regulated for her by Austria; and, therefore, I limit my aspirations for Hungary, for the present, to that single and simple point-Hungarian independence, Hungarian self-government, Hungarian control of Hungarian destinies."

Mr. Webster's Speech at Kossuth Banquet, Jan. 7, 1852; 2 Curtis's Life of Webster, p. 578.

"After the disastrous termination of the Hungarian campaign, 1849, Kossuth, with four thousand of his companions, Poles and Hungarians, fled from Hungary, and found safety at Choumla, in the dominions of the Sultan of Turkey. Others, who had taken refuge at Widdin, in Bulgaria, confiding in the amnesty offered them by the Austrian general sent there for that purpose, returned into Hungary only to meet with death in the most ignominious form.

"The exciting struggle between Hungary and Austria had been watched with close attention by the people of this country, and the Government had manifested its interest through the attempt on the part of the chargé d'affaires of the United States, at Vienna, in 1848, 'to open the door of reconciliation between the opposing parties,' which course received, as was stated by Mr. Buchanan, then Secretary of State, the entire approval of the President. Soon after, a special and confidential agent was authorized by President Taylor to obtain minute. and reliable information in regard to Hungary, and invested with full power to conclude and sign a treaty with her in the name of the United States.

"Public meetings were held to give expression to the general sympathy, and it was officially stated by this Department, that this Government, in the event of the recognition of her independence, would be most happy to enter into commercial as well as diplomatic relations with independent Hungary.

"And when the conflict was finally determined, the deepest interest was felt among the people of the United States in the fate of Kossuth and his compatriots who had sought an asylum within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. The diplomatic agent of the United States was instructed by Mr. Clayton, in January, 1850, to intercede with the Sultan in their behalf, and it was suggested that the President would be gratified if they could find a retreat under the American flag; and it was added that their safe conveyance to this country by any one of our national ships would be hailed with lively satisfaction by the American people. Various obstacles interposed to prevent the immediate fulfillment of this design. Finally, in February, 1851, Mr. Webster, by direction of the President, instructed Mr. Marsh to assure the Sultan that if Kossuth and his companions were allowed to depart from the dominions of His Imperial Majesty at the expiration of the year commencing in May, 1850, for which period he had promised the Austrian Government to detain them, that they would find conveyance to the United States in some of its national ships then in the Mediterranean Sea. In Sep

S. Mis. 162-VOL. I—14

209

tember of the same year, Kossuth, and so many of his companions as
could conveniently be received on board the United States steamship
Mississippi, embarked for the United States. The original number of
the refugees was much diminished during their stay in Turkey; a large
number escaped through the connivance of the Turkish authorities, and
made their way by means of passports or official certificates, given by
the United States agents, to different parts of Europe, and even to the
United States, some returned to Hungary, and many arrived in Con-
stantinople.
Their necessities compelled the legation and the
consulate of the United States-the latter then and for a considerable
period previously in charge of the memorialist-to contribute, as it is
alleged by both, to their relief to an extent which, as stated by Mr.
Marsh, was a serious embarrassment to him. He was aware that he
could not lawfully claim any allowance for this expenditure in his ac-
count with the contingent fund, but the action of the Government and
the expression of public sympathy in America had put him in a position
which absolutely compelled him to go much beyond his means in sup-
plying the wants of these suffering outcasts."

Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mason, Chairman of Committee on Foreign
Relations, U. S. Senate, July 25, 1854. MSS. Report Book.

As to intervention in Koezta's case, see infra § 198; Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 33d
Cong., 1st sess.; Senate Ex. Doc. No. 40, 53, id.

(5) MEDIATION.

§ 49.

President J. Q. Adams's message of May 21, 1828, giving correspondence in reference to mediation between Spain and the Spanish American colonies, is contained in House Doc. No. 497, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 6 Am. State Papers (For. Rel.), 1006.

In a report of Mr. Clay, Secretary of State, March 29, 1826, addressed to the President, and by him sent to Congress, it is stated that "the United States have contracted no engagement, nor made any pledge, to the Governments of Mexico and South America, or to either of them, that the United States would not permit the interference of any foreign powers with the independence or form of government of those nations; nor have any instructions been issued, authorizing any such engagement or pledge. It will be seen that the message of the late President of the United States of the 2d December, 1823, is adverted to in the extracts now furnished from the instructions to Mr. Poinsett, and that he is directed to impress its principles upon the Government of the united Mexican States.

"All apprehensions of the danger, to which Mr. Monroe alludes, of an interference by the allied powers of Europe, to introduce their political systems into this hemisphere, have ceased. If, indeed, an attempt by force had been made, by allied Europe, to subvert the liberties of the southern nations on this continent, and to erect, upon the ruins of their free institutions, monarchical systems, the people of the United States would have stood pledged, in the opinion of their Executive, not to any foreign state, but to themselves and to their posterity, by their dearest

interests and highest duties, to resist to the utmost such attempt; and it is to a pledge of that character that Mr. Poinsett alone refers."

See British and Foreign State Papers (1825-6), Vol. 13, p. 484.

"On the part of France the mediation (that of Great Britain in 1835, as to the non-performance of the French spoliation treaty) was publicly accepted before the offer of it could be received here. Whilst each of

the two Governments has thus discovered a just solicitude to resort to all honorable means of adjusting amicably the controversy between them, it is a matter of congratulation that the mediation has been rendered unnecessary. Under such circumstances the anticipation may be confidently indulged, that the disagreement between the United States and France will not have produced more than a temporary estrangement. Of the elevated and disinterested part the Government of Great Britain has acted, and was prepared to act, I have already had occasion to express my high sense."

President Jackson's Message of Feb. 23, 1836. See infra, § 318.

The papers relative to British mediation for the settlement of differences between France and the United States, respecting the convention of claims of 1831, will be found in the British and Foreign State Papers for 1835-6, Vol. 24, 1104, 1155, 1156. See also same work for 1833-4, Vol. 22, 595, 964. See further as to the controversy as to these claims between France and the United States, infra §§ 148, 228, 316, 318.

"It has never been the purpose of the Government of the United States to interpose, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of the states of Central America, with a view to settle the controversies between them by any influence whatsoever exercised by this Government, without their request or free consent. The mediation and friendly offices of this Government have been solicited, and this request has been complied with and nothing more. Not a step has been taken to coerce either of those Governments into any measure not satisfactory to itself. These Republics are small, and in a great degree powerless, but we respect the national character and independence of each. And although it is to be deeply regretted that, for national purposes, they are not united in some form of confederacy, yet, whilst things remain as they now are, we are to treat with each of them as a separate and independent state."

Mr. Webster, Sec. of State, to the President, Aug. 12, 1852. MSS. Report Book. "Our minister to China, in obedience to his instructions, has remained perfectly neutral in the war between Great Britain and France and the Chinese Empire, although in conjunction with the Russian minister, he was ever ready and willing, had the opportunity offered, to employ his good offices in restoring peace between the parties. It is but an act of simple justice, both to our present minister and his predecessor, to state that they have proved fully equal to the delicate, trying, and responsi ble positions in which they have on different occasions been placed."

President Buchanan's Fourth Annual Message, 1860.

"In 1853 this Government, together with those of Great Britain and France, through their diplomatic representatives, concluded important treaties of friendship, commerce, and free fluvial navigation with the de facto Government of the Argentine Confederation. Those treaties opened to all the riparian states the commercial opportunities and advantages which, hitherto, had been exclusively controlled and enjoyed by Buenos Ayres. Dissatisfied with a policy which removed the barriers she had set up to confine trade to her own capital, and blind to the fact that, seated as she was at the common door through which alike must pass the trade and travel to and from the regions of the Salado, the Paraguay, and the Uruguay, every vessel which sailed up and down those rivers would pour tribute into her lap, she formally protested against the execution of the treaties of commerce and free navigation, and withdrew from the sisterhood of which she was naturally and politically a member.

"Under these circumstances there was but one consistent course to be pursued by those Governments which had entered into treaty stipu lations with the confederation. That was to discountenance the selfish and illiberal policy of Buenos Ayres, and to bestow the moral weight and influence of diplomatic relations upon the Government which had been prompt to recognize the liberal commercial principles of the age."

Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Lamar, Oct. 23, 1857. MSS. Inst, Arg. Rep. "The United States stand as the great American power to which, as their natural ally and friend, they (the South America nations) will always be disposed first to look for mediation and assistance, in the event of any collision between them and any European nation. As such we may often kindly mediate in their behalf without entangling ourselves in foreign wars or unnecessary controversies. Whenever the faith of our treaties with any of them shall require our interference, we must necessarily interpose."

President Taylor's First Annual Message, 1849.

"The fact that the national attachment of this country to France is so pure and so elevated, constitutes just the reason why it could be more easily supplanted by national insult or injustice than our attachment to any other foreign state could be. It is a chivalrous sentiment, and it must be preserved by chivalrous conduct and bearing on both sides. I deduce from the two positions which I have presented a conclusion which has the most solemn interest for both parties, namely, that any attempt at dictation-much more any aggression committed by the Government of France against the United States-would more certainly and effectively rouse the American people to an attitude of determined resistance than a similar affront or injury committed by any other power. There is reason to believe that interested sympathizers with the insurrection in this country have reported to the French Government that it would find a party here disposed to accept its media

tion or intervention. I understand that they reckon upon a supposed sympathy between our democratic citizens and the French Government. It may as well be understood as soon as possible that we have no democrats who do not cherish the independence of our country as the first element of democratic faith, while, on the other hand, it is partiality for France that makes us willingly shut our eyes to the fact that that great nation is only advancing towards, instead of having reached, the democratic condition which attracts us in some other countries."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dayton, Dec. 29, 1862; MSS. Inst., France;
Dip. Corr., 1863.

On the subject of foreign mediation in the late civil war, see Senate Ex. Doc.
No. 38, 39th Cong., 3d Sess.; Brit. and For. State Papers for 1864-5, vol.
55; 3 Phill. Int. Law (3d ed.), 11.

In the wars between Spain and certain South American Republics in 1865–26, the United States "seeks the friendship of neither at the cost of unfairness or concealment in its communications to the other. We have tendered our good offices to each. They have not been accepted. We have concurred in a suggestion that the merits of these unhappy contests should be referred to the Emperor of Russia. We are quite willing to see Great Britain and France undertake the task of mediators. We will favor that or other mediations the parties may be inclined to adopt. We seek no acknowledgments or concessions from either party as an equivalent for impartiality and friendship."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hale, Oct. 27, 1866; MSS. Inst., Spain. See same to same, Dec. 20, 1866, inclosing mediating action of House of Representatives, and making specific proposals of mediation; and see also same to same, Feb. 25, 1867, Aug. 27, 1868.

Undue diplomatic pressure upon two South American belligerents to secure their acceptance of the good offices of the United States as a mediator is to be discountenanced.

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Asboth, Buenos Ayres, April 1, 1867; MSS.
Inst., Arg. Rep.

“We were asked by the new Government to use our good offices, jointly with those of European powers, in the interests of peace. Answer was made that the established policy and the true interests of the United States forbade them to interfere in European questions jointly with European powers. I ascertained, informally and unoffi cially, that the Government of North Germany was not then disposed to listen to such representations from any power, and though earnestly wishing to see the blessings of peace restored to the belligerents, with all of whom the United States are on terms of friendship, I declined, on the part of this Government, to take a step which could only result in injury to our true interests, without advancing the object for which our intervention was invoked. Should the time come when the action of the United States can hasten the return of peace, by a single hour, that