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have it to be. And there are other sorts of property more foreign still than that; but whether more important or not, must depend on occasions and circumstances: There are two more especially; which the owner may enjoy, but cannot command on account of their situation, whether in the voice and outward action of others, or in their inward feelings and sentiments..

6. The first of these will consist in such incidentals as Fame, Honour, and Distinction: respecting which it has been differently argued, whether the same be worth re garding or not, whether all or either of them be worth its usual purchase. And the question seems to be rather a difficult one, or at least liable to a distinction: as these foreign commodities, v. g., honour, fame, &c., may be worth the purchase sometimes, and sometimes not; according to the region in which they are situated, like the property of lands and tenements. Situated with men better than ordi nary, and with One better than men, such property is indeed desirable, but not with others; which makes a distinction of the same unavoidable. Considering then the reality or foundation of honour (for its reality and foundation are one) we may observe two kinds of the property differing widely from each other like their respective sources; from which they may be called divine and human: one real, proceeding from God only; who presides at the fountain of honour, and can turn its ennobling stream whithersoever he will, to honour them that honour him (Sam. I. ii. 30): as it is written, "Such honour have all his saints" (Ps. cxlix. 9); the other unreal proceeding from men; who also pretend to bestow the real sort, as they pretend to other divine offices; but cannot bestow that, any more than they can bestow thunder, or the command of the clouds; having none to bestow.

As the first or real honour which God bestows is a cons stituent characterestic amounting to grandeur or nobility of disposition, it does not of course belong to our present argument, like the unreal sort, and also the only to be ex

pected from man, or likewise to be mentioned at present. This sort is purely incidental to its object or receiver, and evinces merely the good opinion that others may have, or profess to have of him; this is what it is for a man to be "had in honour in which he cannot abide" (Ps. xlix. 12): this is honour according to the notion of many; but a notion that is not a whit the more substantial in itself for the consent of its many assertors. And if we examine fairly, we shall find the whole substance of honour such as the world will have it, being, to be sure, SUCH ONLY AS THE WORLD CAN BESTOW, by no means so solid a thing as one would expect from the account that is made of it; that such honour may be something in a relative way, but absolutely nothing. And that many have felt after bestowing great pains, and incurring a chance of greater for it; as Alexander of Macedon, falsely surnamed the Great for one, who after all his great exploits, and with all his guilty renown, finding no better foundation to rest on, must needs claim kindred with the gods of the time in order to establish his patent of celebrity.

But still, fame, honour, and distinction only in a human degree, may seem to deserve a proportional regard, being the same as Solomon intimates where he says, "A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches, and loving favour rather than silver and gold" (Prov. xxii. 1). · A good name or reputation, and outward favour, flattery or worship are certainly to be chosen rather than riches, as far as either may be worth choosing, seeing the end is generally to be chosen rather than the means. For the end of great riches is to procure reputation and favour for one thing: that is one principal end for which men generally desire them, and consequently the more to be desired. But notwithstanding the general opinion of their importance, it may be allowable to appreciate in a few words these much esteemed articles of foreign property; and particularly that of fame or reputation. For if fame or reputation was the way to happiness and immortality, and

every one who happened to get a great name could know how to keep it, the same would be most desirable for the sake of the farther end to which it conduced. But we have good authority for believing that human reputation, so far from being the way to happiness, is rather the way to woe: e. g. "Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you” (Luke vi. 26).—And if a man should have the good fortune, as it is generally considered, to immortalize his name, he would not be aught the nearer to immortalizing himself. But if you get a name, others must keep it for you: and they will not always be able to do that, if they should be willing; but every day some great name (for it it is but an every day thing at last) will descend through bad keeping into the gulph of oblivion, and sometimes a whole calendar of them shall go at once perhaps by some untoward revolution.

Therefore, what is reputation? Reputation is called a bubble as well as human honour in general: but with more propriety, honour being more like froth which is full of bubbles, and this only one among others. There are men in the world who value their name and the notion or opinion that is entertained of them beyond all the comforts and necessaries of life, if not beyond even life itself. This is certainly preferring the shadow to the substance: as a man's name and notion are only at the best, as it were, his ambassadors and representatives, and therefore deserve not to supersede himself however accurately they may describe him. But so far from such correctness, there is hardly a name worth having, or which a man would be pleased to bear, that he has any right to. Holiness and Reverence, Love, Virtue, Patience, Honour, Grace, and other esteemed properties not excepting CHARITY, are as far from belonging to the men or women surnamed by them as are the gifts of the apostles from being the property of all who bear their names; consequently the names of those properties cannot be property of theirs.

Christian modes forbid the use of odious as well as of flat

tering epithets; of Raca, e. g. as well as of Rabbi; or if men were to be christened with names answering to their latent characters, as names are said to be the signs of ideas, we should meet with such occasionally as it would be painful to utter: and sometimes a man could not even retain his specific name in that case, degraded as it has been since its first imposition, without arrogance, Man being by many shades too good a name for some men. But considering the name of properties, as arbitrary signs of stations and offices; as these are sometimes of families, they may clearly be used without any disparagement to them. Thus, e. g. let Holiness signify merely a pope, and Reverence, a priest; Grace, a duke; and Honour, a justice of the peace; in the same manner, as Pope may denote one family; and Priest, another; and Duke, another or as John, one individual; and Cæsar, another; and there will be no flattery nor misnaming, whether the pope, priest, &c., be holy, reverend, &c., or the reverse. Then Holiness will not stand like the sign over an empty shop; nor Grace, like an old memorandum; nor properties naturally foreign be made more so by a misapplication.

If nominal property, such as honourable or opprobrious names, titles, degrees, and epithets be however the possession of any party, it must be, not of those who receive, but of those who apply them, and especially, to distinguish one man from another; because it is they who have the benefit and enjoyment of them in this respect. Or let the giver and receiver divide the property between them, if they will; for it does not matter much, who owns a property of this sort. Neither, besides the deductions already mentioned, can it be any great commendation of this article, or of honour and distinction altogether, that their bulk is generally more considered than their cost and quality that a huge reputation is thought more of than a good reputation; and extensive honour, applause, and distinction, however they may be expressed, are thought more of than the more merited and judicious. Neither is it

very creditable to public opinion, to judge of honour, as it were by the lump in this way; the quality of which must depend, as before observed, principally on its source, next on its medium, and last of all on that bulk or quantity which the world prefers. It may be saying enough for a worldly judgment, to say, that it does not regard the Highest Giver, nor the noblest medium of honour more than the lowest of both, if it do so much: but the honour that a silly audience shall bestow on a more silly performance at the theatre, shall be more accounted than that which God himself bestows by his Holy Spirit on a faithful performance in the house of God. For the theatre has most hands, and bestows the loudest, consequently to the world most evident, applause.

7. The property which one man seems to have in another's voice and sentiments will certainly be some of the most portable as long as he shall be able to keep it. Yet the most portable property is not always the lightest or least important: for what may be carried on the tongue is of more weight and consequence sometimes, than any burden for the back. A name has great force sometimes, and will give a preponderant impetus to great undertakings: but then it must be through the medium of that other incidental, which is indeed the soul of a great name-of a property as easily diffused and as lasting in its effect or duration. The notion and influence of a person will often operate equally with his power and presence; or even more effectually, as appears by the examples of potentates secluding themselves from the profane gaze of their subjects systematically in some states, that they may be thought the more of, and also by the example of many who are no potentates (and a pity they ever should be!) who make themselves scarce in the private walks of life, or if not themselves yet their sayings; that either by absence in one case, or by silence in the other, they may win that distinction in society which they never could by their speech or presence.

This good incidental usually known by the name of

VOL. I.

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