He then states, that possible in itself, and which is the power of In the latter part of

consequences of their own principles."* "he allows to man all the liberty that is to which the ideas of mankind ever go, doing whatever they will or please." the chapter he maintains that, "there is some fixed law of nature respecting the will, as well as the other powers of the mind, and every thing else in the constitution of nature; and, consequently, that it is never determined without some real or apparent cause, foreign to itself, i. e. without some motive of choice, or that motives influence us in some definite and invariable manner; so that every volition, or choice, is constantly regulated and determined, by what precedes it." This constant determination of mind, according to the motives presented to it, he terms its necessary determination. "And this being admitted to be the fact," he observes, “there will be a necessary connection between all things, past, present, and to come:" so that according to the established laws of nature, no event could have been otherwise than it has been, is, or is to be."

In the second section, Dr. Priestley states the main argument in favour of necessity, and the only one by which the doctrine can be satisfactorily established. This argument is drawn from the consideration of cause and effect; and is stated by the Doctor with great force and accuracy. He maintains that as sequency is always observed between the volition to act, and the state of mind which precedes it, so we have the same reason to infer the necessary connection between cause and effect in the moral world, as we have to predicate it of physical phenomena. He asserts that no effect can be produced without an adequate cause; and in this almost every person will agree with him for whatever notions men entertain of the origin of the notion respecting the necessary connection between cause and effect, it is obvious that no effect can produce itself; and the consciousness of this truth is felt by almost every reasoning being. The Doctor contends that, “if in any given state of mind, with respect both to disposition and motives, two different determinations, or volitions, be possible, in can be so on no other principle than that one of them shall come under the description of an effect without a cause." By this means he endeavours to reduce his opponents to the necessity of agreeing with him, or of asserting a doctrine contrary to the common sense of mankind.

The doctrine of liberty, involving the supposition that an effect can be produced without a cause, overturns, according to *Illust. Phil. Necess. p. 1, 2. Ibid. p.8.

+Ibid. p. 2.

Dr. Priestley, "all reasoning concerning the appearances of nature, and especially the foundation of the only proper argument for the being of a God. For if any thing whatever," he observes, even a thought in the mind of man, could arise without an adequate cause, anything else, the mind itself, or the whole universe, might likewise exist without a cause.'

66

The third section of the Doctor's treatise contains a discussion of the argument in favour of necessity, drawn from the considerations of the divine prescience. His argument on this head is conclusive, provided the premises he assumes are correct. Dr. Priestley, however, wrote for those who would admit them, and has therefore managed the argument with considerable address.

In the fourth section he treats of the cause of volition and the nature of the will. Speaking of the influence of motives in determining the will, he remarks, "the most strenuous advocates of metaphysical liberty must acknowledge that motives have some real influence on the mind. It would be too manifest a contradiction to all experience, to assert that all objects are indifferent to us; that there is nothing in any of them that can excite desire or aversion; or that desire or aversion have no influence upon the will, and do not incline us to decide on what is proposed to us. Now can it be supposed that the will, whatever it be, should be of such a nature as both to be properly influenced, or acted upon by motives, and likewise by something that bears no sort of relation to motive, and consequently has a mode of action entirely different from that of motive? This cannot but appear exceedingly improbable, if not impossible.

66

Every other faculty of the mind has one uniform mode of operation, or affection. The passions are all excited by the view of proper objects; the memory is employed in retaining the ideas of things formerly impressed upon the mind; and the judgment in distinguishing the agreement or disagreement of ideas; whereas according to the modern metaphysical hypothesis, the will is of such a nature as to be influenced sometimes by the passions or motives, and sometimes in a manner in which neither passion nor motive have any thing to do, and of which it is not pretended that any idea can be given, but by saying that it is self-determined; which, in fact, gives no idea at all, or rather implies an absurdity, viz., that a determination, which is an effect, takes place without any cause at all. For, exclusive of every thing that comes under the denomination of motive, there is really nothing at all left that can produce the

* Ibid. p. 27.

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wh have been brought against necessity, a BERKETA TIGRE gleetions in a style of masterly argument. E Boswers to Dr. Price, with respect to the argument drawn fr the consciousness of liberty, is complete and satisfactory.

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correspondence took place between the two gentlemen which was afterwards published. This correspondence contains many able reasonings on both sides of the question, but like many other works of a polemical character is unhappily distinguished by a bitterness of spirit and a tone of irony and sarcasm which detract considerably from its merit as a philosophical publication.

The student who is desirous of exploring the controversy respecting this celebrated question, will find a great deal respecting it in the writings of Lord Kaimes and the philisophical David Hume. Lord Kaimes wrote an Essay on it which he published with other pieces, under the general title of "Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion." This Essay appeared so orthodox to some of the Scotch ministers as to occasion the expulsion of one of their body who maintained the principles it developed. It was replied to by 4 one Gibb, an obscure and illiberal writer, who of all other metaphysicians was perhaps the least qualified to refute the sober reasoning of Lord Kaimes. Gibb's reply was published in 8vo. Edinburgh, 1786, along with some speculations on the Adamic and Abrahamic covenants, which he styled sacred or heavenly contemplations. Unless coarseness and vulgarity of style, illiberality of sentiment, and the frequent use of abusive epithets, constitute a right to such a pompous appellation, Gibb's work was improperly baptized. Some of his readers think that he might have culled a more appropriate title from the language of a certain class of beings who inhabit certain regions described by the immortal Milton.

In concluding this brief notice of the necessarian controversy, I will just add, that a very able and ingenious Essay on moral causation has been published by Mr. Bailey, of Sheffield, along with his Essay on the Pursuit of Truth.

The preceding account renders it evident that some of the wisest and most distinguished of mankind have believed in and advocated the doctrine of necessity. If the Socialists, therefore, err in believing all human action to be necessitated, they certainly are not singular in this respect. The company in which they err is, to say the least of it, respectable; and it forms no 3mall degree of presumptive evidence in favour of the doctrine on which their whole system is based, that so many distinguished philosophers have believed in it. The number of those who elieve as the Socialists believe, with respect to the uniformity of moral causation, is far greater than is generally imagined, and even those who write in favour of metaphysical liberty, admit all that is requisite to establish the opposite doctrine. The necessary agency of man is the fundamental principle

determination. Let a man use what words he pleases, he can have no more conception how we can sometimes be determined by motives, and sometimes without any motive, than he can have of a scale being sometimes weighed down by weights, and sometimes by a kind of substance that has no weight at all, which, whatever it be in itself, must, with respect to the scale, be nothing."+

There are many other valuable arguments contained in the Doctor's work. In some of the remaining sections he treats of objections which have been brought against necessity, and answers those objections in a style of masterly argument. His answers to Dr. Price, with respect to the argument drawn from the consciousness of liberty, is complete and satisfactory.

I shall close this brief notice of Dr. Priestley's work with a quotation from that section which treats of moral and physical necessity. Speaking of the notion of a self-determining power in man, he observes:-"The thing itself was absolutely chimerical; a power of determining without motive, or a proper self-determining power, without any regard to judgment, conscience, or affection, is impossible. It is to suppose an effect without a cause. The supposition is contrary to all experience and observation and if we only admit this one fundamental fact, viz., that the will cannot properly determine itself, but is always determined by motives, that is, by the present disposition of the mind, and the views of things presented to it, it cannot be any other than a necessary determination, subject to laws as strict and invincible as those of mechanics. There cannot possibly be any medium in the case. If we always choose that object, or that action, which, on whatever account, appears preferable at the moment of making the choice, it will always be determined by some invariable rule depending upon the state of the mind and the ideas present to it; and it will never be equally in our power to choose two things, when all the previous circumstances are the very

same.

Alexander Crombie, the friend and contemporary of Priestley, wrote an Essay on the doctrine of necessity, which being approved of by the Doctor, was afterwards published. This Essay contains many sound arguments, but is chiefly valuable on account of one hundred pages of it being devoted to the examination of the celebrated argument advanced by Dr. Gregory, in his Essay on the relation of motive to mind. Crombie's refutation of Dr. Gregory's mode of reasoning is triumphant and satisfactory. After the publication of Crombie's work a *Illust. Phil. Necess. p. 43. +Illust. Phil. Necess, p. 83, 2nd Ed