the material cause, and that, too, to the exclu- material cause sion of the other three, and endeavours to point out some of their numerous misapprehensions. Amongst the rest of their errors are stigmatized that of nullifying the principle of motion, and that of not attributing to things their formal cause. And, moreover, when they might have invested with the attribute of unity what we would naturally expect to find thus arrayed, by not taking this course, they have involved themselves in inextricable difficulties. This is shown in the case of the four elements, earth, air, water, and fire; and as regards the last, this instance brings these philosophers into collision with antiquity, as is proved by the testimony of Hesiod. Nor would the inconsistencies of such a system of etiology be diminished by substituting a plurality of material causes in the place o merely one, as Empedocles does, nor even by a dualism of such prin ciples, as in the theory of Anaxagoras.

And here, again, Aristotle has to repeat the grand 47. The grand lurking imperfection in all such systems, namely, that imperfection o. they are completely buried in matter; that they are the early philoimmersed in material speculations, to the exclusion of others equally important, and they have failed to observe, what is quite apparent in the philosophy of others, that beside those object:

sophy,

which fall under the notice of sense, there are others that are cognisant by the mind, and that the latter are as real-in fact more realas causes than the former. And this school of the Supranaturalists has achieved much more towards an advancement of metaphysical science than that of these Naturalists or Physicists but just mentioned.

48. This funda

mental defect absent from

the systems of

the Supranaturalist.

Now this fundamental absurdity of the Physicists finds no place in the systems of the Supranaturalists; for although those of the latter are loaded with inconsistencies peculiar to themselves, and though they may appear to put forward strange causes, yet they avoid the gross error of the former, who are mere Materialists, and this they do because they derive their principles from suprasensual sources. And this tells upon their philosophy in general, and is apparent in the wideness of their speculations, and in the boldness with which they have penetrated into the secrets of Nature. And, above all, what fixes a chasm-not to be bridged over-between the schools of the Naturalists and the Supranaturalists is this, that in the latter there is secured, from the nature of their principles, a necessary transition to a higher order of phenomena; and this is the charm of their philosophy, that it opens up to our view a glimpse into the glorious regions of transcendentalism.1

closed by one of

ix.

The whole of the foregoing review of the philosophy 49. This review of the ancients is drawn to a close by an examination the Ideal Hypo- into the Ideal Hypothesis of Plato. The inconsistencies thesis in chap. of this hypothesis are unsparingly exposed; the very arguments brought forward by its advocates in its favour are in reality subversive of it; it is quite insufficient to account for actual phenomena; it brings nothing forward that can advance the interests of science; and therefore for each and all of these reasons is by no means to be received with unhesitating assent. Likewise is the theory of Plato, in regard of the and other assimilation of forms with numbers, attacked, and that of Platonic tenets. the generation of mathematical substances. As to the former, he shows the absurdity of investing numbers with the attri bute of causality, which they cannot possess. Again, how will you secure the production of one form from many, as is the case with the generation of numbers; and besides all this, such a theory presupposes the necessity of the existence of some other description of number, besides that which falls within the province of arithmetic. In his attack on the latter, he stigmatises the over-partiality of the Platonists for mathematics, and their making these studies paramount to all others, though they profess to prosecute them merely in su> servience to and for the promotion of the rest of the sciences

(1) Fide concluding remarks of this Analysis.

(21 Fide book XIII. chapter vi

ficient.

But, in fact, the Platonic system of first principles in 50. The Plageneral may be said to strike at the roots of all know- tonic apxai ledge whatever, because it is based on the assumption essentially deof the discoverability of the elements of all things, irrespective of their many distinctions and divisions. But how is this to be the case ?-how is one to learn the elements of all things? for, in such an attempt, it is evident that he must disclaim any previous knowledge of the matter in hand. A person, e. g., learning geometry may be acquainted witn other things previously, but not so with those about which the science is immediately conversant. He must then admit the impossibility of his acquaintance with any preexistent principles; and yet on these, as an essential basis, rests every acquired system of science. Every science, in the mode of acquiring it, is attainable by means of previous data furnished by demonstration and definition. For as to any innate knowledge independent of induction and definition, it is quite contrary to our own experience to say that we possess any such; or, supposing that we do, it is then quite astonishing that we should ever have been wholly unconscious of our possession of such a treasure.

51. Conclusion

Greater in
chap. x.

In conclusion, Aristotle once more appeals to the history of the Greek philosophy as a vindication of his of book I. the division of causes. He repeats that the ancient or even modern speculators, with all their ingenuity, could not fix on any other species of cause which would not fall under the category of one or other of these; and no argument lies against this, from the obscurity or imperfection of the early systems. That is to be anticipated. The dawn of Philosophy may be compared to one whose articulation is not very finished or matured; and for this very reason, because it is its dawn, when we cannot expect to find its principles enunciated with the same confidence and precision as when men have advanced in speculation, and thus achieved, at the same time, the passage of Philosophy from its early child-like simplicity into the gravity of a more advanced period of its existence.

BOOK I. THE LESS.

Greater and

In order to show the connexion between Book I. the 1. Connexion Greater, the analysis of which has been just brought to between a conclusion, and Book I. the Less, the consideration of Book I. the which will occupy us now,—in order to show this con- Book I. the nexion, we must bear in mind that Aristotle considers Less. speculative science, properly so called, to be synonymous 1 with truth. Now, speculative science, in the strictest sense of the word, he has already defined Metaphysics to te; and therefore he must needs

1

(1) Alexander Aphrodisiensis on this passage, as well as Thomas Aquinas.

behold Ontology from this point of view. Accordingly, we are now favoured with a short synopsis of the relations subsisting between truth and scientific knowledge in general, and of the influence exercised by the nature of the former on the progress and destinies of the latter.

about truth,

hapter i.

An inquiry into the subject of truth is partly difficult 2. An inquiry and partly easy: this dogma is capable of verification. partly easy and The difficulty that attends philosophers in their pursuit Dartly difficult, of truth, is evinced in the fact that no adequate system of it has been successfully formed; and yet this implies, n a certain sense, the facility of such a search. For it shows that many attempts of the sort have been made from time to time, which, though they have turned out to be incomplete, as far as regards the full attainment of truth, yet have contained in themselves some portion of it, however inconsiderable.1

3. This shows the value of

And this it is which should teach us the precise degree of value to be attached to the labours of those previous philo- who toil along with us in the paths of knowledge. sophic labours. The results of their research, when viewed separately in reference to the speculators individually, amongst those who have brought them forward-the results may, in this point of view, appear insignificant; and yet the entire labours of all together, in their aggregate condition, may amount to something of considerable magnitude. It is under the influence of this very principle that Aristotle himself is careful ever to pierce into the very centre of the philosophic systems of others, in order that he may, on the one hand, disengage therefrom whatever falsehood may lurk therein, and stigmatise it; and that, on the other hand, by a careful analysis, he discover whatever truth they contain, and appropriate that to himself.

4. An important principle as regards truth.

may

One very important principle is laid down in reference to the difficulties of speculative truth in general, and it is this that the cause of these difficulties may reside not so much in the things themselves as in the imperfection of the faculties of the searchers after truth. And this Aristotle illustrates, with so much reality and beauty, by the case of bats, whose powers of vision, he says, bear the same proportion to the brightness of the noonday as do the principles of the soul and intellect to the splendour of the phenomena of Nature. And, moreover, upon this subject we should remember how, from age to age, successive improvements are being made towards the formation of a system of truth in the world; how one generation avails itself of the scientific discoveries that have accumulated together from preceding ages; and how all this stamps on truth itself its noble character of progressiveness.

5. How Aris

Now, Aristotie, having already established the fact Lotle comes to that Metaphysics was a science concerned with causes; (1) Vide Dr. Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, book II. chap. i.