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NOTES OF SERMONS.

I.

ON THE BEING AND NAME OF JEHOVAH.

Exod. iii. 14.-And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM. and he said, Thus shall ye say to the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.*

I. LET us consider the import of the name; the incommunicable

name.

II. The proof of his [God's] possessing the attributes included in it. III. The probable reasons of his choosing to represent himself under this character.

I. The import of the word JEHOVAH. It comes from a word which denotes to be, to exist; and the proper import of it appears to be permanent, unchanging existence. In the word JEHOVAH is included the affixes and terminations of the future and of the past; implying that he centres within himself all past, together with all future, exist

ence.

The name I AM in the LXX. is rendered & v.

In the first chapter of the Revelation of St. John, the Lord describes himself under the following character," Who is (5), and who was, and who is to come." It denotes eternal, original, unchanging be ing.

Solve the difficulty respecting this name not being known to Abraham, to Isaac, and Jacob. He never used that name himself, though Moses employs it in reciting the communications he made to the nation. II. We propose to demonstrate the existence of such a Being.

1. Something always must have existed, or nothing could have had an existence. To suppose the matter of this world, for example, to have arisen out of nothing, without any cause whatever, is evidently to suppose what is absurd and impossible.

2. Whatever exists of itself, and consequently from all eternity, can never cease to exist, and must be perfectly independent of every other being, with respect to existence, and the manner of its existence. Since it exists of itself, the cause and reason of its existence must, by the supposition, be in itself, not in another; it must have, so to speak, a perpetual spring of existence, independent of the operation or will

* Preached at Leicester, in October, 1814.

of all other beings. It exists by absolute necessity. It exists because it cannot be otherwise than it is; for whatever can be so is contingent, not necessary. Hence it is absolutely unchangeable: which is sufficient to prove that matter is not that eternal, self-existent Being; because matter is undergoing continual changes; and instead of being unalterable, is perfectly passive and indifferent to all changes whatever.

3. The Being who always existed, in and of himself, must be an intelligent Being, or a Being possessed of reason and understanding: for these exist; and since they could not arise out of nothing, they must have been produced by something or other. But they could not have been produced by what was unintelligent. Reason and understanding could no more have been caused by what had none, than matter could have arisen out of nothing. Take a lump of clay, or of any part of inanimate matter, and ask yourselves whether it is not in the highest degree absurd to suppose that the power of remembering, of reasoning, of judging, should arise from that as a cause. It is, plainly, just as possible that light should spring from darkness as a cause, as that which is incapable of thought should produce it. Whether the power of thinking may possibly be superadded to matter is not the question at present; admitting this were possible, it is plainly impossible that thought, or the power of thinking, should spring from inanimate matter as a cause. But as there are many beings possessed of reason and understanding, there must have been at least some one intelligent Being from eternity, or those thinking creatures could never have existed; since it is quite as impossible that thought and intelligence should arise out of unconscious matter, as that they should spring out of nothing.

As to the idea which some atheists have pleaded for, of an eternal succession of finite beings, such as we witness at present, without supposing any original, uncaused Being, it is evidently inconsistent with reason and with itself. For it affirms that to be true of the part, which it denies with respect to the whole: every particular being in the series, upon that supposition, depends upon a preceding one, yet the whole depends upon nothing; as if it were affirmed that there could be a chain infinitely long, each link of which was supported by the next, and so on, in each instance, and yet the whole absolutely depended upon nothing. The difficulty of supposing a being beginning to exist without a cause is not at all lessened by supposing an eternal succession of such beings; for unless there be some first Being on whom all the rest depend, it is evident the whole series hang upon nothing, which is altogether as impossible as that any one in particular should. Hence it is evident there must have always been one intelligent Being, whose existence is uncaused and absolutely eternal, unchangeable, and independent.

4. There is but one such Being. To affirm there is more than one, without reason, must, by the very terms, be unreasonable. But no shadow of reason can be assigned for believing in a plurality of such beings, because the supposition of one accounts for all that we see, as well, and even much better, than the supposition of more.

That there must be one underived, self-existent, eternal, and intelligent Cause must of necessity be allowed, in order to account for what we know to exist; but no reason can be assigned for supposing more. It is with the utmost propriety established as an axiom, that we ought in no case to assign more causes than will account for the effects.

The harmony and order of the universe, and the sameness and universality of the laws which pervade every part of it as far as our [knowledge*] extends, make it evident that it is the production of one eternal, intelligent Cause. Had it been the product of many, there would necessarily have been discrepancies, irregularities, and disorder in it, as the necessary effect of contrary plans and inclinations; at least, it would have formed different systems, bearing the indication of their being the product of distinct authors: as we see no two individuals, left entirely to themselves, can be found, who would build a house exactly upon the same plan, of the same size, and with the same ornaments. The most fundamental laws of the material world [not only] pervade this globe which we inhabit, but are found to extend to the remotest bounds of the universe, as far as they have fallen under our observation, either by the naked eye or by telescopes. The compound [substance] of light which illuminates our system is found to extend to the region of the fixed stars, immeasurably more distant from us than the sun. The law of gravitation pervades every particle of matter, at least within the solar system; and, there is every reason to believe, throughout the whole universe. Such simplicity and uniformity in the laws of nature evince that they are the product of one and the same Intelligence.

III. We propose to consider why he chose to reveal himself, especially under this character, rather than under some one expression of his moral perfections.

1. This is an attribute of God, to which the heathen deities did not aspire. It was fit to be the name of that Being who was, when worshipped, to be maintained in the midst of surrounding idols, of a character totally distinct.

None of them pretended to be the supreme God, the Origin, and Father of existence.

2. So abstract and elevated a conception of the Great Supreme was less likely than [any] other to be perverted into image-worship.

No ideas are so impossible to paint or represent, under sensible rms, as self-origination, immutability, eternal existence, &c. The import of Jehovah-not positive-but negative.

3. It exhibits that view of the Divine character which is most peculiar and appropriate to the Supreme Being, and from which his other perfections may most satisfactorily be inferred and deduced.

* Mr. Hall's handwriting is frequently so chaotic as to defy all interpretation; and words, and short portions of sentences, are sometimes omitted. In such cases, the sense is supplied conjecturally; and, that the author may not be blamed for any imperfections in style or phraseology, which may thus be occasioned, the words introduced by the editor are uniformly placed between brackets, as above.-ED.

No other being possesses any degree of them. And from these may be inferred his absolute, infinite perfection, rectitude, &c. &c. This is the great, glorious, and fearful name, "THE LORD OUR GOD."*

II.

THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE DIVINE NATURE.

Isaiah xxxi. 3.-The Egyptians are men, and not God; and their horses flesh, and not spirit.

I. THE spirituality of the Divine nature is intimately connected with the possession of almighty power. The vulgar notion which would restrict the exercise of power to what is corporeal, and deny it to that which is spiritual and immaterial, is a mere prejudice, founded on gross inattention or ignorance. It probably arises chiefly from the resistance which bodies are found to oppose to the effort to remove or displace them. But so remote is this from active power, that it is entirely the effect of the vis inertie, or the tendency of matter to continue in the [same] state, whether it be of rest or of motion. If we inquire after the original seat of power, we shall invariably find it in mind, not in body; in spirit, not in flesh.

The changes we are able to effect in the state of the objects around us are produced through the instrumentality of the body, which is always previously put in motion by the mind. Volition, which is a faculty, if you please, or state of the mind, moves the muscles and the limbs, and those the various portions of matter by which we are surrounded; so that, in every instance, it is the spirit or immaterial principle which originally acts, and produces all the subsequent changes. Take away the power of volition, which is a mental faculty, and our dominion over nature is at an end. Within a certain sphere, and to a certain extent, the will is absolute; and the moment we will a certain motion of the body, that motion takes place. Though we are far from supposing that the Deity is the soul of the world, as some have vainly asserted, the power which the mind exerts over certain motions of the body may furnish an apt illustration of the control which the Supreme Spirit possesses over the universe.

As we can move certain parts of our bodies at pleasure, and nothing intervenes between the volition and the corresponding movements, so the great original Spirit impresses on the machine of the universe what movements he pleases, and without the intervention of any other

* Deut. xxviii. 58.

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