state that when the troops left their position and ran out of the shelter of
the timber, they pursued them as they would a herd of buffaloes. They
pointed out the place a short distance from the timber where they killed
the first soldier, who had, as they said, a "large yellow stripe down the
side of his trousers." This meant that the first man
they killed was a sergeant of the Seventh Cavalry.
They then pointed out the places where they had
killed others as they were crossing the plain, fording
the river, or ascending the bluffs.

Just as they had followed Reno's command up the
bluffs and into Benteen's command, the alarm was
raised that other troops were attacking the center of
the village. This was Custer's command, and it was
engaging the Minneconjoux and the Sans Arcs. As
the Indians tell the story, this was a stand-off fight
-give and take. The Uncpapas and Ogalallas
had mostly crossed the Little Big Horn, and
had gone up on the hill, following Reno's com-
mand when this alarm was given. Then they
left Reno and went to the protection of their
camp, moving down on the right bank of the
Little Big Horn to do so.

The Cheyennes were encamped at the extreme lower end of the village, and did not get up in time to take part in the pursuit of Reno's troops before the report of this attack on the center of the village was received. These did not, therefore, cross the Little Big Horn with the others, but when they returned, moved down on the same side up which they had previously gone, passing through the village to the extreme lower end, and then crossing the stream, they took position on the left of the Minneconjoux and San Arcs, and attacked the right flank of Custer's command. The Ogalallas and Uncpapas that had moved down on the right bank, as stated, took position on the right of the Minneconjoux. and massed in the low ground near the left of Custer's line, held by Lieutenants Calhoun and Crittenden.

Here for some time it was an even contest. It must have lasted at least two hours according to the report of firing heard by the men of Reno's command, and the statements of the Indians. As they say, it was

an even fight until they had massed on the left of Custer's command and made a charge which turned the left of his line. They then swept down from the left to the right, rolling his command up in confusion and destruction. As the right of the line was reached, those who had not been

killed let go their horses, and the Cheyennes report that they captured most of these. Many of the horses on the right of the line, including the gray troop, had been killed by the soldiers and their bodies used as a protection from behind which to continue the fight. The Indians say that

the fight was kept up until all the troops were killed or disabled except about forty men on the extreme right of the line. These, as a last resort, suddenly rose and made a rush toward the timber, skirting the bank of the Little Big Horn, a distance of two hundred yards, approximately. This was evidently a forlorn hope, as the fire was then so hot from all directions that they realized that it was only a question of a short time when they must all be killed if they remained where they were. The Indians state that as these men rushed toward the timber they first started in the direction of a small ravine, but as the fire was so hot from the position that the Cheyennes had taken up, they swerved toward the head of a neighboring ravine. But the Indians killed the last one before he reached the timber. The graves of these men to-day confirm this account of that part of the tragedy, and the fact that there were no horses found along this line of bodies indicates that their version of it is correct, and that Custer and his command never went down that ravine.

The distance across the valley from the position first occupied by Reno, where Custer undoubtedly expected him to remain, and the position where Custer's command fought, is not more than two miles. In fact one is in plain sight from the other. Rifle shots from one would cross the line of fire of the other. In other words, any enemy between the two commands would have been under the fire of both. Had Reno remained in that position, it would have enabled Benteen to "come on" and "be quick" as he had been ordered and as he was doing. It would have brought him into position and into action between the two commands of Custer and Reno. The only difference in the original formation would have been that Reno's and Benteen's commands would have exchanged places, and Benteen's command would have been in the center instead of on the left.

When asked what would have been the result if Reno had not retreated, the Indians frankly said that if he had not run, they would have fled. They were also asked what the consequences would have been if Reno with the seven troops had followed the Uncpapas and Ogalallas when they turned and went down to the assistance of the Indians in the village, and they candidly admitted that they would have been between two fires. In other words the battle was lost twice, not by the action of Custer, however, for his command fought gallantly as long as it lasted, and he had given proper and judicious orders to the other commands.

It is not expected that five troops could have whipped that body of Indians, neither is it believed that that body of Indians could have whipped twelve troops of the Seventh Cavalry under Custer's command, or if his

orders had been properly executed. The fact that after Custer's five troops had been annihilated, the Indians who came back and engaged the seven troops were repulsed, and that they failed to dislodge these troops, is proof that the force was amply strong, if it had only acted in full concert. No commanding officer can win victories with seven-twelfths of his command remaining out of the engagement when within sound of his rifleshots. Grouchy did not come up to the "sound of the guns," but Blucher did; and the historic Waterloo was the result.

The distance from where the running Reno halted and kept the seven troops and the reserve ammunition, to the extreme right of Custer's command was about four miles. A cavalry horse walked that distance in fiftyeight minutes. At a smart trot or gallop, as a cavalryman goes into action, fifteen minutes would have brought the whole command into the engagement and the result might have been entirely different. This we proved on that same ground by the actual test of moving our horses over it, and timing them by the watch.

As the lips of Custer and those who died with him are forever sealed, and since there was no official investigation of all the circumstances that resulted in such a terrible disaster, it is but charity to withhold any severe criticism upon so gallant and distinguished an officer with such a brilliant record as he had made in successfully handling large bodies of troops dur ing the great war. It is one of the saddest and greatest sacrifices that was ever made by heroic men on any battlefield. No man of military knowledge in riding over this field now, and examining the position that Custer quickly took upon that crest commanding the valley, could fail to recognize the military ability of that commander; and those graves remain as monuments to the fortitude of men who stood their ground.

Custer's body was not mutilated, but he had received a rifle shot through the body and one through the head.

The Indians further explained that after the fight was over the Uncpapas, who, previous to the engagement, had been encamped at the upper end of the village, struck their camp at the advance of Reno's command, and afterward went into camp at the other end of the village, and pitched their tents near the Cheyennes, where they remained for two days. Thus, the impression was given to the troops that afterward went over the field and examined the camp ground, that a larger body of Indians had camped there than was actually the case, or, in other words, there seemed to have been a larger camp than there really was. From such information as I could obtain from the Indians themselves, the number of their warriors

MOUNTING THE IINFANTRY ON CAPTURED PONIES.-SEE PAGE 252.