CHAP. IV. GRANDEUR AND SUBLIMITY. The mind of man attached to things great and elevated-Elevation of an objec affects us as well as magnitude-The effect of a great object; and also of an elevated one-Emotions produced by great and elevated objects, are grandeur and sublimity-Greatness, considered abstractly, is agreeable-Regularity, proportion, order, and color, assist in causing grandeur-Greatness distinguishes grandeur from beauty-Difference between an emotion of grandeur and of beauty -The former is serious, the latter gay and weak-Regularity, proportion, and order, not so essential to grandeur as to beauty-Not so distinctly perceived in a great as in a small object-The mind occupied with the capital parts-These observations applied to sublimity-An agreeable object made sublime by placing it high-Littleness and lowness of place not disagreeable, are indifferent-If they were agreeable, greatness and elevation would not be so-a mental progression from less to greater, more agreeable than from greater to less-Grandeur and sublimity figurative-These terms applicable to persons and characters→→ The same in music-An ascending series of thought, or climax, agreeable The grandest emotion is when the whole object is seen at one view-The sublime may be carried too far-The effort is too great; and it is difficult to descendGrandeur in manner, consists in presenting the most important circumstances→ A good description often affects more than a real view-Abstract terms to be avoided-An emotion of grandeur raised by reiterated impressions -Grandeur indirectly applied, depresses the mind-The bombast-Imaginary beings, without propriety of action. NATURE has not more remarkably distinguished us from other animals by an erect posture, than by a capacious and aspiring mind, attaching us to things great and elevated. The ocean, the sky, seize the attention, and make a deep impression:* robes of state are made large and full, to draw respect: we admire an elephant for its magnitude, notwithstanding its unwieldiness. The elevation of an object affects us no less than its magnitude: a high place is chosen for the statue of a deity or hero: a tree growing on the brink of a precipice looks charming when viewed from the plain below: a throne is erected for the chief magistrate; and a chair with a high seat for the president of a court. Among all nations, heaven is placed far above us, hell far below us. In some objects, greatness and elevation concur to make a complicated impression: the Alps and the Peak of Teneriffe are proper exemples; with the following difference, that in the former greatness seems to prevail, elevation in the latter. The emotions raised by great and by elevated objects, are clearly distinguishable, not only in internal feeling, but even in their external expressions. A great object makes the spectator endeavor to enlarge his bulk; which is remarkable in plain people, who give way to nature without reserve; in describing a great object, they naturally expand themselves by drawing in air with all their *Longinus observes, that nature inclines us to admire, not a small rivulet, however clear and transparent, but the Nile, the Ister, the Rhine, or still more the The sight of a small fire produces no emotion; but we are struck with the boiling furnaces of Etna, pouring out whole rivers of liquid flame. Treatise of the Sublime, chap. 29. ocean. force. An elevated object produces a different expression; it makes the spectator stretch upward, and stand a-tiptoe. Great and elevated objects considered with relation to the emotions produced by them, are termed grand and sublime. Grandeur and sublimity have a double signification: they commonly signify the quality or circumstance in objects by which the emotions of grandeur and sublimity are produced; sometimes the emotions themselves. In handling the present subject, it is necessary that the impression made on the mind by the magnitude of an object, abstracting from its other qualities, should be ascertained. And because abstraction is a mental operation of some difficulty, the safest method for judging is, to choose a plain object that is neither beautiful nor deformed, if such a one can be found. The plainest that occurs, is a huge mass of rubbish, the ruins, perhaps, of some extensive building, or a large heap of stones, such as are collected together for keeping in memory a battle or other remarkable event. Such an object, which in miniature would be perfectly indifferent, makes an impression by its magnitude, and appears agreeable. And supposing it so large, as to fill the eye, and to prevent the attention from wandering upon other objects, the impression it makes will be so much the deeper.* But, though a plain object of that kind be agreeable, it is not termed grand: it is not entitled to that character, unless, together with its size, it be possessed of other qualities that contribute to beauty, such as regularity, proportion, order, or color: and according to the number of such qualities combined with magnitude, it is more or less grand. Thus, St. Peter's church at Rome, the great pyramid of Egypt, the Alps towering above the clouds, a great arm of the sea, and, above all, a clear and serene sky, are grand, because, beside their size, they are beautiful in an eminent degree. On the other hand, an overgrown whale, having a disagreeable appearance, is not grand. A large building, agreeable by its regularity and proportions, is grand, and yet a much larger building destitute of regularity, has not the least tincture of grandeur. A single regiment in battle array, makes a grand appearance; which the surrounding crowd does not, though perhaps ten for one in number. And a regiment where the men are all in one livery, and the horses of one color, makes a grander appearance, and consequently strikes more terror, than where there is confusion of colors and of dress. Thus greatness or magnitude is the circumstance that distinguishes grandeur from beauty: agreeableness is the genus, of which beauty and grandeur are species. The emotion of grandeur, duly examined, will be found an additional proof of the foregoing doctrine. That this emotion is pleasant in a high degree, requires no other evidence than once to have seen a grand object; and if an emotion of grandeur be pleasant, its cause or object, as observed above, must infallibly be agreeable in proportion. The qualities of grandeur and beauty are not more distinct, than the emotions are which these qualities produce in a spectator. It is * See Appendix, Terms defined, sect. 33. observed in the chapter immediately foregoing, that all the various emotions of beauty have one common character, that of sweetness and gaiety. The emotion of grandeur has a different character: a large object that is agreeable, occupies the whole attention, and swells the heart into a vivid emotion, which, though extremely pleasant, is rather serious than gay. And this affords a good reason for distinguishing in language these different emotions. The emotions raised by color, by regularity, by proportion, and by order, have such a resemblance to each other, as readily to come under one general term, viz. the emotion of beauty; but the emotion of grandeur is so different from these mentioned, as to merit a peculiar name. Though regularity, proportion, order, and color, contribute to grandeur as well as to beauty, yet these qualities are not by far so essential to the former as to the latter. To make out that proposition, some preliminaries are requisite. In the first place, the mind, not being totally occupied with a small object, can give its attention at the same time to every minute part; but in a great or extensive object, the mind being totally occupied with the capital and striking parts, has no attention left for those that are little or indifferent. In the next place, two similar objects appear not similar when viewed at different distances; the similar parts of a very large object, cannot be seen but at different distances; and for that reason, its regularity, and the proportion of its parts, are, in some measure, lost to the eye; neither are the irregularities of a very large object so conspicuous as of one that is small. Hence it is, that a large object is not so agreeable by its regularity, as a small object; nor so disagreeable by its irregularities. These considerations make it evident, that grandeur is satisfied with a less degree of regularity and of the other qualities mentioned, than is requisite for beauty; which may be illustrated by the following experiment. Approaching to a small conical hill, we take an accurate survey of every part, and are sensible of the slightest deviation from regularity and proportion. Supposing the hill to be considerably enlarged, so as to make us less sensible of its regularity, it will, upon that account, appear less beautiful. It will not, however, appear less agreeable, because some slight emotion of grandeur comes in place of what is lost in beauty. And at last, when the hill is enlarged to a great mountain, the small degree of beauty that is left, is sunk in its grandeur. Hence it is, that a towering hill is delightful, if it have but the slightest resemblance of a cone; and a chain of mountains no less so, though deficient in the accuracy of order and proportion. We require a small surface to be smooth; but in an extensive plain, considerable inequalities are overlooked. In a word, regularity, proportion, order, and color, contribute to grandeur as well as to beauty; but with a remarkable difference, that, in passing from small to great, they are not required in the same degree of perfection. This remark serves to explain the extreme delight we have in viewing the face of nature, when sufficiently enriched and diversified with objects. The bulk of the objects in a natural landscape are beautiful, and some of them grand: a flowing river, a spreading oak, a round hill, an extended plain, are delightful; and even a rugged rock or barren heath, though in themselves disagreeable, contribute, by contrast, to the beauty of the whole. Joining to these, the verdure of the fields, the mixture of light and shade, and the sublime canopy spread over all; it will not appear wonderful, that so extensive a group of splendid objects should swell the heart to its utmost bounds, and raise the strongest emotion of grandeur. The spectator is conscious of an enthusiasm, which cannot bear confinement, nor the strictness of regularity and order: he loves to range at large; and is so enchanted with magnificent objects, as to overlook slight beauties or deformities. The same observation is applicable, in some measure, to works of art: in a small building, the slightest irregularity is disagreeable; but, in a magnificent palace, or a large Gothic church, irregularities are less regarded in an epic poem we pardon many negligences that would not be permitted in a sonnet or epigram. Notwithstanding such exceptions, it may be justly laid down for a rule, that in works of art, order and regularity ought to be governing principles: and hence the observation of Longinus,* "In works of art we have regard to exact proportion; in those of nature, to grandeur and magnificence." The same reflections are, in a good measure, applicable to sublimity; particularly, that, like grandeur, it is a species of agreeableness; that a beautiful object placed high, appearing more agreeable than formerly, produces in the spectator a new emotion, termed the emotion of sublimity; and that the perfection of order, regularity, and proportion, is less required in objects placed high, or at a distance, than at hand. The pleasant emotion raised by large objects, has not escaped the poets. He doth bestride the narrow world Like a Colossus; and we petty men Walk under his huge legs. Julius Cæsar, Act I. Sc. 3. Cleopatra. I dreamt there was an Emp'ror Antony; But such another man! His face was as the heavens: and therein stuck A sun and moon, which kept their course, and lighted His legs bestrid the ocean, his rear'd arm Crested the world. Antony and Cleopatra, Act V. Sc. 3. Dies not alone, but, like a gulph, doth draw To whose huge spokes, ten thousand lesser things Each small annexment, petty consequence, Hamlet, Act III. Sc. 8. The poets have also made good use of the emotion produced by the elevated situation of an object: Quod si me lyricis vatibus inseres, * Chap. 30. Horat. Carm. 1. 1. Ode 1. Amongst the lyric bards let me be read, To reach at victory above my head. Richard II. Act I. Sc. 4. The mounting Bolingbroke ascends my throne. Richard II. Act V, Sc. 2. Antony. Why was I rais'd the meteor of the world, Till all my fires were spent; and then cast downward; Dryden, All for Love, Act I. The description of Paradise in the fourth book of Paradise Lost, a fine illustration of the impression made by elevated objects: So on he fares, and to the border comes Of Eden, where delicious Paradise, Now nearer, crowns with her inclosure green, As with a rural mound, the champain head Of a steep wilderness; whose hairy sides With thicket overgrown, grotesque and wild, Access deny'd; and overhead up grew Insuperable height of loftiest shade, Cedar and pine, and fir, and branching palm, A sylvan scene; and as the ranks ascend, Shade above shade, a woody theatre Of stateliest view. Yet higher than their tops The verd'rous wall of Paradise up sprung; Which to our general sire gave prospect large Into his nether empire neighb'ring round. And higher than that wall a circling row Of goodliest trees, loaden with fairest fruit, Blossoms and fruits at once of golden hue, Appear'd with gay enamel'd colors mix'd. Though a grand object is agreeable, we must not infer that a little object is disagreeable; which would be unhappy for man, considering that he is surrounded with so many objects of that kind. same holds with respect to place: a body placed high is agreeable; but the same body placed low, is not, by that circumstance, rendered disagreeable. Littleness and lowness of place are precisely similar in the following particular, that they neither give pleasure nor pain. And in this may visibly be discovered peculiar attention in fitting the internal constitution of man to his external circumstances. Were littleness and lowness of place agreeable, greatness and elevation could not be so: were littleness and lowness of place disagreeable, they would occasion perpetual uneasiness. B. 4. l. 131. The The difference between great and little with respect to agreeableness, is remarkably felt in a series, when we pass gradually from the one extreme to the other. A mental progress from the capital to the kingdom, from that to Europe-to the whole earth-to the planetary system to the universe, is extremely pleasant: the heart swells, and the mind is dilated, at every step. The returning in an opposite direction is not positively painful, though our pleasure lessens at every step, till it vanishes into indifference: such a progress may sometimes produce pleasure of a different sort, which arises from |