Commercial treaty with. President's message retransmitting the same, as amended by insertion of the word "steel" in item (35) 66 of the list appended to article 2. February 6, 1883. (S. Ex. Doc. 75, Forty-seventh Congress, second session.) Report recommending that it be carried into operation. With map. June 17, 1884. (H. Rep. 1848, Forty-eighth Congress, first session.) Amendment to pending treaty asked. Memorial of Trinidad and San José Silver Mining Company. January 16, 1883. (S. Mis. Doc. 23, Forty-seventh Congress, second session.) Trade between the United States and, and traffic over railroads connecting the two countries. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury. With map. February 8, 1884. (H. Ex. Doc. 86, Forty-eighth Congress, first session.) Boundary between Guatemala and. President's message, transmitting report of the Secretary of State. May 6, 1884. (H. Ex. Doc. 154, Forty-eighth Congress, first session.) Boundary line between the United States and. President's message, transmitting letter from the Secretary of State recommending an appropriation for relocating monuments marking. May 14, 1884. (H. Ex. Doc. 158, Forty-eighth Congress, first session.) Boundary line between the United States and. Report of Lieut. Thomas W. Symons concerning a preliminary reconnoissance of. May 26, 1884. (S. Latest law of, creating or modifying the Zona Libre. President's message trans- (2) PERU. § 59. "The deplorable condition of Peru, the disorganization of its Government, and the absence of precise and trustworthy information as to the state of affairs now existing in that unhappy country, render it impossible to give you instructions as full and definite as I would desire. "Judging from the most recent dispatches from our ministers, you will probably find on the part of the Chilian authorities in possession of Peru a willingness to facilitate the establishment of the provisional Government which has been attempted by Señor Calderon. If so, you will do all you properly can to encourage the Peruvians to accept any reasonable conditions and limitations with which this concession may be accompanied. It is vitally important to Peru that she be allowed to resume the functions of a native and orderly Government, both for the purposes of internal administration and the negotiation of peace. . To obtain this end it would be far better to accept conditions which may be hard and unwelcome than by demanding too much to force the continuance of the military control of Chili. It is hoped that you will be able, in your necessary association with the Chilian authorities, to impress upon them that the more liberal and considerate their policy, the surer it will be to obtain a lasting and satisfactory settlement. The Peruvians cannot but be aware of the sympathy and interest of the people and Government of the United States, and will, I feel confident, be prepared to give to your representations the consideration to which the friendly anxiety of this Government entitles them. "The United States cannot refuse to recognize the rights which the Chilian Government has acquired by the successes of the war, and it may be that a cession of territory will be the necessary price to be paid for peace. It would seem to be injudicious for Peru to declare that under no circumstances could the loss of territory. be accepted as the result of negotiation. The great objects of the provisional authorities of Peru would seem to be to secure the establishment of a constitutional Government, and next to succeed in the opening of negotiations for peace without the declaration of preliminary conditions as an ultimatum on either side. It will be difficult, perhaps, to obtain this from Chili; but as the Chilian Government has distinctly repudiated the idea that this was a war of conquest, the Government of Peru may fairly claim the opportunity to make propositions of indemnity and guarantee before submitting to a cession of territory. As far as the influence of the United States will go in Chili, it will be exerted to induce the Chilian Government to consent that the question of the cession of territory should be the subject of negotiation and not the condition precedent upon which alone negotiation shall commence. If you can aid the Government of Peru in securing such a result, you will have rendered the service which seems most pressing. Whether it is in the power of the Peruvian Government to make any arrangements at home or abroad, singly or with the assistance of friendly powers, which will furnish the necessary indemnity or supply the required guarantee, you will be better able to advise me after you have reached your post. "As you are aware, more than one proposition has been submitted to the consideration of this Government looking to a friendly intervention by which Peru might be enabled to meet the conditions which would probably be imposed. Circumstances do not seem at present opportune for such action; but if, upon full knowledge of the condition of Peru, you can inform this Government that Peru can devise and carry into practical effect a plan by which all the reasonable conditions of Chili can be met without sacrificing the integrity of Peruvian territory, the Government of the United States would be willing to offer its good of. fices toward the execution of such a project. "As a strictly confidential communication, I inclose you a copy of instructions sent this day to the United States minister at Santiago. You will thus be advised of the position which this Government assumes toward all the parties to this deplorable conflict. It is the desire of the United States to act in a spirit of the sincerest friendship to the three Republics, and to use its influence solely in the interest of an honorable and lasting peace." Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hurlbut, June 15, 1881; MSS. Inst., Peru; For. "Your dispatches to No. 23, inclusive, have been received, and I learn with regret that a construction has been put upon your language and conduct indicating a policy of active intervention on the part of this Government, beyond the scope of your instructions. As those instructions were clear and explicit, and as this Department is in the possession of no information which would seem to require the withdrawal of the confidence reposed in you, I must consider this interpretation of your words and acts as the result of some strange and perhaps prejudiced misconception. "My only material for forming an opinion consists of your memorandum to Admiral Lynch, your letter to Señor Garcia, the secretary of General Piérola, and the convention with President Calderon, ceding a naval station to the United States. I would have preferred that you should hold no communication with Admiral Lynch on questions of a diplomatic character. He was present. as a military commander of Chilian forces, and you were accredited to Peru. Nor do I conceive that Admiral Lynch, as the commander of the Chilian army of оссираtion, had any right to ask or receive any formal assurance from you as to the opinions of your Government. The United States was represented in Chili by a properly accredited minister, and from his own Government the admiral could and ought to have received any information which it was important for him to have. It was to be expected, and even desired, that frank and friendly relations should exist between you, but I cannot consider such confidential communication as justifying a formal appeal to your colleague in Chili, for the correction or criticism of your conduct. If there was anything in your proceedings in Peru to which the Government of Chili could properly take exception, a direct representation to this Government, through the Chilian minister here, was due, both to the Government and to yourself. "Having said this, I must add that the language of the memorandum was capable of not unnatural construction. While you said nothing that may not fairly be considered warranted by your instructions, you omitted to say with equal emphasis some things which your instructions supplied, and which would perhaps have relieved the sensitive apprehensions of the Chilian authorities. For, while the United States would unquestionably "regard with disfavor" the imperious annexation of Peruvian territory as the right of conquest, you were distinctly informed that this Government could not refuse to recognize that such annexation might become a necessary condition in a final treaty of peace. And the main purpose of your effort was expected to be, not so much a protest against any possible annexation, as an attempt by friendly but unofficial communications with the Chilian authorities (with whom you were daily associated), to induce them to support the policy of giving to Peru, without the imposition of harsh and absolute conditions precedent, the opportunity to show that the rights and in terests of Chili could be satisfied without such annexation. There is enough in your memorandum, if carefully considered, to indicate this purpose, and I only regret that you did not state it with a distinctness, and if necessary with a repetition, which would have made impossible anything but the most willful misconception. "As at present advised I must express disapproval of your letter to Señor Garcia, the secretary of General Piérola. I think that your proper course in reference to Garcia's communication would have been either entirely to ignore it as claiming an official character which you could not recognize, or, if you deemed that courtesy required a reply, to state that you were accredited to the Calderon government, and could, therefore, know no other, and that any communication which General Piérola thought it his duty or interest to make must be made directly to the Government at Washington. You had no responsibility in the matter, and it was injudicious to assume any. The recognition of the Calderon government had been duly considered and decided by your own Government, and you were neither instructed nor expected to furnish General Piérola or the Peruvian public with the reasons for that action. The following language in your letter to Señor Garcia might well be misunderstood: "Chili desires, and asks for Tarapacá, and will recognize the Govern ment which agrees to its cession. The Calderon government will not cede it. It remains to be seen whether that of Piérola will prove more pliable."" "It might easily be supposed, by an excited public opinion on either side, that such language was intended to imply that the Government of the United States had recognized the government of Calderon be cause of its resolution not to cede Peruvian territory. No such motive has ever been declared by this Government. The government of Cald eron was recognized because we believed it to the interest of both Chili and Peru that some respectable authority should be established which could restore internal order, and initiate responsible negotiations for peace. We desired that the Peruvian Government should have a fair opportunity to obtain the best terms it could, and hoped that it would be able to satisfy the just demands of Chili without the painful sacri fice of the national territory. But we did not make, and never intended to make, any special result of the peace negotiations the basis of our recognition of the Calderon government. What was best, and what was possible for Peru to do, we are anxious to the extent of our power to aid her in doing, by the use of whatever influence or consideration we enjoyed with Chili. Further than that, the Government of the United States, as yet, expressed neither opinion nor intention. "I must also express the dissatisfaction of the Department at your telegram to the minister of the United States near the Argentine Confederation, suggesting that a minister be sent by that Government to Peru. "This would have been clearly without the sphere of your proper official action at any time, but as there then existed a serious difference between Chili and the Argentine Confederation, you might naturally have anticipated that such a recommendation would be considered by Chili as an effort to effect a political combination against her. The United States was not in search of alliances to support a hostile demonstration against Chili, and such an anxiety might well be deemed inconsistent with the professions of an impartial mediation. "As to the convention with regard to a naval station in the bay of Chimbote, I am of the opinion that, although it is a desirable arrangement, the time is not opportune. I would be very unwilling to ask such a concession under circumstances which would almost seem to impose upon Peru the necessity of compliance with our request, and I have no doubt that whenever Peru is relieved from present embarrassments she would cheerfully grant any facilities which our naval or commercial interests might require. Nor in the present excited condition of public opinion in Chili would I be willing to afford to evil-disposed persons the opportunity to intimate that the United States contemplated the establishment of a naval rendezvous in the neighborhood of either Peru or Chili. The very natural and innocent convenience which we require might be misunderstood or misrepresented, and as our sole purpose is to be allowed, in a spirit of the most impartial friendship, to act as mediator between these two powers, I would prefer at present to ask no favors of the one and to excite no possible apprehension in the other. "Having thus stated with frankness the impression made upon the Department by such information as you have furnished it, it becomes my duty to add that this Government is unable to understand the abolition of the Calderon government and the arrest of President Calderon himself by the Chilian authorities, or I suppose I ought to say by the Chilian Government, as the secretary for foreign affairs of that Government has in a formal communication to Mr. Kilpatrick declared that the Calderon government "was at an end." As we recognized that government in supposed conformity with the wishes of Chili, and as no reason for its destruction has been given us, you will still consider yourself accredited to it, if any legitimate representative exists in the place of President Calderon. If none such exists, you will remain in Lima until you receive further instructions, confining your communications with the Chilian authorities to such limits as your personal convenience and the maintenance of the rights and privileges of your legation may require. "The complicated condition of affairs resulting from the action of the Chilian Government, the time required for communication between the |