that we must allow God Almighty to be possessed of such a life as is eternal and uninterrupted." notions of God. Now, in these words, which are to be found towards the close of book XI. chapter vii., may be said to be tion the sum 26. This quota. contained the most lucid statement of Aristotle's and substance notions of the Divine Nature of the Being and Attri- of Aristotle's butes of God; and the bearing of this passage on the question of his Theology is most important, and is briefly noticed again in the remarks which follow after the actual analysis of the Metaphysics has been brought to its close. Pythagoreans. And here Aristotle mentions an erroneous view preva- 27. Error in lent on this point amongst the Pythagoreans and Speu- Theology of the sippus, which he but just notices, and the discussion of which, as we shall see, he resumes in the last Book of the Metaphysics. The Pythagoreans thought that what was excellent, and what was most glorious, could not be discovered in the dawn of Creation, but was a thing of subsequent growth in the way of natural development; and in opposition to this false opinion, which has reappeared on several occasions since the age of Pythagoras, and especially in modern times, Aristotle contends for the existence of perfection as what is original, and to be regarded as a paramount principle in Creation. 1 God. This remarkable chapter concludes with a further 28. Further delineation of the Divine Nature as that which is sketch of the devoid of parts, for magnitude cannot in any way in- nature of volve this Divine Nature; for God imparts motion throughout infinite duration, and nothing finite-as magnitude is— can be possessed of an infinite capacity. And, likewise, is God devoid of passions, and unalterable—ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀναλλοίωτονfor all such notions as are involved in passion or alteration are quite outside the sphere, so to say, of the Divine existence. Now, this representation added to that which recognises the necessary existence of God, which is given in the early parts of the chapter, completes the Aristotelian picture of the Divine Attributes. The 29. Summary Stagyrite, therefore, beholds in God a Being whose view of Arisessence is love, manifested in eternal energy; and the totle's notions final cause of the exercise of his Divine perfections is the happiness which He wishes to diffuse amongst all his creatures; and this happiness itself doth He participate in from all eternity. Besides, His existence excludes everything like the notion of potentiality, which would presuppose the possibility of non-existence; and, therefore, God's existence is a recessary existence. Further, also, He is devoid of parts, and without passicns or alterations, possessed of of God. (1) This may be seen in those treatises which place the modern discoveries in Geology by the side of Revelation. professedly with a friendly aim, but really in order to bring the latter into disrepute. uninterrupted and eternal life, and exercising his functions throughout infinite duration. 30. Chap. viii. The unity or plurality of primary sub experiment ally. And from this Aristotle passes on, in chapter viii, to the subject, as to whether we are to recognise the unity or plurality of such primary substances; and, in stance proved determining for their plurality, he does not infringe upon the doctrine already established in the last chapter of the existence of one First Cause of all. For, although in this chapter he puts forward these many primary substances, yet they are endued with motion-albeit, eternal;1 and this motion they have received, in the first instance, from that which, though the source of all motion in the Universe, is itself, notwithstanding, unmoved; but this, with Aristotle, is God Himself. And here, too, we see another example of Aristotle's eclectic spirit in his reference to the works of others, and his custom of extracting therefrom whatever may be real and serviceable to truth. As to the Ideal hypothesis, however, or the Pythagorean system of numbers, he leaves them out of the way; for, after all, they have no bearing on the present subject; but rather, in the theories of astronomers, does Aristotle expect to discover the object of his pursuit. 31. Reference He, accordingly, searches into the works of astroto the writings nomers; such as Eudoxus and Calippus, in order to of others on ascertain the generally received notions of scientific this subject. men, as to the number of the orbital motions of the heavenly bodies; and for this reason, because corresponding to these several motions, there are so many substances belonging to the stars -first, second. and so on, according to the arrangement adopted by astronomers. For Aristotle's idea was, that the nature of the stars constituted a certain eternal substance; and, though he thus recognises a number of eternal substances, yet he places one above them all, from whence, as from a fountain, the others derive their motion. this reference. This sketch, which is given us in this eighth 32. Value of chapter, of the systems of Eudoxus and Calippus is interesting, so far as it illustrates the condition of astronomical science about the time of Aristotle; and what we have here is likely to be an extract from the Stagyrite's own work on astronomy, in which he undertakes to amplify and improve the labours of Eudoxus; and the loss of which must be regarded with serious regret by all those interested in the learning of the ancients. Having ascertained the number of the motions of the heavenly bodies, and, therefore, of the bodies themselves, to amount to fifty and five, or, exclusive of those of the sun and moon, forty-seven, he somewhat too dogmatically pronounces about the completeness of this enume ration, and concludes with an assertion of what he had already proved in the De Colo; namely, the existence of one heaven(1) Revelation has taught us of the eternal generation of the S in from the Father els oupavós. The connexion between this assertion and Ariɛ otle's theological system will be briefly considered in the remarks to be found at the end of this Analysis; to which, therefore, the reader is referred. from ancient 34. Repels the charge of inno vation, and the passage quoted In thus investing the heaven and the stars with the 33. Confirine attribute of Divinity, Aristotle conceives himself called his assertions apon to furnish some confirmation of his opinions on tradition. this point; and he appeals to the authority of antiquity, and to tradition, to bear him out in supporting his theory. Perhaps, after all, this was merely a piece of flattery to the popular supersti tion; for Aristotle, more than any other of the Greek philosophers, viewed with contempt those long-cherished mythological notions which had been bequeathed to his countrymen, from an age too dark and remote for the lamp of history to shoot its rays into. The passage, however, is a most remarkable one, in which the Stagyrite seeks to disencumber his opinions of any novelty that they might at first sight appear to assume; and runs somewhat as follows:-"It has been traditionally reported, as from the very earliest ages, and in which this is has been left to posterity in the form of a myth, both that these celestial substances are gods, and that Divinity embraces the entire system of Nature. There have been made, however, to these, certain fabulous additions, for the purpose of winning the belief of the multitude, and thus securing their obedience to the laws, and their co-operation towards advancing the general welfare of the state. These additions have been to the effect that these gods were of the same form as men, and even that some of them were in appearance similar to certain others amongst the rest of the animal creation. The wise course, however, would be for the philosopher to disengage from these traditions the false element and to embrace that which is true; and the truth lies in that portion of this ancient doctrine which recognises the existence of these primary celestial substances, and regards them as gods." done. the nature of This brings to a close the proposed examination into 35. The sequel the existence and nature of the First Cause; and inas- to his theory of much as, in the unfolding of his theory on this point, God. Aristotle has ascended up to the Absolute and Eternal Mind, through the subjectivity of the human mind, and also had demonstrated that the Divine Nature is what in itself must be essentially good, two questions apparently remain for discussion; the first involving certain subjects of doubt as regards the Mind itself, which are investigated in chapter ix., and the second as to whether the Universe involves in its entire system this very excellence—this rô ayabór, which we found to be inherent in the Divinity. 36. Questions The question discussed in regard of mind is as to what the essence of mind consists in, whether we must relating to the assume its essence as being manifested in the capacity mind; chap. ix of perceiving, or in the actual perception itself-rò voeiv or ǹ vóŋois. Now, it is important to decide this question-for the settlement of which the student is referred to chapter ix.; for the dignity of mind Aristotle conceives depends very much upon correct views as to its nature: the great danger to be avoided is the exaltation of the objects of perception above the great percipient faculty itself. Such will only tend to drag down mind from the eminence that it ought always to occupy in our estimation. 37. The nature The next question is, as to the nature of the Good of the Toyu in its connexion with the system of the Universe óv; chap. x. -a subject that is also discussed in chapters iv. and v. book XIII. The inquiry which is mentioned in this tenth chapter is, as to whether the nature of the entire of Creation constitutes what is good and excellent. How are we to account for the existence of what is good?-how are we to give a solution of the orderly system of the Universe? Is not the point in question best illustrated by the case of an army, where the discipline and order that prevail there, and give rise to its excellent condition, are the result of the vigilance and strict command exercised by the general: the general, certainly, does not preside over the army on account of the subordination that is found there; but, vice versa. The application of this to the matter in hand is obvious; and by it we see Aristotle recognising what is good as a paramount principle in Creation. And this, too, exposes the absurdities of any system that would ignore the existence of what is good; and it is easy to see why it was that they were led to adopt such an hypothesis. They were for generating all things from contraries; and would thus assume the active influence at work therein of a principle of what is bad (roû pavλoû); whereas had they thought as Aristotle did, and admitted the existence of matter (un), they would have recognised that as the prime source of evil. It was quite absurd for them to insist on such principles as these, because it was in reality a denial of what was matter of fact, of what was plainly in existence before their very eyes, and that was the operation of a certain power, which aimed at the promotion of what is good as such, and succeeded likewise in the attainment of this very purpose. 38. Why men deny the exist were led to ence of good. 39. Aristotle's "origin of evil." This, then, constitutes Aristotle's solution of the account of the origin of evil, and is put forward by its author as the best refutation of such theories as those of Empedocles, for example, and his school, in their recognition of the principles of harmony and discord. The inconsistency of this system its utter insufficiency to account for the actual difficulty it proposes to solve-has been already exposed by the Stagyrite in his Review of the Greek Philosophy, and again in book II. chapter iv. 40. Funda- Against such systems as these, which would ascribe mental error of the phenomenon of generation to contrariety, the funda trariety. system. mental difficulty still remains as to how we can discover ascribing gene. any principle of efficiency in the Universe. Contraries ration to conare mutually impassive, and whatever may be the results of the conflict of two of them, such, certainly, cannot be equivalent with motion. Motion must be communicated from some ir dependent source. Grant the phenomenon of generation; but what is the cause of generation? And such is the force of this difficulty, that it presented itself to the minds of the ancient philosophers, as we have already seen; and they were thus compelled, by actual reason, to recognise some gradation in their first principles, and the existence of one as more dominant than the other. In general, 41. The general however, they fell into the absurdity of advancing the objection existence of a something contrary to what was primary; against this and this inconsistency is avoided by Aristotle, who has iust proved the separate subsistence of a certain First Cause, paramount to every other power or principle in the Universe. In vain, then, are we to look for this, even in the systems of the Supra naturalists: where, for example, will we discover the principle of causality in the Ideal hypothesis of Plato, or in the numbers of Pythagoras? Such is not to be found there; and this, too, amid all their needless multiplication of first principles. And, further. Nature herself seeks to break loose from the bondage 42. Nature profixed upon her by such speculations; and things them- tests against a selves cry out against the increase of their rulers: and needless multiplication of thus we find, not merely in the system of human primary government, but also in the wide kingdoms of Creation, entities. the one principle loudly proclaimed, of there being one sovereign influence that presides over all, and that the dominion of many is not what is advantageous either in the physical or social arrangements of the world; and this truth is conveyed to us in the well-known line from the Iliad: "The government of many is not a good thing; let us have one chief ruler amongst us." BOOK XII. 1. The aim of We now enter upon an analysis of book XII., which, however, does not contain speculations of equal interest book XII. and importance with what has gone before. The chief point of interest, however, in it relates to a refutation of the Ideal hypothesis-more elaborate and more enlarged than that found in book I. The first chapter of this book opens with a statement that the nature of the substance of those objects that fall under the notice of our senses has been declared, but that the inquiry proposed in the Metaphysics is, as to whether, beside these sensible objects, there is in existence a certain Immovable and Eternal Substance or |