NUMB. 81. TUESDAY, December 25, 1750.

Difcite Juftitiam moniti·

Hear, and be juft.

VIRG.

AMONG queftions which have been difcuffed,

without any approach to decifion, may be numbered the precedency or fuperior excellence of one virtue to another, which has long furnished a subject of dispute to men whose leisure fent them out into the intellectual world in search of employment, and who have, perhaps, been fometimes withheld from the practice of their favourite duty, by zeal for its advancement, and diligence in its celebration.

The intricacy of this dispute may be alleged as a proof of that tenderness for mankind which providence has, I think, univerfally displayed, by making attainments easy in proportion as they are neceffary. That all the duties of morality ought to be practised, is without difficulty difcoverable, because ignorance or uncertainty would immediately involve the world in confufion and diftrefs; but which duty ought to be most esteemed, we may continue to debate without inconvenience, fo all be diligently performed as there is opportunity or need for upon practice, not upon opinion, depends the happiness of mankind; and controverfies, merely fpeculative, are of fmall importance in themfelves, however they may have fometimes heated a difputant, or provoked a faction.

Of

Of the divine author of our religion it is impoffible to perufe the evangelical hiftories, without obferving how little he favoured the vanity of inquifi, tiveness; how much more rarely he condescended to fatisfy curiofity, than to relieve diftrefs; and how much he defired that his followers fhould rather excel in goodness than in knowledge. His precepts tend immediately to the rectification of the moral principles, and the direction of daily conduct, without oftentation, without art, at once irrefragable and plain, fuch as well-meaning fimplicity may readily conceive, and of which we cannot mistake the meaning, but when we are afraid to find it.

The measure of juftice prescribed to us, in our tranfactions with others, is remarkably clear and comprehenfive: Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even fo do unto them. A law by which every claim of right may be immediately adjusted as far as the private confcience requires to be informed; a law, of which every man may find the exposition in his own breaft, and which may always be ob served without any other qualifications than honesty of intention, and purity of will.

Over this law, indeed, fome fons of fophiftry have been fubtle enough to throw mifts, which have darkened their own eyes. To perplex this univerfal principle, they have enquired whether a man, confcious to himself of unreasonable wishes, be bound to gratify them in another. But surely there needed no long deliberation to conclude, that the defires, which are to be confidered by us as the meafure of right, must be fuch as we approve, and that we ought to pay no regard to thofe cx

pectations

pectations in others which we condemn in ourfelves, and which, however they may intrude upon our imagination, we know it our duty to refift and fupprefs.

One of the most celebrated cafes which have been produced as requiring fome skill in the direction of confcience to adapt them to this great rule, is that of a criminal asking mercy of his judge, who cannot but know, that if he was in the ftate of the fupplicant, he should defire that pardon which he now denies. The difficulty of this fophifm will vanish, if we remember that the parties are, in reality, on one fide the criminal, and on the other the community, of which the magiftrate is only the minifter, and by which he is intrufted with the publick fafety. The magistrate, therefore, in pardoning a man unworthy of pardon, betrays the truft with which he is invefted, gives away what is not his own, and, apparently, does to others what he would not that others fhould do to him. Even the community, whofe

right is still greater to arbitrary grants of mercy, is bound by thofe laws which regard the great repub lick of mankind, and cannot justify fuch forbearance as may promote wickednefs, and leffen the general confidence and fecurity in which all have an equal intereft, and which all are therefore bound to maintain. For this reason the ftate has not a right to erect a general fanctuary for fugitives, or give protection to fuch as have forfeited their lives by crimes against the laws of common morality equally acknowledged by all nations, becaufe no people can, without infraction of the univerfal league of focial

beings,

beings, incite, by profpects of impunity and safety, those practices in another dominion, which they would themselves punish in their own.

One occafion of uncertainty and hesitation, in those by whom this great rule has been commented and dilated, is the confufion of what the exacter cafuifts are careful to distinguish, debts of justice and debts of charity. The immediate and primary intention of this precept, is to establish a rule of justice, and I know not whether invention, or fophiftry, can start a single difficulty to retard its application, when it is thus expreffed and explained, let every man allow the claim of right in another, which he should think himself entitled to make in the like circumstances.

The discharge of the debts of charity, or duties which we owe to others, not merely as required by justice, but as dictated by benevolence, admits in its own nature greater complication of circumstances, and greater latitude of choice. Juftice is indifpenfably and univerfally neceffary, and what is neceffary must always be limited, uniform, and diftinct. But beneficence, though in general equally enjoined by our religion, and equally needful to the conciliation of the divine favour, is yet, for the most part, with regard to its fingle acts, elective and voluntary. We may certainly, without injury to our fellowbeings, allow in the diftribution of kindnefs fomething to our affections, and change the measure of our liberality, according to our opinions and profpects, our hopes and fears. This rule therefore is not equally determinate and abfolute, with refpect to offices of kindness, and acts of liberality, becaufe liberality

and

and kindness, abfolutely determined, would lofe their nature; for how could we be called tender, or charitable, for giving that which we are pofitively forbidden to withhold?

Yet, even in adjusting the extent of our beneficence, no other measure can be taken than this precept affords us, for we can only know what others fuffer for want, by confidering how we should be affected in the fame ftate; nor can we proportion our affiftance by any other rule than that of doing what we should then expect from others. It indeed generally happens that the giver and receiver differ in their opinions of generofity; the fame partiality to his own intereft inclines one to large expectations, and the other to fparing diftributions. Perhaps the infirmity of human nature will fcarcely fuffer a man groaning under the preffure of diftrefs, to judge rightly of the kindness of his friends, or think they have done enough till his deliverance is completed; not therefore what we might wish, but what we could demand from others, we are obliged to grant fince, though we can eafily know how much we might claim, it is impoffible to determine what we fhould hope.

But in all enquiries concerning the practice of voluntary and occafional virtues, it is fafeft for minds not oppreffed with fuperftitious fears to determine against their own inclinations, and fecure themfelves from deficiency, by doing more than they believe ftrictly neceffary. For of this every man may be certain, that, if he were to exchange conditions with his dependent, he fhould expect more than, with the utmost exertion of his ardour, he now will pre