CONTENTS. BOOK I. MAN'S natural desire of Knowledge-Sense, memory, foresight-Art compared with BOOK I. THE LESS. The Pursuit of Truth-Infinite progression of Causes-Degrees of scientific BOOK II. Pp. 47-53. Doubt in relation to Truth-Questions preliminary to Ontology-Apodeiktic Prin- BOOK III. Pp. 54-78. BOOK IV. Principal Cause defined-The term Element explained-Nature defined-The term BOOK V. - Physics and Metaphysics-Speculative Science Threefold-No Science of Aceident- BOOK VI. Enbdivisions of Entity-Opinions about Substance-Substance as the formal Cause- a Pp. 166-210 BOOK VII. Substance cognized by sense-Energy in Substance-Import of the name of a thing, BOOK VIII. Ontology treats about Potentiality-Rational and Irrational Capacities-The Mega- BOOK IX. Pp. 226-251. Nature of Unity-Unity viewed as a Measure-Is Unity Substance?-Unity as op- BOOK X. What is the Subject Matter of Ontology?-Anything separable from Singulars?-Are BOOK XI. Classification of Substances-Under Change lies the subject of it-Diversity in First BOOK XII. Inquiries pursued in Book XII.-Mathematical entities not in sensibles-This Contraries as First Principles-Unity, Inequality, Plurality-Are Things Eternal Pp. 390-418. ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS INTRODUCTION. "THE Metaphysics of Aristotle," says Mr. Maurice,' 1. Importance are troublesome reading, partly from the frequent re- of the Metapetitions which occur in them, partly from the difficulty physics. of discovering a sequence in the books. Nevertheless, they should be read by any student who wishes to investigate the questions which have occupied men in later times." Notwithstanding, however, their bearing on modern 2. Study of systems of Ontology, and their being occupied in the them neglect discussion of questions of vast importance, in specula 2 ed. tion, at least, the Metaphysics have almost since the Middle Ages been buried in obscurity, and, with a few brilliant exceptions in Germany, have been quite forgotten. This neglect has been growing greater and greater from the time of Cudworth and More, but has been quite confirmed in the present century; and in England, at least, the Metaphysics of Aristotle have been consigned to utter oblivion. One cause, amongst others, that undoubtedly 3. Partial has contributed to bring this odium upon the Meta- cause of this physics, and thus to contract their circulation within neglect. a narrow sphere in our country, is the absence of any work that would assist the student in the entire labour of mastering the difficulties, which confessedly he must make up his mind to encounter in such a task. No English translation, for instance, that can be said really to have answered such an end as this, has as yet appeared; and thus, whilst other portions of Aristotle's works have been illustrated in this way, the Metaphysics have been left to moulder in the dust of our public Libraries, and have encountered contempt disproportionate to their literary value-disproportionate when compared with the attention and scholarship that have been lavished upon the rest of the Stagyrite's Philosophy. (1) In his incomparable Analysis of Aristotle's Metaphysics, to be found in his "History of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy," published originally in the Cyclopædia Metropolitana. (2) Buhle, for example, in his treatise on the "Authenticity of Aristotle's Metaphysics." (3) In fact, the only translation extant of tre Metaphysics is that by Thomas Taylor, but for the reasons already stated in my Preface-there is not much to be found there to assist the student beyond an English version not entirely out of the teach of censure. Further, the scarcity of this not very commodious volume, places it beyond the hands of ordinary purchasers. b 4. Attempted remedy for it in the present Translation, This deficiency it has been attempted to supply by the present Translation; and the hope of the Translator is that it may be found useful in this way, if not to very profound Greek scholars and Aristotelians, who do not require such, yet, at least, to those students of ordinary attainments, who, however willing to become acquainted with the Metaphysics, are deterred from the undertaking by as well the actual magnitude of the Treatise as the difficulties of the text. And, as the and the Analysis. fittest accompaniment to this Translation, the student is supplied with the following Analysis of the work itself, in which the connexion of thought that runs through the entire is traced, as well as its bearing on Modern Philosophy illustrated. The contents, moreover, of the several books and chapters are succinctly given in the order in which they occur in the arrangement adopted by Bekker. 1. The Preface BOOK I. THE Metaphysics open with a short Preface, in which Aristotle seeks to introduce his readers to the philosophy that he is now about to develop for them, and which he implies is quite distinct' in its aim from that found in the other portions of his works; though at the same time inseparably connected with them, as pieces of that vast edifice of knowledge, practical as well as speculative, which it was his ambition to build up and leave behind him for the service of mankind. 2. Aristotle's For this purpose he endeavours to exalt as much as object in this possible the nature of the inquiry undertaken in this Preface. Treatise, and he thereby calculated on enlisting the sympathy of his readers in its behalf. Moreover, by thus arraying Metaphysics in an attractive garb, he was enabled to answer indirectly the objections that were afloat in the popular mind against the practicability of their study. Now both of these ends assuredly were answered in this Preface; for whatever would have a tendency to promote the dignity of Metaphysics as a science, would necessarily exercise a reflex influence in giving a decided answer to all the sneers that might be levelled against it by the ignorant and presuming Sophists. 3. Positive and Thus Aristotle defends Ontology positively and nega negative de- tively positively, by a bold analysis of the nature and fence of Onto- objects of the science; and negatively, by making this analysis subserve as a plain answer to all the cavils of ogy. the Sceptics. (1) This is apparent from his imposition of the term Sophia, or Wisdom, to desig Sate the science under investigation in this Treatise. (2) Towards the end of chapter i. In this Preface, therefore, to the Metaphysics, we 4. Aristotle's may lay it down that the chief aim of Aristotle is to chief aim in invest Ontology with its peculiar attributes as a science, this Preface. and this, too, for the purpose that thereby it should be elevated to its proper position amongst the other sciences; and this he conceived to be the most effectual refutation against all misconceptions as to its expediency, or scope, or general utility. The course, then, which Aristotle pursues to accom- 5. How this plish all this is as follows: he aims to establish that aim is attained. Ontology, or, as he calls it, Wisdom, was the science properly so called. Viewed in relation to the other sciences, it contained their most absolute generalizations. The science of Metaphysics might be said to bear the same relation to physical or natural science which logic has to psychology. As logic exhibits the reasoning process1 of the mind, and thus illustrates its capabilities for the attainment of knowledge, so Metaphysics, as a science, is conversant about the highest and purest deductions from experimental philosophy, and its province is to exemplify those abstract notions and fundamental principles which establish the certainty of knowledge itself. Sense and experience merely3 deal with individual instances, but Ontology lays hold on what is the universal element therein, and thus gradually mounts up to be, what it is, a science about causes and first principles. And this very fact, that Metaphysics is a science of 6. What it is causes, it is that invests it with its dignity and import- that invests ance, and draws the line of demarcation between it and Metaphysics all other sources of information. The senses merely with itsdignity; bear their testimony to the particular fact of a particular sensation, but say nothing about the cause. The practical or experienced the common workman, for instance,-understand the doing of a thing, but they have no perception as to the principle or cause of it; and for this reason we estimate the architect above the handicraftsman, inasmuch as the one is, whereas the other is not, conversant with the principle or cause of what is being constructed. To attribute, indeed, an acquaintance with the cause to an handicraftsman, would be as absurd as if we were to do so in the case of one of the brute creation; for both fulfil their functions, whilst acting, wholly irrespective of a knowledge of causes, and what the latter does from blind instinct, the former accomplishes from the mere impulse of habit; so that, in short, what sheds such lustre on Metaphysics as a science, what imparts such elevation to it, is its being a science conversant with causes and first principles. chap. i. (1) For a most lucid explanation of this point the student is referred to Archbishop Whately's "Elements of Logic," Analytical outline, where the nature and province of the science are placed beyond the possibility of misapprehension for the future. (2) This connexion between apodeiktic principles and the science of metaphysics bads Aristotle, in the third Book, into a refutation of scepticism. (3) This is shown in chap. i. |