der circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should, therefore, have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom. "One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Brit ain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one or all on earth, and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her, then, we should most seduously cherish a cordial friendship, and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more side by side in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. "But the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system of keeping out of our land all foreign powers-of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it; and if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European powers and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion that it will prevent instead of provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not undertake such a war, for how would they propose to get at either enemy without superior fleets? Nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition offers of declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of another so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless Alliance calling itself Holy. "But we have first to ask ourselves a question. Do we wish to acquire to our own confederacy any one or more of the Spanish provinces ? I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States. The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well-being. Yet, as I am sensible that this can never be obtained, even with her own consent, but by war, and its independence, which is our second interest (and especially its independence of England), can be secured without it, I have no hesitation in abandoning my first wish to future chances, and accepting its independence, with peace and the friendship of England, rather than its association at the expense of war and her enmity. "I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions-that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and the mother country-but that we will oppose with all our means the forcible interposition of any other power as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and most especially their transfer to any power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way. I should think it, therefore, advisable that the Executive should encourage the British Government to a continuance in the dispositions expressed in these letters by an assurance of his concurrence with them as far as his authority goes, and that as it may lead to war, the declaration of which requires an act of Congress, the case shall be laid before them for consideration at their first meeting, and under the reasonable aspect in which it is seen by himself. "I have been so long weaned from political subjects, and have so long ceased to take any interest in them, that I am sensible I am not qualified to offer opinions on them worthy of any attention; but the question now proposed involves consequences so lasting, and effects so decisive of our future destinies, as to rekindle all the interest I have heretofore felt on such occasions, and to induce me to the hazard of opinions which will prove only my wish to contribute still my mite toward anything which may be useful to our country. And, praying you to accept it at only what it is worth, I add the assurance of my constant and affectionate friendship and respect." 7 Jeff. Works, 315. Mr. Madison, being consulted at the same time, through Mr. Jefferson, answered as follows: TO PRESIDENT MONROE. OCTOBER 30, 1823. "DEAR SIR: I have just received from Mr. Jefferson your letter to him, with the correspondence between Mr. Canning and Mr. Rush, sent for his and my perusal and our opinions on the subject of it. "From the disclosures of Mr. Canning, it appears, as was otherwise to be inferred, that the success of France against Spain would be followed by an attempt of the holy allies to reduce the revolutionized colonies of the latter to their former dependence. "The professions we have made to these neighbors, our sympathies with their liberties and independence, the deep interest we have in the most friendly relations with them, and the consequences threatened by a command of their resources by the great powers, confederated against the rights and reforms of which we have given so conspicuous and persuasive an example, all unite in calling for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade. It is particularly fortunate that the policy of Great Britain, though guided by calculations different from ours, has presented a co-operation for an object the same with ours. With that cooperation we have nothing to fear from the rest of Europe, and with it the best assurance of success to our laudable views. There ought not, therefore, to be any backwardness, I think, in meeting her in the way she has proposed, keeping in view, of course, the spirit and forms of the Constitution in every step taken in the road to war, which must be the last step if those short of war should be without avail. "It cannot be doubted that Mr. Canning's proposal, though made with the air of consultation, as well as concert, was founded on a predetermination to take the course marked out, whatever might be the reception given here to his invitation. But this consideration ought not to divert us from what is just and proper in itself. Our co-operation is due to ourselves and to the world, and while it must insure success in the event of an appeal to force, it doubles the chance of success without that appeal. It is not improbable that Great Britain would like best to have the merit of being the sole champion of her new friends, notwithstanding the greater difficulty to be encountered, but for the dilemma in which she would be placed. She must, in that case, either leave us, as neutrals, to extend our commerce and navigation at the expense of hers, or make us enemies by renewing her paper blockades and other arbitrary proceedings on the ocean. It may be hoped that such a dilemma will not be without a permanent tendency to check her proneness to unnecessary wars. "Why the British Cabinet should have scrupled to arrest the calamity it now apprehends by applying to the threats of France against Spain the small effort which it scruples not to employ in behalf of Spanish America, is best known to itself. It is difficult to find any other explanation than that interest in the one case has more weight in its casuistry than principle had in the other. "Will it not be honorable to our country, and possibly not altogether in vain, to invite the British Government to extend the 'avowed disapprobation' of the project against the Spanish colonies to the enter prise of France against Spain herself, and even to join in some declaratory act in behalf of the Greeks? On the supposition that no form could be given to the act clearing it of a pledge to follow it up by war, we ought to compare the good to be done with the little injury to be apprehended to the United States, shielded as their interests would be by the power and the fleets of Great Britain united with their own. These are questions, however, which may require more information than I possess, and more reflection than I can now give them. "What is the extent of Mr. Canning's disclaimer as to the 'remaining possessions of Spain in America. Does it exclude future views of acquiring Porto Rico, &c., as well as Cuba? It leaves Great Britain free, as I understand it, in relation to other quarters of the globe." TO MR. JEFFERSON. MONTPELIER, November 1, 1823. "DEAR SIR: I return the letter of the President. The correspondence from abroad has gone back to him, as you desired. I have expressed to him my concurrence in the policy of meeting the advances of the British Government, having an eye to the forms of our Constitution in every step in the road to war. With the British power and navy combined with our own, we have nothing to fear from the rest of the world, and in the great struggle of the epoch between liberty and despotism, we owe it to ourselves to sustain the former, in this hemisphere at least. I have even suggested an invitation to the British Government to join in applying the "small effort for so much good" to the French invasion of Spain, and to make Greece an object of some such favorable attention. Why Mr. Canning and his colleague did not sooner interpose against the calamity, which could not have escaped foresight, cannot be otherwise explained but by the different aspect of the question when it related to liberty in Spain, and to the extension of British commerce to her former colonies." 3 Madison's Writings, 339. ** ** The following is from a "private" letter from Mr.. Canning, on De cember 21, 1823, to Sir William à Court, British minister at Spain (Stapleton's Canning and his Times, 395): "Monarchy in Mexico and monarchy in Brazil would cure the evils of universal democracy and prevent the drawing of demarkation which I most dread-America vs. Europe. The United States, naturally enough, aim at this divis ion, and cherish the democracy which leads to it. But I do not much apprehend their influence, even if I believe (which I do not altogether) in all the reports of their activity in America. Mexico and they are too neighborly to be friends. In the meanwhile they have aided us materially. * While I was yet hesitating (in September) what shape to give to the declaration and protest which ultimately was conveyed in my conference with P. de Polignac, and while I was more doubtful as to the effect of that protest and declaration, I sounded Mr. Rush (the American minister here) as to his powers and disposition to join in any step which we might take to prevent a hostile enterprise on the part of the European powers against Spanish America. He had no powers; but he would have taken upon himself to join with us, if we would have begun by recognizing the Spanish-American States. This we could not do, and so we went on without. But I have no doubt that his report to his Government of this sounding, which he probably rep resented as an overture, had a great share in producing the explicit declaration of the President." As Mr. Stapleton remarks, Mr. Canning's position was simply that Great Britain would not permit other European powers to interfere on behalf of Spain in her contest with her American colonies. So far from assenting to the position that the "unoccupied parts of America are no longer open to colonization from Europe," he held that "the United States had no right to take umbrage at the establishment of new colonies from Europe on any such unoccupied parts of the American continent." The Holy Alliance, at the period when Mr. Canning's conference with Mr. Rush took place, acted vigorously. They united in sustaining the Bourbons in Naples, where they re-established the Bourbon dynasty on the basis of absolutism, against the faint protest of France and the sullen disapproval of England. Meeting again at Verona in 1822, they guaranteed the intervention of France in Spain, although the British ministry gave still more ominous signs of disapproval, which finally exhibited themselves in utterances of the British cabinet to the effect that they would not look with indifference at any intervention of the Alliance in the affairs of South America. It is by the possibility of the Alliance undertaking such intervention that the correspondence here given is to be explained. The Government of the United States was determined to resist such intervention, and in such resistance, if wisely conducted, it had every reason to expect the assistance of Great Brit ain. The terms, however, in which this position was expressed by Mr. Monroe differed only in form from those in which the relations of the United States to European Governments had been defined previously by Mr. Jefferson. Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Short, Nov. 24, 1791, 3 Jeff. Works, 302; to Mr. Paine, March 18, 1801-4, id., 370; to Mr. Short, Oct. 3, 1801-4, id., 413; see supra, § 45. The Emperor of Russia having suggested, early in 1820, that the United States should join the Holy Alliance, the following response was made: "The political system of the United States is essentially extra-European. To stand in firm and cautious independence of all entanglement in the European system, has been a cardinal point of their policy under every administration of their Government from the peace of 1783 to this day." For this, if for no other reasons, the request of Russia, that the United States should become a party to the Holy Alliance, should be declinéd. Mr J. Q. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Middleton, July 5, 1820; MSS. Inst., In Mr. Monroe's seventh annual message, delivered on December 2, 1823, the doctrine, afterwards called by his name, was thus expressed: "At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange, by amicable negotiation, the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal had been made by his Imperial Majesty'to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous, by this friendly proceeding, of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor, and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. "It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appears to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. "The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that S. Mis. 162—VOL, I-18 273 |