pofe then, again, that in your Travels abroad, you pass thro' fuch a delightful Country; what is it that prevents your Fondnefs, but only confidering that you are not at Home, that you must not always fee and enjoy what you now do? And therefore all the fine Things you meet with, you rather look upon as Curiofities to be remarked in Story, or to be tried by way of Experiment, or to be used for prefent Neceffity, than as fuch Things which are to be enjoyed, which you know they are not. And did we ufe the World thus, we fhould never grow over fond of it. Those who marry, would be as though they married not; and those who weep, as though they wept not; and those who rejoice, as though they rejoiced not; and those who use this World, as not abufing it; because the Fashion of this World paffeth away. The World itself will not last long, though it will out-laft us; but we are to continue here fo little a while, that we have no Reason to call it our Home, or to place our Enjoyment in it. It is an old and a good Diftinction, that fome Things are only for Ufe, and fome Things for Enjoyment. The first we value only for their Ufe, the fecond we account our Happiness. Now it is certain, that what is tranext and momentary can be only for Ufe; for Man is a miferable Creature, if what is his Happiness be not lafting; and a very foolish Creature, if he places his Happiness in what is not lafting. Now this fhould make a vaft Difference in our Affections to Things. We cannot blame any Man who lets loofe his Affections upon that which is his Happiness; for there neither can, nor ought to be, any Bounds fet to our Defires or Enjoyment of our true Happiness; but what we account only for Ufe, we have no farther Cocernment for, but only as it is of Ufe to us; and this confines our Defires and Affections to its Ufe:

And were this the Measure of our Love to prefent Things, as it ought to be, we could not err, nor entertain any troublesome or vicious Paffion for them. As for, Inftance: What is the natural Use of eating and drinking, but to repair the Decays of Nature, and preferve our Bodies in Health and Vigour? Now, as great Delicacies and Curiofities as there are in Nature, both of Food and Liquors, if Men valued them only for their Ufe, they would never be guilty of Excefs, nor grow fo fond of them, as if they were only to eat and drink, and to judge of the Differences of Taftes. To value Things for their Ufe, is to value them no further than they are ufeful; and this is the only Value which is due to Things which we must leave; for they can be only for present Ufe: but when we come to place our Happiness, as fenfual Men do, in Things which are defigned only for our Ufe, it both makes us extravagant in the Ufe of them, [which often proves a great Mischief to us in this World] and creates fuch an unnatural Paffion for them, as they cannot anfwer; which makes them vain and empty, and unfatisfactory while we have them, and fills us with Vexation, and all the Restleffness of a furious Paffion and Appetite when we want them; as we muft do at one time or other, either before, or, to be fure, when we leave this World.

3. Let us fuppofe again, That in our Paffage through foreign Countries, where we are not to ftay long, we fhould not meet with all thofe Neceffaries and Conveniencies of Life, which we have at Home; that the Country is barren, the Way rough and mountainous, the Road infested with Thieves and Robbers, but without any convenient Reception for Travellers, the People rude and barbarous, and infolent to Strangers; will a wife Man be over follicitous about fuch Hardships as these in travelling?

Does

Does he not comfort himself, that he is not to ftay there, that this will not laft long; that these Difficulties will only recommend his own Country to him, and make him haften Home again, where he fhall remember with Pleasure, what is now uneafy and troublesome ?

And is there not as much Reafon for Chriftians to bear all the Evils, and Cafualties, and Sufferings of this Life with an equal Mind, remembring that they are not to stay always here? That this Life is but their Pilgrimage, they are from Home, and therefore muft expect the Ufage which Strangers and Travellers ordinarily meet with. That they are not to live here always, is a fufficient Proof that their Happiness does not confift in prefent Things: And then if they can make a Shift, tho' it may be it is a hard Shift, to pass through this World, the Scene will be altered, and they fhall find a kinder Reception in the next. This is the Foundation of Contentment in all Conditions, and of Patience under Sufferings; That Death, which is not far off, when it removes us out of this World, will remove us from all the Sufferings of it: And why should we not bear up with the Courage and Refolution of Travellers in the mean Time, when we have Home, a peaceful and eternal Home, in our Profpect?

4. Once more, to conclude this Argument: Suppofe a Man in his Travels thro' a foreign Country should be commanded immediately to leave the Country, unless he would forfwear ever returning to his own Country again; would not a wife Man confider, that if he had not been commanded to leave the Country, he did not intend to have stay'd long in it; and therefore it would be an unaccountable Folly and Madness in him to abjure his own Country, where his Father and Kindred, and Inhe

ritance

ritance is, only to gratify his Curiofity in ftaying a little longer there? And can we then think it a hard Command, (when we know we muft fhortly die, and leave this World, that whether we will or no, we cannot stay long in it,) to facrifice our very Lives, rather than renounce our Hopes of Heaven and a better Life? When we know that we must leave this World, what does it fignify to die a little fooner than it may be in the Courfe of Nature we should, to obtain an immortal Life; to go to that bleffed Jefus who lived in this World for us, and died for us, and is ready to receive us into that bleffed Place where he is, that we may behold his Glory? I am fure it is a very foolish Thing for à Man who muft die; to forfeit an immortal Life, to reprieve a mortal and perifhing Life for fome few Years.

II. As Death, which is our leaving this World,. proves that these prefent Things are not very valuable to us, fo it proves that they are not the most valuable Things in their own Natures; though we were to enjoy them always, it would be but a very mean and imperfect State, in Comparison of that better Life which is referved for good Men in the next World: For, 1. It is congruous to the Divine Wif dom and Goodnefs, that the beft Things fhould be the most lafting: Wisdom dictates this; for it is no more than to give the Preference to thofe Things which are beft. The longest Continuance gives a natural Preference to Things; we always value thofe Things moft, which we fhall enjoy longeft; and therefore to give the longest Duration to the worst Things, is to fet the greatest Value on them, and to teach Mankind to prefer them before that which is better. What we value moft, we defire to enjoy longeft, and were it in our Power we would make

fuch

fuch Things the most lafting; which fhews that it is the natural Senfe of Mankind, that the best Things deserve to continue longeft; and therefore we need not doubt, but that infinite Wisdom which made the World, has proportioned the Continuance of Things to their true Worth. And if God hath made the best Things the most lafting, then the next World in its own intrinfick Nature is as much better than this World, as it will last longer. For this is moft agreeable to the Divine Goodness too, and God's Love to his Creatures, that what is their greatest and trueft Happiness fhould be most lafting. For if God hath made Man capable of different Degrees and States of Happinefs, of living in this World and in the next, it is an Expreffion of more perfect Goodness (as it is moft for the Happiness of his Creatures) that the most perfect State of Happinefs fhould laft the longeft; for the more perfectly happy we are, the more do we experience the Divine Goodness; and he is the most perfectly happy, who has the longest Enjoyment of the best Things.

2. It seems most agreeable alfo to the Divine Wisdom and Goodnefs, that where God makes fuch a vaft Change in the State of his Creatures, as to remove them from this World to the next, the laft State should be the most perfect and happy. I fpeak now of fuch Creatures as God defigns for Happinefs, for the Reason alters where he intends to punish. But where God intends to do good to Creatures, it seems a very improper Method to translate them from a more perfect and happy, to a less happy State. Every Abatement of Happiness is a Degree of Punishment, and that which thofe Men are very fenfible of, who have enjoyed a more perfect Happiness and therefore we may certainly conclude, that God would not remove good Men out of this World, were this the happiest Place.

Yes,