which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security. "The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on a principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal. concerus of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried on the same principle is a question to which all independent powers whose Governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the Government de facto as the legitimate Government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold , such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course." "I did not leave Mr. de Chateaubriand (French minister for foreign affairs) without adverting to the affairs of Spain. That our sympathies were entirely on her side, and that we considered the war made on her by France unjust, I did not pretend to conceal; but I added that the United States would undoubtedly preserve their neutrality, provided it was respected, and avoid every interference with the politics of Europe. * But I had reason to believe that, on the other hand, they would not suffer others to interfere against the emancipation of America." Mr. Gallatin, minister to France, to Mr. J. Q. Adams, Sec. of State, June 24, 1823; 2 Gallatin's Writings, 271. "At the office Baron Tuyl came. I told him specially that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new colonial estab. lishments." Mr. J. Q. Adams's Memoirs, July 17, 1823; 6 J. Q. Adams's Memoirs, 163. As to Mr. Adams's part in formulating the "Monroe doctrine," see 82 N. Am. Rev., 494; Tucker's Monroe Doct., 12-14, 21, 40, 111. "January 6. In a dispatch to the Secretary of State of this date, I mention Mr. Canning's desire that the negotiation at St. Petersburg, on the Russian ukase of September, 1821, respecting the Northwest coast, to which the United States and England had equally objected, should proceed separately, and not conjointly, by the three nations, as proposed by the United States, and my acquiescence in this course. It be ing a departure from the course my Government had contemplated, I give the following reasons for it: "1. That whatever force of argument I might be able to give to the principle of non-colonization as laid down in the President's message, which had arrived in England since my instructions for the negotiation, my opinion was that it would still remain a subject of contest between the United States and England; and that as, by all I could learn since the message arrived, Russia also dissented from the principle, a negotiation at St. Petersburg relative to the Northwest coast, to which the three nations were parties, might place Russia on the side of England and against the United States, this, I thought, had better be avoided. 2. That a preliminary and detached discussion of so great a principle, against which England protested in limine, brought on by me when her foreign secretary was content to waive the discussion at present and preferred doing so, might have an unpropitious influence on other parts of the negotiation of more immediate and practical interest. 3. That by abstaining from discussing it at present nothing was given up. The principle, as promulgated in the President's message, would remain undiminished as notice to other nations and a guide to me in the general negotiation with England when that came on." Rush, Residence at the Court of London; as quoted in 82 N. Am. Rev. (April, 1856), 508. "This message of President Monroe reached England while the correspondence between Mr. Canning and the Prince Polignac was in prog ress; and it was received not only with satisfaction but with enthusiasm. Mr. Brougham said: The question with regard to South America is now, I believe, disposed of, or nearly so; for an event has recently happened than which none has ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude over all the free men of Europe; that event, which is decisive on the subject, is the language held with respect to Spanish America in the message of the President of the United States.' Sir James Mackintosh said: This coincidence of the two great English commonwealths (for so I delight to call them; and I heartily pray that they may be forever united in the cause of justice and liberty) cannot be contemplated without the utmost pleasure by every enlightened citizen of the earth. This attitude of the American Government gave a decisive support to that of Great Britain, and effectually put an end to the designs of the absolutist powers of the continent to interfere with the affairs of Spanish America. Those dynasties had no disposition to hazard a war with such a power, moral and material, as Great Britain and the United States would have presented, when united, in the defense of independent constitutional governments. "It is to be borne in mind that the declarations known as the Monroe doctrine have never received the sanction of an act or resolution of Congress, nor have they any of that authority which European Governments attach to a royal ordinance. They are, in fact, only the declarations of an existing Administration of what its own policy would be, and what it thinks should ever be the policy of the country, on a subject of paramount and permanent interest. Thus, at the same session in which the message was delivered, Mr. Clay introduced the following resolution: That the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible interposition by the allied powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the continent of America which have proclaimed and established for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly recognized by the United States.' But this resolution was never brought up for action or discussion. It is seen, also, by the debates on the Panama mission and the Yucatan intervention, that Congress has never been willing to commit the nation to any compact or pledge on this subject, or to any specific declaration of purpose or methods, beyond the general language of the message. "In the debates on the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, in 1855-56, above referred to, all the speakers seemed to agree to this position of the subject. Mr. Clayton said: In reference to this particular territory, I would not hesitate at all, as one Senator, to assert the Monroe doctrine and maintain it by my vote; but I do not expect to be sustained in such a vote by both branches of Congress. Whenever the attempt has been made to assert the Monroe doctrine in either branch of Congress, it has failed. The present Democratic party came into power, after the debate on the Panama mission, on the utter abnegation of the whole doctrine, and stood upon Washington's doctrine of non-intervention. You cannot prevail on a majority, and I will venture to say that you cannot prevail on one-third of either house of Congress to sustain it.' Mr. Cass said: Whenever the Monroe doctrine has been urged, either one or the other house of Congress, or both houses, did not stand up to it.' Mr. Seward said: 'It is true that each house of Congress has declined to assert it; but the honorable Senators must do each house the justice to acknowledge that the reason why they did decline to assert the doctrine was, that it was proposed, as many members thought, as an ab straction, unnecessary, not called for at the time.' Mr. Mason spoke of it as having never been sanctioned or recognized by any constitutional authority.' Mr. Cass afterwards, in a very elaborate speech (of January 28, 1856), gave his views of the history and character of the doctrine. He placed it upon very high ground, as a declaration not only against European intervention or future colonization, but against the acquisition of dominion on the continent by European powers, by whatever mode or however derived; and seemed to consider it as a pledge to resist such a result by force, if necessary, in any part of the continent. He says: 'We ought years ago, by Congressional interposition, to have made this system of policy an American system, by a solemn declaration; and if we had done so, we should have spared ourselves much trouble and no little mortification.' Referring to Mr. Polk's message, in 1845, he said there was then an opportunity for Congress to adopt the doctrine, not as an abstraction, but on a practical point. We refused to say a word; and, I repeat, we refused then even to take the subject into consideration.' He denied the correctness of Mr. Calhoun's explanation (vide supra), and contended that the non-colonization clause was intended to be, and understood by England to be, a foreclosure of the whole continent against all future European dominion, however derived. It may well be said, however, and such seems now to be the prevalent opinion, that the complaints of Mr. Cass and others of his school, of the neglect and abandonment of the Monroe doctrine, apply rather to their construction of the doctrine than to the doctrine itself. "It has sometimes been assumed that the Monroe doctrine contained some declaration against any other than democratic-republican institutions on this continent, however arising or introduced. The message will be searched in vain for anything of the kind. We were the first to recognize the imperial authority of Dom Pedro, in Brazil, and of Iturbide in Mexico; and more than half the northern continent was under the scepters of Great Britain and Russia; and these dependencies would certainly be free to adopt what institutions they pleased, in case of successful rebellion, or of peaceful separation from their parent states. (See Mr. Seward's correspondence respecting Mexico, from 1862 to 1866, as illustrative of the position of the United States at the present time on this subject, given at length in note 41 to §76, infra.) "As a summary of this subject, it would seem that the following positions may be safely taken: "I. The declarations upon which Mr. Monroe consulted Mr. Jefferson and his Cabinet related to the interposition of European powers in the affairs of American States. "II. The kind of interposition declared against was that which may be made for the purpose of controlling their political affairs, or of extending to this hemisphere the system in operation upon the continent of Europe, by which the great powers exercise a control over the affairs of other European states. "III. The declarations do not intimate any course of conduct to be pursued in case of such interpositions, but merely say that they would be considered as dangerous to our peace and safety,' and as 'the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States,' which it would be impossible for us to behold with indifference;' thus leaving the nation to act at all times as its opinion of its policy or duty might require. "IV. The declarations are only the opinion of the administration of 1823, and have acquired no legal force or sanction. "V. The United States has never made any alliance with, or pledge to, any other American state on the subject covered by the declarations. "VI. The declaration respecting non-colonization was on a subject distinct from European intervention with American states, and related to the acquisition of sovereign title by any European power, by new and original occupation or colonization thereafter. Whatever were the political motives for resisting such colonization, the principle of public law upon which it was placed was, that the continent must be considered as already within the occupation and jurisdiction of independent civilized nations." Dana's Wheaton; § 67, note 36. The position that Mr. Monroe's declaration "was intended as a caveat to the designs of the allies, and as an earnest protest against the extension to this continent of 'the political system' on which they were based” is supported at length in 82 N. Am. Rev., 483 (April, 1856). See 103 id., 471, (Oct., 1866). The failure to obtain Congressional approval for Mr. Clay's resolution "that the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, forcible interposition by the allied powers of Europe, on behalf of Spain," in South America, is noticed and explained in 82 N. Am. Rev., 488 (April, 1856). "The other principle asserted in the message is that whilst we do not desire to interfere in Europe with the political system of the allied powers we should regard as dangerous to our peace and safety any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere. The political systems of the two continents are essentially different. Each has an exclusive right to judge for itself what is best suited to its own condition, and most likely to promote its happiness, but neither has a right to enforce upon the other the establishment of its peculiar system. This principle was declared in the face of the world, at a moment when there was reason to apprehend that the allied powers were entertaining designs inimical to the freedom, if not the independence, of the new governments. There is a ground for believing that the declaration of it had considerable effect in preventing the maturity, if not in producing the abandonment of all such designs. Both principles were laid down after much and anxious deliberation on the part of the late administration. The President, who then formed a part of it, continues entirely to coincide in both. And you will urge upon the Government of Mexico the utility and expediency of asserting the same principles on all proper occasions." Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Poinsett, Mar. 26, 1825; MSS. Inst. Ministers. "The late President of the United States, in his message to Congress of the 2d of December, 1823, while announcing the negotiation then pending with Russia, relating to the northwest coast of this continent, observes that the occasion of the discussions to which that incident had given rise, had been taken for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States were involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they had |