"To the war as it commences she has declared her intention of remaining neutral; but the spirit of the British nation is so strongly and with so much unanimity pronounced against France, their interests are so deeply involved in the issue, their national resentments and jealousies will be so forcibly stimulated by the progress of the war, whatever it may be, that, unless the conflict should be as short and the issue as decisive as that of which Italy was recently the scene, it is scarcely possible that the neutrality of Great Britain should be long maintained. The prospect is that she will soon be engaged on the side of Spain; but, in making common cause with her, it is not to be supposed that she will yield her assistance upon principles altogether disinterested and gratuitous. As the price of her alliance, the two remaining islands of Spain in the West Indies present objects no longer of much possible value or benefit to Spain, but of such importance to Great Britain that it is impossible to suppose her indifferent to the acquisition of them. The motives of Great Britain for desiring the possession of Cuba are so obvious, especially since the independence of Mexico and the annexation of the Floridas to our Union; the internal condition of the island since the recent Spanish revolution, and the possibility of its continued dependence upon Spain, have been so precarious; the want of protection there, the power of affording it possessed by Great Britain, and the necessities of Spain, to secure, by some equivalent, the support of Great Britain for herself, have formed a remarkable concurrence of predispositions to the transfer of Cuba, and during the last two years rumors have been multiplied that it was already consummated. We have been confidently told, by indirect communication from the French Government, that more than two years since Great Britain was negotiating with Spain for the cession of Cuba, and so eager in the pursuit as to have offered Gibraltar, and more, for it in exchange. There is reason to believe that, in this respect, the French Government was misinformed; but neither is entire reliance to be placed on the declaration lately made by the present British secretary for foreign affairs to the French Government, and which, with precautions indicating distrust, has been also confidentially communicated to us, viz, that Great Britain would hold it disgraceful to avail herself of the distressed situation of Spain to obtain possession of any portion of her American colonies. "The object of this declaration, and of the communication of it here, undoubtedly was to induce the belief that Great Britain entertained no purpose of obtaining the possession of Cuba; but these assurances were given with reference to a state of peace then still existing, and which it was the intention and hope of Great Britain to preserve. The condition of all the parties to them has since changed, and however indisposed the British Government might be ungenerously to avail themselves of the distress of Spain to extort from her any remnant of her former possessions, they did not forbear to take advantage of it by order of reprisals given to two successive squadrons dispatched to the West Indies, and stationed in immediate proximity to the Island of Cuba. "By measures thus vigorous and peremptory, they obtained from Spain an immediate revocation of the blockade which her generals had proclaimed on the coast of Terra Firma, and pledges of reparation for all the captures of British vessels made under cover of that military fiction. They obtained also an acknowledgment of many long-standing claims of British subjects upon the Spanish Government, and promises of payment of them as a part of the national debt. The whole amount of them, however, as well as that of the reparation and indemnity promised for the capture of British property under the blockades of General Morales and by the Porto Rico privateers, yet exists in the form of claims; and the whole mass of them now is acknowledged claim, for the satisfaction of which pledges have been given to be redeemed hereafter; and for which the Island of Cuba may be the only indemnity in the power of Spain to grant, as it would undoubtedly be to Great Britain the most satisfactory indemnity which she could receive. "The war between France and Spain changes so totally the circumstances under which the declaration above mentioned of Mr. Canning was made, that it may, at its very outset, produce events under which the possession of Cuba may be obtained by Great Britain without even raising a reproach of intended deception against the British Government for making it. An alliance between Great Britain and Spain may be one of the first fruits of this war. A guarantee of the island to Spain may be among the stipulations of that alliance; and in the event either of a threatened attack upon the island by France, or of attempts on the part of the islanders to assume their independence, a resort to the temporary occupation of the Havana by British forces may be among the probable expedients through which it may be obtained, by concert between Great Britain and Spain herself. It is not necessary to point out the numerous contingencies by which the transition from a temporary and fiduciary occupation to a permanent and proprietary possession may be effected. "The transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the interests of this Union. The opinion is so generally enter; tained, that even the groundless rumors that it was about to be accomplished, which have spread abroad, and are still teeming, may be traced to the deep and almost universal feeling of aversion to it, and to the alarm which the mere probability of its occurrence has stimulated. The question both of our right and of our power to prevent it, if necessary by force, already obtrudes itself upon our councils, and the Administration is called upon, in the performance of its duties to the nation, at least, to use all the means within its competency to guard against and forefend it. It will be among the primary objects requiring your most earnest and unremitting attention to ascertain and report to us every movement of negotiation between Spain and Great Britain upon this subject. We cannot, indeed, prescribe any special instructions in relation to it. We scarcely know where you will find the Government of Spain upon your arrival in the country, nor can we foresee with certainty by whom it will be administered. Your credentials are addressed to Ferdinand, the King of Spain under the constitution. You may find him under the guardianship of the Cortes, under the custody of an army of faith, or under the protection of the invaders of his country. So long as the constitutional Government may continue to be administered in his name, your official intercourse will be with his ministers, and to them you will repeat what Mr. Forsyth has been instructed to say, that the wishes of your Government are that Cuba and Porto Rico may continue in connection with independent and constitutional Spain. "You will add that no countenance has been given by us to any projected plan of separation from Spain which may have been formed in the island. This assurance becomes proper, as by late dispatch received from Mr. Forsyth he intimates that the Spanish Government have been informed that a revolution in Cuba was secretly preparing, fomented by communications between a society of Freemasons there and another of the same fraternity in Philadelphia. Of this we have no other knowledge; and the societies of Freemasons in this country are so little in the practice of using agency of a political nature on any occasion, that we think it most probable the information of the Spanish Government in that respect is unfounded. It is true that the Freemasons at the Havana have taken part of late in the politics of Cuba, and, so far as it is known to us, it has been an earnest and active part in favor of the continuance of their connection with Spain. While disclaiming all disposition on our part either to obtain possession of Cuba or Porto Rico ourselves, you will declare that the American Government had no knowledge of the lawless expedition undertaken against the latter of those islands last summer." Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Nelson, Apr. 28, 1823; MSS. Inst. Ministers; published in Br. and For. St. Pap. (1853-4), vol. 44, p. 138. Portions of these instructions are in 5 Am. St. Pap. (For. Rel.), 408. "With Europe we have few occasions of collision, and these, with a little prudence and forbearance, may be generally accommodated. Of the brethren of our own hemisphere, none are yet, or for an age to come will be, in a shape, condition, or disposition to war against us. And the foothold which the nations of Europe had in either America is slipping from under them, so that we shall soon be rid of their neighborhood. Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its independence against all the world, except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own. But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to do so. While no duty, therefore, calls on us to take part in the present war of Europe, and a golden harvest offers itself in reward for doing nothing, peace and neutrality seem to be our duty and interest. We may gratify ourselves, indeed, with a neutrality as partial to Spain as would be justifiable without giving cause of war to her adversary. We might and ought to avail ourselves of the happy occasion of procuring and cementing a cordial reconciliation with her by giving assurance of every friendly office which neutrality admits, and especially against all apprehension of our intermeddling in the quarrel with her colonies. And I expect daily and confidently to hear of a spark kindled in France which will employ her at home and relieve Spain from all further apprehensions of danger." Mr. Jefferson to President Monroe, June 11, 1823; 7 Jeff. Works, 288. For another portion of this letter see supra, § 45; see also Mr. Jefferson to President Monroe, October 24, 1823, quoted supra, § 57. "I had supposed" (when writing a former letter) "an English interest there (in Cuba) quite as strong as that of the United States, and therefore that to avoid war and keep the island open to our own commerce, it would be best to join that power in mutually guaranteeing its independence. But if there is no danger of its falling into the possession of England, I must retract an opinion founded on an error of fact. We are surely under no obligation to give her gratis an interest which she has not; and the whole inhabitants being averse to her, and the climate mortal to strangers, its continued military occupation by her would be impracticable. It is better, then, to lie still, in readiness to receive that interesting incorporation when solicited by herself, for certainly her addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanted to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest." Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Monroe, President, June 23, 1823; Monroe Pap., Dep. of Instructions were sent, under direction of the President (Mr. J. Q. Adams), by Mr. Clay, when Secretary of State, to the ministers to the leading European Governments to announce "that the United States, for themselves, desired no change in the political condition of Cuba; that they were satisfied that it should remain, open as it now is, to their commerce, and that they could not with indifference see it passing from Spain to any (other) European power." Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. King, Oct. 17, 1825; MSS. Inst. Ministers. "You will now add that we could not consent to the occupation of those islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever." Mr. Clay to Mr. Brown, Oct. 25, 1825; MSS. Inst. Ministers. The following is from the diary of Lord Ellenborough, under date of February 8, 1830, Lord Ellenborough being at the time a cabinet minister in the Duke of Wellington's administration: "It appears, on looking over the papers of 1825 and 1826, that so far from our having prohibited Mexico and Colombia from making any attack upon Cuba, we uniformly abstained from doing anything of the kind. The Americans declared that they could not see with indifference any state other than Spain in possession of Cuba, and further, their disposition to interpose their power should war be conducted in Cuba in a devastating manner, and with a view to the excitement of a servile war." 2 Diary, &c., 188. In 1825 the British Government suggested to the Governments of France and of the United States a joint declaration by the three Governments (as an inducement to Spain to acknowledge South American independence), that they would not permit Cuba to be wrested from Spain. The Government of the United States held this under advisement, and on France declining, the proposal was dropped. Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. King, Oct. 25, 1825; MSS. Inst. Ministers. As to the attitude that would be assumed by the United States in case of the The note of Mr. A. H. Everett, minister to Spain, on Jan. 20, 1826, to the Span- "If the acquisition of Cuba were desirable to the United States, there is believed to be no reasonable prospect of effecting, at this conjuncture, that object. And if there were any, the frankness of their diplomacy, which has induced the President freely and fully to disclose our views both to Great Britain and France, forbids absolutely any movement whatever, at this time, with such a purpose. This con. dition of the great maritime powers (the United States, Great Britain, and France) is almost equivalent to an actual guarantee of the islands to Spain. But we can enter into no stipulations by treaty to guarantee them." Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. A. H. Everett, Apr. 13, 1826; MSS. Inst. Ministers. (See more fully Mr. Clay to Messrs. Anderson and Sergeant, May 8, 1826, ibid.) Mr. Gallatin, when minister at London, tried "to impress strongly on his (Mr. Canning's) mind that it was impossible that the United States could acquiesce in the conquest by, or transfer of, that island (Cuba) to any great maritime power." Mr. Gallatin to Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, Dec. 22, 1826; 2 Gallatin's Writings, 346. "The Government has always looked with the deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich productions, the ex |