never so completely unarmed, as we were when this civil war broke out. We were never before so shorn of national prestige as we are now through the operation of domestic faction; yet we have never before been so strongly armed as we are at this moment upon land and water. If we have ever been aggressive, it was the interest of slavery that made us belligerent abroad, as it was the same interest that has now afflicted ourselves with civil war. We can be only a peaceful nation if we are left to enjoy our independence in the way that our destiny leads us. We can only become a disturber of the world's peace by being called into the world to defend that independence.". Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, Nov. 30, 1863; MSS. Inst. Gr. Brit.; "Within the last three years it has seen an attempt at revolution in the ancient Kingdom of Poland, a successful revolution in what was New Granada, but now is Colombia, a war between France and Mexico, a civil war in Venezuela, a war between three allied Spanish-American Republics and Salvador, and a war between Colombia and Ecuador. It now sees a probability of a war between Denmark and Germany. In regard to such of these conflicts as have actually occurred, the United States have pursued the same policy, attended by the same measure of reserve, that they have thus far followed, in regard to the civil war in Santo Domingo. It is by this policy that the United States equally avoid throwing themselves across the way of human progress, or lending encouragement to factious revolutions. Pursuing this course, the United States leave to the government and people of every foreign state the exclusive settlement of their own affairs and the exclusive enjoyment of their own institutions. Whatever may be thought by other nations of this policy, it seems to the undersigned to be in strict conformity with those prudential principles of international law-that nations are equal in their independence and sovereignty, and that each individual state is bound to do unto all other states just what it reasonably expects those states to do unto itself." Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Tassara, Feb. 3, 1864; MSS. Notes Spain. As to keeping aloof from foreign interests, see 9 John Adams's Works, 108, 109, As to non-intervention generally see 3 John Adams's Works, 316; 7 id., 151; 8 id., As to non-intervention in South America, see supra, §§ 57 ff. authora "The President wishes in no manner to dictate or make any tive utterance to either Peru or Chili as to the merits of the controversy existing between those republics, as to what indemnity should be asked or given, as to a change of boundaries, or as to the personnel of the Government of Peru. The President recognizes Peru and Chili to be independent republics, to which he has no right or inclination to dictate. "Were the United States to assume an attitude of dictation towards the South American republics, even for the purpose of preventing war, the greatest of evils, or to preserve the autonomy of nations, it must be prepared by army and navy to enforce its mandate, and to this end tax our people for the exclusive benefit of foreign nations. "The President's policy with the South American republics and other foreign nations is that expressed in the immortal address of Washington, with which you are entirely familiar. What the President does seek to do, is to extend the kindly offices of the United States impartially to both Peru and Chili, whose hostile attitude to each other he seriously laments; and he considers himself fortunate in having one so competent as yourself to bring the powers of reason and persuasion to bear in seeking the termination of the unhappy controversy; and you will consider as revoked that portion of your original instruction which directs you on the contingency therein stated as follows: "You will say to the Chilian Government that the President considers such a proceeding as an intentional and unwarranted offense, and that you will communicate such an avowal to the Government of the United States with the assurance that it will be regarded by the Government as an act of such unfriendly import as to require the immediate suspension of all diplomatic intercourse. You will imform me immediately of the happening of such a contingency, and instructions will be sent you. "Believing that a prolific cause of contention between nations is an irritability which is too readily offended, the President prefers that he shall himself determine after report has been made to him whether there is or is not cause for offense. "It is also the President's wish that you do not visit (although indicated in your original instruction you should do so), as the envoy of this government, the Atlantic republics after leaving Chili. "The United States is at peace with all the nations of the earth, and the President wishes hereafter to determine whether it will conduce to that general peace, which he would cherish and promote, for this government to enter into negotiations and consultation for the promotion of peace with selected friendly nationalities without extending a like confidence to other peoples with whom the United States is on equally friendly terms. "If such partial confidence would create jealousy and ill-will, peace, the object sought by such consultation, would not be promoted." Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Trescot, Jan. 9, 1882; MSS. Inst., Mr. Senior, in an article in 77 Edinburgh Review, 334 (1843), distinguishes between intervention by one or more states for the purpose of maintaining the balance of power, and intervention to interfere with the political affairs of another country: "The first is the privilege of the weak against the strong; the second, that of the strong against the weak. The circumstances that give rise to the first are tolerably definite and must always be evident. Those which create the second are incapable of definition, and generally incapable of proof. If we examine the statements of evils suffered or apprehended from the domestic affairs of independent nations, on which the most remarkable modern interventions have been founded, we shall find them in general too vague to be susceptible of refutation or too frivolous to deserve it." In this article the general policy of intervention is discussed with much care. But the position that intervention to preserve the balance of power is proper is now generally abandoned by publicists. It is further stated by Mr. Senior (77 Edin. Rev., 358) that the British Government in refusing to accede to the declaration of the Holy Alliance in 1818," denied that any general right of interference against revolu tionary movements in independent states was sanctioned by the law of nations, or could be made prospectively the basis of an alliance. Admitting the right of a state to interfere where its own immediate security or essential interests were seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another state, they declared this right to be an exception to general principles of the greatest value; to be capable of arising only out of the circumstances of each special case; to be justified only by the strongest necessity, and to be limited and regulated thereby; and to be insusceptible of being so far reduced to rule as to be incorporated into the ordinary diplomacy of states, or into the institutes of the law of nations." See British Circular, Jan. 19, 1821; State Papers, 1820-21, p. 1160. "The main difficulty connected with intervention is the following: It may be admitted that there are possibilities of tyrannical usage, barbarous practices, or persistent and hopeless anarchy, out of which the friendly aid of a generous, impartial, and truly disinterested by-stander, may be the only way to a deliverance. But two cautions have to be observed: first, it has to be provided that the aid is accorded at a time and under circumstances which do not in any way prejudge the issue of a struggle yet undetermined, and which ought, in the interests of the state concerned, to be decided by the real and internal and not by the factitious and external elements of victory. The importance of this consideration was signally illustrated in the late insurrection of the Southern States of the American Union, and in the controversy that long hung round the questions whether England had chosen the proper moment for according to the Southern Confederacy the rights of a belligerent state, and what was the meaning of recognition for belligerent purposes." Amos, Remedies for War (N. Y., ed. 1880), 61. "A second caution in respect to intervention is that, admitting the propriety and duty of intervention in certain extreme crises, it is always open to a state, influential, designing, and unscrupulous, to foster in another state, subject to its moral control, the very condition of things which will, sooner or later, bring about a fit opportunity for its own overt interference. Whether Russia was guilty of this conduct in the case of the late Servian war and the Herzegovinian insurrection, is of less importance here than the fact that she was constantly reproached with it. It is a danger which is almost inherent in the doctrine of a right of intervention in certain emergencies." Ibid. 1. EXCEPTIONS. (1) RELIEF AND PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD. § 46. Illustrations of interventions of this class will be found in subsequent sections. (Infra §§ 189, 215.) This exception applies not merely to citizens of the United States, but to persons domiciled in the United States. The rule is that wherever a person of either of these classes claims when abroad the protection of the Department, or redress in case of injury, the Secretary, on affidavits showing the nature of the danger or wrong, will instruct the minister, in the country from which the danger or wrong proceeds, to ask explanation, and in case of the danger or wrong being proved, to insist on relief or redress. (See infra, §§ 189, 213.) (2) AGENCIES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION AS TO PENDING INSURREC TION. § 47. In 1816, when the acknowledgment of the independence of the South American colonies was under consideration, Mr. Monroe sent three commissioners, Cæsar A. Rodney, Theoderick Bland, and John Graham, in a ship-of-war, to visit the several colonies, inquire into the condition of things in respect to the probability of endurance of successful hostilities, and then report. These commissioners were not nominated to the Senate, though that body was in session when they sailed, but went exclusively on the President's nomination. Their expenses were not paid out of the contingent fund, but were met by a subsequent appropriation of $30,000 by Congress. See 3 Schouler's Hist. U. S., 28 ff; President Monroe's First Annual Message, 1817; Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hyde de Neuville, July 27, 1818; MSS. For. Leg. Notes. As to appointment and pay of such agents, see infra, § 78. "During the late conflict between Austria and Hungary, there seemed to be a prospect that the latter might become an independent nation. However faint that prospect at the time appeared, I thought it my duty, in accordance with the general sentiment of the American people, who deeply sympathized with the Magyar patriots, to stand prepared, upon the contingency of the establishment by her of a permanent government, to be the first to welcome independent Hungary into the family of nations. For this purpose, I invested an agent, then in Europe, with power to declare our willingness promptly to recognize her independ ence in the event of her ability to sustain it. The powerful intervention of Russia in the contest extinguished the hopes of the struggling Magyars. The United States did not, at any time, interfere in the contest; but the feelings of the nation were strongly enlisted in the cause, and by the sufferings of a brave people, who had made a gallant though unsuccessful effort to be free." President Taylor's First Annual Message, 1849. The instructions to Mr. Mann are given in part infra § 70. (See comments in 1 Lawrence Com. sur Droit Int., 201.) Mr. Abdy (Abdy's Kent, 1878, 92), after speaking with high approval of the conduct of the United States in delaying recognition of the independence of the South American states, and of Texas, until such independence was practically established, quotes the passage from President Taylor's first annual message above cited, and then proceeds to say: "Is it necessary to criticise a document in which two faults are at all events visible, the delegacy of sovereign powers to an agent, and its victory of sympathy and sentiment over reason and law. What would have been thought of an English minister who should have directed an agent in the Confederate States to declare the willingness of England promptly to recognize their independence, in the event of their ability to maintain it?" "The undersigned, Secretary of State of the United States, had the honor to receive some time ago the note of Mr. Hülsemanu, chargé d'affaires of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, of the 30th September. Causes not arising from any want of personal regard for Mr. Hülsemann or of proper respect for his Government have delayed an answer until the present moment. Having submitted Mr. Hülsemann's letter to the President, the undersigned is now directed by him to return the following reply: "The objects of Mr. Hülsemann's note are, first, to protest, by order of his Government, against the steps taken by the late President of the United States to ascertain the progress and probable result of the revolutionary movements in Hungary; and, secondly, to complain of some expressions in the instructions of the late Secretary of State to Mr. A. Dudley Mann, a confidential agent of the United States, as communicated by President Taylor to the Senate on the 28th of March last. "The principal ground of protest is founded on the idea or in the allegation that the Government of the United States, by the mission of Mr. Mann and his instructions, has interfered in the domestic affairs of Austria in a manner unjust or disrespectful toward that power. The President's message was a communication made by him to the Senate, transmitting a correspondence between the Executive Government and a confidential agent of its own. This would seem to be itself a domestic transaction-a mere instance of intercourse between the President and the Senate in the manner which is usual and indispensable in communications between the different branches of the Government. It was not addressed either to Austria or Hungary, nor was it any public mani |